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Executive Summary  
Scope of Application and Results of the MPM 2014 
Implementation. Risks to Media Pluralism in the Selected 
Countries 
 
In September 2013, the European Commission assigned to the Centre for Media Pluralism 
and Media Freedom at the European University Institute, the task of updating, simplifying and 
conducting a pilot-test implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) developed in 
2009 by a consortium led by the University of Leuven. The Centre, acting independently from 
the Commission and the Member States, after reducing the scope of application of the MPM 
to news and current affairs, fulfilled these tasks and pilot tested the Monitor in a sample of 
nine EU countries. This action was followed with the scope of enhancing the practical 
applicability of the MPM as a research instrument that would potentially be usable for future 
implementation, in a neutral and standard way, across all of the EU Member States, and to 
assess the risk to media pluralism in the selected countries. Based on scientific and neutral 
criteria, the CMPF has designed the MPM2014 by reducing the number of legal, economic and 
socio-political indicators that were included in the MPM2009, has set standard methodological 
strategies in order to improve the data collection’s feasibility across the EU Member States. 
The MPM2014 has been constructed as a streamlined version of the MPM2009, but with an 
effort to maintain its holistic character and to reflect the growing importance of the internet. 
The simplified MPM2014 has been focused on news and current affairs aspects of the media 
due to their key importance for the civic and political awareness of citizens and for the 
democratic processes.  
In order to pilot test the MPM tool, the CMPF selected a sample of 9 countries, where it was 
implemented. The list of the sampled countries includes: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the UK. Several criteria have been used to assure 
the highest degree of neutrality and representativeness of the sample, to allow for a consistent 
implementation in different contexts. In particular, the selected countries represent all of the 
broad geographical regions, including Western and Central-Eastern countries, Southern and 
Northern parts of the continent; founding and recently accessed Member States and also 
countries with different size and population, as well as different political and media systems. 
Based on the selected countries, the CMPF has identified and established a network of 
outstanding institutions and experts in the field of media pluralism, who are based in each of 
selected countries, with the scope of collaborating and supporting the CMPF’s work on the 
implementation of the MPM according to their expertise in the country. 
The analysis of the results from this test-implementation proved to be very useful in terms 
of testing the methodology, country media systems’ analysis, assessing media pluralism and 
media freedom, and in defining strategies for a further enhancement of the tool in terms of 
applicability, universality and comparability. 
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The aim of the MPM, as a measurement tool, is to assess the risks to media pluralism in the 
country monitored. The results of the pilot-test implementation therefore show a provisional 
assessment of the risk to media pluralism through different risk domains in the selected 
countries. The current scores however, are somewhat influenced by the not-fine-tuned design 
of the instrument and therefore, should be taken only as indicative ones. The examined risk 
domains are: Basic domain, Cultural pluralism in the media, Geographical pluralism in the 
media, Pluralism of media ownership and control, Political pluralism in the media and 
Pluralism of media types and genres.  
Within the Basic Domain, the Monitor tests the strength of the media’s legal framework in 
each country and measures whether there are risks for the protection of freedom of speech 
and related rights (including the rights of journalists) and risks for the independence of the 
governance bodies of the media system. Additional to that, when it comes to internet policies, 
the basic domain considers as relevant if a country is promoting measures for the impartial 
circulation of internet data. The basic domain measures also the risk of insufficient media 
literacy and the country’s policies to foster it. The selected countries show an overall 
compliance with basic and common legal standards on freedom of expression. Problems 
raised in those countries where defamation is a criminal offence, or where the implementation 
of the law is not consistent with the principle set in the law itself. Some concern is raised in 
some of the countries by the high score given by the assessment of the independence of the 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs). This domain scores low risk for Belgium, Denmark, 
France and the UK, and medium risk for Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary and Italy. 
The risk domain Cultural Pluralism in the Media is focused on the universality of the 
media’s accessibility and representation, especially in relation to minorities and special needs 
groups. It is one of the risk domains that have been most significantly transformed when 
compared with the MPM2009, due to the shifting focus towards news and current affairs. This 
risk domain struggles with the lack of a unified and politically accepted definition and 
approach to minorities across the EU - an issue that is to be tackled in the next application of 
the MPM. This issue creates a measurement problem, but it is also indicative of some policy 
deficiencies, which often go beyond the media policies. The major risks to media pluralism are 
here related to this, and to the consequent lack of sufficient provisions that guarantee media 
pluralism relating to minorities. This domain scores a low risk for Denmark and the UK; a 
medium risk for Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Hungary and Italy; and a high risk for 
Estonia. 
The risk domain Geographical Pluralism in the Media includes indicators concerning the 
level of representation of local and regional communities, defined on the basis of both the 
spatial and social dimensions, in the various media outlets. This risk domain has been 
examined in a limited pilot fashion by the MPM2014 as some indicators focused on measuring 
risks only on national level. High risk is assessed in Greece and Hungary; medium risk is 
assessed in 6 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, the UK), while France 
scores a low risk in relation to this domain. 
The domain Pluralism of Media Ownership and Control assesses the guarantees that media 
outlets are sufficiently owned by multiple independent actors, which fosters the likelihood to 
limit the level of control on such media, which facilitate pluralism in content production. By 
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monitoring the risks of high ownership concentration in the media, high concentration of 
cross-media ownership, and lack of transparency in ownership structures, indicators assess a 
medium to high-risk result in all of the 9 countries. It must be stressed, nonetheless, that the 
results must be interpreted in the light of the different sizes of the national markets. This result 
indicates a risk to media pluralism, but also it emphasises the necessity of careful application of 
coefficients reflecting the structural characteristics of media markets, especially their size and 
resourcefulness.  
The risk domain Political Pluralism in the Media focuses on the risks related to political 
pressure and interference in the content and functioning of the media outlets. This risk 
domain includes indicators measuring the legal safeguards as well as the socio-political context. 
The data demonstrates that in a number of countries there are many aspects that need 
thorough attention in order to achieve low risk in this domain. An important issue in this 
domain is the lack of data and transparency of ownership in some countries, which created 
methodological challenges to be addressed in the future application of the MPM, as well as 
demonstrated a risk to pluralism. This domain scores a low risk for Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, the UK; medium risk for Bulgaria, France, and a high risk for Greece, Hungary and 
Italy. 
The risk domain Pluralism of Media Types and Genres relates to measures that ensure that 
the markets effectively remain plural when it comes to the distribution of information of 
public interest, or the supply of public service media. This domain has been transformed and 
limited significantly due to the MPM2014 focus on news and current affairs. It scores high risk 
in Italy and Greece. 
The application of the MPM2014 demonstrates that there are various risks for media pluralism 
across the selected countries and every country has a specific weakness that creates high 
scores, meaning high risk. Due to the yet unfinished design of the MPM, in these cases a 
further investigation is needed to understand whether the high score means a clear and present 
danger for media pluralism, or whether it is a false positive. From a methodological point of 
view, the pilot test implementation of the MPM is highly successful. Based on this, the CMPF 
will further fine-tune the tool according to the outcomes of the test-implementation, to 
enhance the usability and the validity of the monitoring exercise and to limiting results that can 
be read as false positives. The pilot test implementation led to a number of conclusions 
regarding the future implementation of the MPM, including better definitions and thresholds 
for some indicators, instructions on how to evaluate lack of data, implementation of 
coefficients, extended collaboration with stakeholders and further simplification of the risk 
domains. This further enhanced and fine-tuned instrument will be applied in the 19 EU 
Member States that were not included in this first experimental implementation. 
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1. Monitoring Media Pluralism: State of Play 
 
1.1. EU Policy and the Political Debate Related to Media Pluralism and its 
Measurement  
 
Freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of information, access to 
information, and, of course, media pluralism: this is just a small list of the fundamental rights 
and principles, stemming from freedom of speech, that are basic features of contemporary 
democracies. Media pluralism, in particular, is the factor that enables democracy itself a 
pluralistic media offering that is the condition that allows citizens to participate and actively 
contribute to the public debate, to the political agenda and, in the end, to the political 
decision-making process. 
It is self-evident that this principle is at the core of the shared values of EU Member States 
and that is why it is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Moreover, when implementing its enlargement policy, the EU requires countries that are 
seeking its membership to respect media freedom and pluralism (Brogi, Dobreva, Parcu, 
2014). Indeed, the EU considers media freedom and media pluralism as prerequisites of EU 
membership and as values that must be safeguarded, monitored and assessed. The 
monitoring and assessment efforts of the accession procedures, however, are yet to be 
matched with media pluralism monitoring of the Member States.  
In 2007, the European Commission initiated the so-called “three step approach” to media 
pluralism, which was proposed by Commissioner Reding and Vice-President Wallström. 
As a first step, the European Commission published a Staff Working Document (SEC 
(2007) 32, 16 January) (EC Working Document, 2007) on “Media Pluralism in the Member 
States of the European Union”. The document provides an overview of the broad meaning 
of media pluralism and underlines how “the concept embraces a number of aspects, such as 
diversity of ownership, variety in the sources of information and in the range of contents 
available in the different Member States” (EC Working Document, 2007). There are 
different levels of commitment – from the EU and the Council of Europe - to its 
preservation and fostering. The Working Document does not endorse a European legislative 
initiative on pluralism, but proposes to adopt a new analytical framework made up of 
concrete indicators that are used to measure and assess the risks to media pluralism across 
Member States. 
Accordingly, DG INFSO (now DG CONNECT) launched the “second step” of this action, 
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namely, a study aiming to clarify and advance the debate on media pluralism. This study, 
carried out in 2009 by a consortium of the University of Leuven, the Central European 
University, Jönköping International Business School, Ernst & Young Consultancy, Belgium, 
defined a set of 166 indicators and guidance towards a monitoring tool to measure the 
threats to pluralism in the Member States (Valcke et Al., 2009). According to the EC 
Working Document, then, the third step should have been a Communication of the 
Commission presenting the outcome of the study and recommending its use by stakeholders 
(Commission Staff Working Document, 2007). In October 2011, EC Vice-President Kroes 
appointed a High Level Group (HLG) of experts on media pluralism and freedom with the 
mission of analysing and providing recommendations on the main issues on the topic. On 
the media industry side, in December 2011, she established the EU Media Futures Forum, 
chaired by Christian van Thillo, CEO of the De Persgroep, to reflect on the impact of the 
digital revolution on the European media industries and on ways in which the policy 
framework for the European media industries could be improved. In the meantime, she also 
initiated the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) at the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute of Florence, 
with the long-term mission of accompanying the process of European integration on media 
pluralism and freedom, and the short-term mission of developing a policy report on 
European Union competencies on media freedom and media pluralism (Brogi, Parcu, 2014). 
The report of the High Level Group, particularly in providing a list of policy 
recommendations to foster media freedom and pluralism, calls also for a monitoring system 
to support the EU in having updated data on the situation in regard to media pluralism 
across the Member States. 
More recently, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have shown a growing 
and specific interest in monitoring media pluralism policy strategy. This was firstly done 
through the Resolution of 21st May, 2013, on the EU Charter: on the standard settings for 
media freedom across the EU, where the European Parliament called for a regular 
monitoring activity on media freedom and pluralism in all of the Member States. Moreover, 
the European Parliament, stressing its engagement in safeguarding media pluralism, allocated 
funds for a pilot project on the implementation of the MPM2009 tool. In this framework, 
the EC allocated the funds of the Parliament’s Pilot Project to the CMPF, which conducted 
the pilot-test implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor, as described in this report. 
The EU Council also endorses the monitoring policy: The Council of the European Union 
and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting on 26th 
November, 2013, adopted the Conclusions on media freedom and pluralism in the digital 
environment, inviting the Commission to keep supporting the independent monitoring tools 
for assessing the risks to media pluralism in the EU. 
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1.2. The Media Pluralism Monitor 2009: Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Following the public discussions and concerns about media pluralism in Europe and the 
related political demand for further information, in 2009, the above mentioned consortium 
of predominantly academic organisations created The Independent Study on Indicators for 
Media Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach (MPM2009). The 
study resulted in the designing of a comprehensive inventory of indicators addressing 
different aspects and potential threats to media pluralism in a systematic and in-depth 
analytical way. Its holistic approach to the phenomenon of media pluralism guaranteed an 
adequate complexity and comprehensiveness in examining a rather complex phenomenon. 
However, the holistic approach also resulted in making it a rather large and hard to 
implement research instrument. The MPM2009 consists of 166 indicators, covering three 
areas of risk assessment (supply, distribution and use) in six main risk domains (basic 
domain, cultural pluralism, political pluralism, geographical pluralism, pluralism of ownership 
and control, diversity of media types [including PSM] and genres) and 43 specific risks, 
assessed through the application of three types of indicators: legal, economic and socio-
political-demographic ones. This structure meant that it became a very challenging 
instrument in terms of data collection, analysis and the elaboration of its results. The 
challenging perspective of the implementation of the MPM2009 created the necessity for a 
revision and a pilot test implementation of the instrument. It is precisely this revision and 
pilot testing that are the central aim of the study presented in this report. However, the 
MPM still preserves its holistic nature reflecting all major aspects of media pluralism risks, 
unlike most existing indices in this area.  
The core characteristic of the MPM2009 is its risk-based approach. The instrument is 
designed not so much to diagnose the media pluralism situation, but mostly to flag up 
certain issues in the legal, political and economic areas that carry the risk of jeopardising 
media pluralism. It indicates and measures the predispositions and conditions that constitute 
the risks to media pluralism in the respective country. From an academic point of view, this 
approach provides a deep analysis of the context in which media pluralism is settled. From a 
policy point of view, this approach provides constructive and helpful information, rather 
than simply outlining the problems; an early warning system, rather than discovering the 
deficiencies in media pluralism that are already there. Unlike other existing indices in the 
field of media freedom and pluralism, the MPM does not count or assess the already 
conducted violations of media freedom and pluralism, but seeks to establish the structural 
conditions creating risks and potential or existing problems. The risk-based approach is 
maintained as a core characteristic and principle of the MPM throughout this study, and the 
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revision of the indicators has better focused the study on registering the media pluralism 
risks.  
A major goal in revising and simplifying the MPM2009 has been to enhance its neutrality 
and applicability throughout the European Union, without favouritism for a particular media 
system or model. The instrument is envisaged as a tool that guarantees the comparability of 
the assessment outcomes, taking into account the variety of media systems and markets in 
Europe, including systems focused on internal and/or external pluralism. The opportunity to 
create a comparative tool also creates the challenge to build a set of indicators that are 
applicable and relevant to all of the countries. Although the team creating the MPM2009 had 
put considerable effort into building the instrument in line with this principle, only a pilot 
test implementation could verify and fine-tune the instrument’s parameters after the 
scrutinising of each indicator, its application, and of the instrument as a whole.  
An advantage of the MPM2009, as an instrument aiming at a high level of validity, is the fact 
that it uses both quantitative and qualitative measurements, following the character of the 
particular indicators that it measures. The combination of data collection methods, as well as 
the combination of several fields of expertise, creates a challenge in writing a rather detailed 
and thorough User Guide. This challenge has been faced and resolved during the pilot test 
implementation of the MPM, with the help of the initial outline that was provided by the 
MPM2009 itself.  
When created, the MPM2009 reflected the contemporary trends in academic and policy 
approaches to media pluralism. However, it was also designed as an evolving tool, “which 
has deliberately been developed to be sufficiently flexible so as to allow for regular updates 
and adjustments” (Valcke, 2009). Based on this, the study presented in this report is focused 
on testing a revised version of the MPM, as well as on updating it according to the currently 
relevant developments in media markets and media policies, including a strengthened focus 
on the internet and a focussed scope of application (news and current affairs).  
 
1.3. Comparing Media Pluralism in Europe and Other Measurements 
  
The main challenge of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2009 was the validity of its indicators 
across different national media systems. Although we are witnessing an increasing debate that 
is addressing a European dimension of the media landscape, national media platforms are still 
largely an expression of national socio-demographic, economic and political peculiarities. 
Given the fragmentation of its media landscape, a European media policy debate calls for 
monitoring strategies that are able to compare media pluralism across the variety of socio-
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demographic and political dimensions that characterise the EU Member States. To this scope, 
multiple parties are increasingly engaged in exploring media pluralism within countries and 
across national contexts. International organisations (Council of Europe 2008; UNESCO 
2007), media regulators (Ofcom 2012), and academic research (CMPF 2013; Gálik 2010; Irion 
& Ledger 2014; Craufurd Smith & Tambini 2012; Valcke et al. 2010) are enhancing discussion 
in the field in order to identify a common theoretical framework. This is a key priority in 
designing comparative approaches that are able to capture the multidimensional nature of 
media pluralism in Europe, and in providing neutral and comprehensive data. 
We are also witnessing an increasing availability of indices that aim to compare media 
freedoms across countries from multiple perspectives, including Freedom of the Press (by 
Freedom House), Press Freedom (by Reporters Sans Frontières), Freedom on the Net (by 
Freedom House), and UNESCO’s Media Development Indicators. The outcomes of these 
indices provide rankings that facilitate a comparison of unequal freedoms in media systems 
across countries, but they also often show inconsistencies amongst the final results. Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) stress that in order to identify a more efficient comparative research strategy, it 
is key to first identify the predefined theory, thus better framing the comparative study. 
According to this, the lack of a unique approach to media freedom and a common research 
strategy on ways to measure it across different socio-political contexts causes a variety of 
measurements and comparative strategies that provide different outcomes. 
Similarly to media freedom, media pluralism is also a multidimensional concept, which can be 
observed from several perspectives. The design of a comparative research strategy to assess 
and measure media pluralism across Europe goes hand in hand with the challenge of taking 
into consideration multiple predefined theories. In other words, media pluralism is determined, 
threatened or secured by multiple factors, and we can design many measurement and 
comparative strategies, and consider many perspectives Within this framework, the literature is 
rich in contributions that look at media pluralism according to media ownership 
concentrations, for instance, or at media market competition. Others look at the level of 
independence of the national regulatory bodies, or, finally, at press freedom, or the variety of 
content production (Valcke et al. 2010; Schulz et al. 2014). However, as a consequence of the 
lack of an overall approach to the measurement of media pluralism, the discussion about how 
to assess and compare media pluralism across different national media regulatory frameworks 
is still open. In particular, the comparison and assessment of media pluralism across the variety 
of national regulation, socio-political and economic contexts across Europe, is still a major 
challenge. 
This is, however certainly, not new to media studies, where a comparative research approach, 
regardless of the challenges involved, remains a key strategy in order to shed light on 
phenomena that otherwise risk remaining invisible (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995); or in verifying 
a theory under different conditions, and also to expand our knowledge about other national 
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contexts (Livingstone 2003). In this scope, and to explore media pluralism in relation to the 
variety of national peculiarities, both the relevant scholarly and policy research in the field call 
for more cross-national research and the identification of common comparative strategies that 
are able to explore media pluralism across socio-political frameworks. In Europe, a 
comparative approach and a monitoring strategy to assess media pluralism across the EU 
Member States is called for in order to expand our understanding of media pluralism in 
relation to national socio-political and economic frameworks, but also to obtain a comparable 
picture that allows us to identify the similarities and inequalities across European countries. 
Moreover, given that comparative research strategies also offer an opportunity to learn about 
policy making from multiple national experiences (Livingstone 2003), comparing media 
pluralism across EU national contexts should also facilitate the identification of successful 
policy initiatives that can be exported and implemented in other contexts. 
The MPM pursues this goal, and in what follows we address the challenges of its 
implementation, and the results achieved. 
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2 The MPM 2014 
 
2.1 The Simplification Strategy 
 
The Goals and Principles of the Simplification  
As is widely acknowledged, the MPM2009 is a comprehensive, and therefore very complex, 
inventory of risk indicators, which covers most of the potential threats to pluralism in an in-
depth analytical way. Inevitably, the very complexity of the inventory also turns it into an 
instrument that is rather difficult to implement. Based on scientific and neutral criteria, 
before launching its pilot test implementation, the original MPM was simplified in terms of 
the number of indicators, as well as in the very scope and definition of media pluralism that 
is used in the study (for detailed record of the simplification on the level of indicators see 
Appendix 4 of this report). It was also streamlined in terms of methodological and data 
collection procedures. This simplification enhances the practical applicability of the MPM 
research instrument, facilitating its foreseen future implementation in a neutral and standard 
way across all of the EU Member States. The simplification of MPM2009 is focused on the 
following major aspects:  
Relevance: the scope of the MPM2009 is considered to be too wide. A number of 
indicators address issues that may not be part of a truly operational definition of media 
pluralism. Other indicators tackle information that is only indirectly related to the goal of 
media freedom and pluralism to guarantee and facilitate the presence of well-informed 
citizens in relevant current and political affairs and public debates. 
Applicability: some indicators are particularly complex, consume both time and money, and 
therefore hardly fit within the tight timeframe and budgetary limitations of the MPM2014 
and future applications. 
Measurability of indicators: several MPM2009 indicators seem not to be fully convincing 
in their role as effective instruments for the evaluation of media pluralism; there are also 
indicators whose measurement could be considered overwhelmingly subjective.  
Cross-country validity: some indicators appear too idiosyncratic, i.e., they measure aspects 
of the functioning of a media system that are either not applicable to all Member States, or 
that have different meanings and impacts on the level of media pluralism, depending on the 
country context and the different political and social structures of those countries. 
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Simplification Steps 
Led by these principles, the simplification of the MPM2009 included the following steps: 
1) Narrowing the scope of application of the Monitor (Relevance): in line with recent 
policies in the area of media pluralism, as well as the current academic trends, the 
MPM2014 focuses only on the indicators that fall, or that can be strictly referred to, 
under the general definition of “news and current affairs”. As a result, any instrument 
of information or entertainment that does not fall into the "news and current affairs" 
category is now considered to be outside of the scope of the MPM tool. News and 
current affairs media platforms and programmes are the current focus of the 
monitoring, as one aspect of the standards of democratic functioning (Copenhagen 
political criteria of institutional guarantees for democracy, human rights and minority 
protection). However, all indicators that assess the general universality of media 
coverage and the outreach of the diffusion of information are included in the revised 
MPM. They are considered to be basic indicators that are relevant to the infrastructure 
and universality principles as a whole. In particular, indicators on pluralism vis à vis 
minority coverage, outreach to disabled people, and media literacy, are preserved as part 
of this holistic principle.  
2) Clustering the indicators according to more general principles (Applicability): 
due to the shared risk domain and the overall similarity of a number of indicators, they 
were clustered, where appropriate, in order to achieve a higher level of usability. Apart 
from streamlining the data collection, such clustering makes the results of the MPM 
much more readable, and clearer to the policy makers and the wider public; 
3) Simplifying the procedures for data collection (Applicability, Measurability of 
indicators): this principle is applied, especially in the cases of content analysis and 
panels of experts, in order to assure the applicability of the measurements within the 
time and budget constraints of this project, as well as to streamline the data collection 
and make it easier for further elaboration and scrutiny. 
4) Revision of the universality (Cross-country validity): this principle is applied on 
each indicator, in order to analyse the validity of each indicator in the respective 
countries as an actual measurement of pluralism risk. Additionally, it is applied on the 
Monitor as a whole, in order to assure the lack of bias in the measurement instrument 
as a whole, i.e. preference of a particular media system not based on the actual risk to 
pluralism 
 
Outcome of the Simplification  
 15 
According to the principles of, and the steps in, the simplification, the MPM2014 has been 
constructed as a rather streamlined version of the MPM2009, but still maintains its holistic 
character. It tackles all major elements included in the media pluralism definitions, namely 
diversity of media supply, the free public sphere, freedom and independence of media 
outlets, access and representation of all groups of people in the society (CMPF, 2013). The 
simplification has affected all risk domains, but to a different degree. The risk domains that 
are exposed to the most changes are the Cultural pluralism in the media (7 out of 10 risks 
have been excluded) and Pluralism of media types and genres (4 out of 6 risks have been 
excluded). The impact on these two risk domains is related mainly to the more focused 
approach of the MPM2014 onto news and current affairs. In some cases, certain indicators 
have been eliminated, even if their relevant risks are still present. Then the risk is measured 
on the basis of a shorter list of indicators that does not include those eliminated indicators. 
In other cases, indicators that closely measure related phenomena, or simply the same 
phenomenon, but refer to different media platforms, have been merged into one indicator. 
Whenever applicable, different types of media have been grouped according to the logic of 
media convergence.  
The data collection methods and the samples of the media examined have been reduced in 
many cases. The outcome of this simplification has impacted to the largest extent on the use 
of content analysis. It has been heavily reduced and implemented only experimentally in a 
format that is insufficient for a standardised use in the MPM. Therefore, the results of the 
content analysis, in particular indicator 29, should be considered as indicative, but not 
conclusive.  
The simplification of the indicators also has an obvious consequence in the need to revise 
the score grids. Scores have been adapted according to, and in parallel with, the 
simplification and/or merging operations. For example, indicator 4 Regulatory safeguards for the 
journalistic profession simplifies and includes in itself the three indicators in the Basic domain 
on the regulatory safeguards for the journalistic profession. Indeed, it covers the former 
three indicators on journalistic practice, the protection of sources, and access to events. With 
regard to the scoring, in order to be consistent with the merging, some former assessments 
have been cut, the remaining ones have been readapted, and the score has been assessed 
accordingly. 
As a whole, the outcome of the simplification is the reduction of the indicators from 166 
indicators in the MPM2009 to 34 indicators in the MPM2014. The risks that are no longer 
covered by the MPM are listed in the table below (Table 1): 
 
Risk 
domain 
N of 
risks 
Total 
Indicators 
Legal Econo
mic 
Socio-
political 
Risks that are not covered in MPM2014 
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Basic 
domain 
3 11 11 0 0 ————— 
Cultural 
Pluralism in 
the Media 
10 44 13 6 25 1 Insufficient media representation of European cultures 
2 Insufficient media representation of national culture 
3 Insufficient proportion of independent production 
4 Insufficient proportion of in-house production 
5 Insufficient representation of world cultures 
6 Insufficient representation of the various cultural and 
social groups in mainstream media content and services 
9 Insufficient representation of different cultural and 
social groups in HR in the media sector 
Geographic 
Pluralism in 
the Media 
6 25 7 6 12 4 Insufficient representation of regional and local 
communities in HR in the media sector, 
5 Dominance of a limited number of information 
sources for local issues 
Pluralism 
and Media 
Ownership 
Control 
10 28 13 15 0 5 High ownership concentration of magazines,  
7 High ownership concentration in book publishing, 
9 High vertical concentration 
Political 
Pluralism in 
the Media 
8 37 16 0 21 8 Insufficient citizen activity and political impact in 
online media 
Pluralism of 
Media 
Types and 
Genres 
6 21 7 12 2 2 Lack of/under-representation of/dominance of media 
genres, 
3 Lack of sufficient market resources to support range of 
media, 
5 Insufficient engagement of PSM in new media,  
6 Insufficient attention paid to public participation. 
Total 43 166 67 39 60   
Table 1: Table of risks not covered by the MPM2014  
 
2.2 Update: Digital Indicators 
  
The internet has been described as facilitating the circulation of traditional media in 
unprecedented ways. Due to their online presence, traditional media, e.g., newspapers, can 
now reach broader audiences at lower costs, beyond geographical, societal and cultural 
barriers. Moreover, the internet also facilitates new bottom-up forms of information 
processes. Through the internet, people not only access information but, as simple members 
of the public, they are in a position to report on facts and events and to contribute to the 
public debate, via blogs, social media, personal pages, or through many of the other available 
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digital platforms (so-called User Generated Content). Giving people the opportunity to create 
new independent channels of communication could be an opportunity for a dramatic impact 
on the hegemonic role that traditional media had so far as the only available source of 
information. For this reason, the internet is broadly seen as offering endless amounts of 
information coming from multiple sources, including from people of any gender, race and 
age, and going beyond any geographical barriers in the process of communication (Rheingold 
2000). 
As a result, in the context of pluralism, the internet is likely to expose audiences to multiple 
points of view on politics, and many other fields (Mossberger et al. 2008; Garrett et al. 2004)1. 
Where traditional media may have difficulties in being representative of the multiple political, 
societal and cultural dimensions of society, the internet - by facilitating bottom up forms of 
information production - allows people to contribute to debates and to circulate information 
representing their own opinions and perspectives on facts and events. 
In order to facilitate the circulation of information, the internet infrastructure should put 
people in a condition where they can actively produce and circulate information as freely and 
easily as possible. If the production of online content from the bottom up is not facilitated by 
internet services, however, the production of information may be inhibited, and the impact of 
the internet on pluralism may be limited. In this context, in addition to the small number of 
digital indicators that already existed in the MPM2009, the MPM2014 includes new indicators 
and variables through which to assess the pluralistic dimensions of the internet as a media 
platform in its own right, and not only as an extension of the traditional media. The new 
indicators and variables collect information on the ways in which the infrastructure of the 
internet and its national policy framework, favour pluralism in each country by also facilitating 
bottom up forms of content production. In sum, two new indicators have been created and 
three new variables have been included in order to back up the three different and already 
existing major indicators. At the same time, three indicators that existed in the MPM2009 
have now been turned into variables controlling three major indicators. Finally, in the MPM 
2014, the risks to pluralism in the digital environment are assessed as being the following: 
1) The following two new indicators are included in the MPM2014: 
- 20 Regulatory safeguards for the impartial transmission of information, without regard to content, 
destination or source, controlling the policy implementation and discussion that aims to 
safeguard the neutrality of the internet infrastructure. 
                                               
1 This possible influence of the internet is highly debatable as there is still insufficient research on the (long-term) 
effect of internet on the heterogeneity/homogeneity of the information audiences receive. For example, a notable 
theory, claiming that internet in fact leads to decreased pluralism of the perceived information, is the filter bubble 
theory of Eli Pariser. Both approaches and further empirical research of the issue will be considered in the MPM2015 
revision of the internet-related indicators.  
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- 24 Availability and quality of broadband, obtained by merging values about the following 4 
variables: 
- Both 24.1 Broadband subscribers and 24.2 Mobile Broadband subscribers: assess 
the actual access to broadband connectivity in each country. 
- 24.3 Broadband speed (for downloading): assesses the speed of download and 
therefore the quality of the internet infrastructure for accessing content and, in 
particular, multimedia content; 
- 24.4 Broadband speed (for uploading): assesses the speed of uploading content, 
which is indicative of how versatile the connectivity to produce content from the 
bottom up is. 
2) Furthermore, 3 new variables have been included and have been merged with indicators 
that were already included in the MPM2009. The list here includes: 
1.7i Regulatory safeguards for online content production, Variable included in indicator 1, 
assessing whether there is or is not evidence of any law/case law that unreasonably 
restricts freedom of expression on the internet (e.g., the filtering of information, the 
blocking of websites, control of social networks). 
21.4 Ownership concentration in Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Variable of indicator 21 
Ownership Media Concentration, substituting for indicator O6.1, Ownership concentration 
in internet content provision (horizontal) in the MPM2009. This indicator assesses the 
percentage of market shares of the TOP 4 ISPs within each country. 
22.4 Subscription concentration in internet services provision, variable of indicator 22 Audience and 
readership media concentration, substituting for indicator O6.2, Readership concentration in 
internet content provision in the MPM2009. This indicator assesses the percentage of 
subscribers to the TOP 4 internet service providers within each country. 
3) Finally, the following indicators have been turned into variables and have been merged 
with other indicators that already existed in MPM2009: 
11.4i (Formerly G6.4) – Policy measures to promote the roll out of, and access to, 
broadband networks in remote and/or rural areas. 
12.3 (Formerly O6.3) – Regulatory safeguards against a high concentration of ownership 
and/or control in ISP. 
28.4i (Formerly G6.3) – Availability of broadband networks in rural areas, controlling 
the possibly unequal availability of access to broadband in urban and rural areas. 
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2.3 List of Indicators 
 
Following the simplification and updating of the MPM tool, this is the list of the 34 
indicators (see also Appendix 5 for further details): 
 
 
 
Risk 
Code  
 
RISK NAME MPM2013/14 
Indicator 
ID  
KEY INDICATOR 
B
a
si
c
 R
is
k
 D
o
m
a
in
 
B1 
Freedom of speech and related rights and 
freedoms are insufficiently protected 1 
Regulatory safeguards for freedom of 
expression 
B1 Freedom of speech and related rights and 
freedoms are insufficiently protected 2 
Regulatory safeguards for right to 
information 
B1 
Freedom of speech and related rights and 
freedoms are insufficiently protected 3 
Recognition of media pluralism as an 
intrinsic part of media freedoms and/or as a 
policy objective of media legislation and/or 
regulation 
B1 Freedom of speech and related rights and 
freedoms are insufficiently protected 4 
Regulatory safeguards for the journalistic 
profession 
B2 
Insufficiently independent supervision in media 
sector 5 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence 
and the efficiency of the relevant national 
authorities 
B3 
Insufficient media (including digital) literacy 6 
Policies and support measures for media 
literacy (particularly digital literacy) among 
different groups of the population 
B4 
Barriers to the free flow of digital information  
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Policy measures for the impartial circulation 
of internet data, without regard to content, 
destination or source 
  
   
 
 
     
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 i
n
 
th
e
 M
e
d
ia
 
C1 
Insufficient representation of the various cultural 
and social groups in PSM 7 
Regulatory safeguards for access to airtime 
on PSM by the various cultural and social 
groups 
C2 Insufficient system of minority and community 
media 8 
Regulatory safeguards for minority and 
community media 
C2 Insufficient system of minority and community 
media 25 Minority and community media 
C3 
Limited accessibility by special needs people 27 
Guarantees for universal access to media 
regarding special needs groups  
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G
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
l 
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
M
e
d
ia
 
G1 
Insufficient system of regional and local media 9 
Regulatory safeguards and policies for 
regional and local media 
G2 
Insufficient representation of regional and local 
communities in news 10 
Regulatory safeguards for locally oriented 
and locally produced news delivered by 
PSM channels and services 
G3 Insufficient access to media and distribution 
systems due to geographical factors 11 
Regulatory safeguards for the universal 
coverage of the media 
G3 
Insufficient access to media and distribution 
systems due to geographical factors 28 
Guarantees for universal coverage of PSM 
and broadband networks in regard to 
geographical coverage 
G4 High centralisation of the national media system 26 Centralisation of the national media system 
G5 Insufficient quality of the digital infrastructure 24 Availability and quality of broadband 
  
   
     
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 a
n
d
 M
e
d
ia
 O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
O1 
High ownership concentration in media 12 
Regulatory safeguards against high 
concentration of ownership and/or control 
in media 
O1 High ownership concentration in media 21 Media ownership concentration 
O1 
High ownership concentration in media 22 
Media audience and readership 
concentration 
O2 
High concentration of cross-media ownership 13 
Regulatory safeguards against high degree 
of cross ownership between television and 
other media 
O2 
High concentration of cross-media ownership 23 
Number of sectors in which top 8 
firms/owners are active 
O3 
Lack of transparency in media ownership  14 
Regulatory safeguards for transparency of 
ownership and/or control 
  
  
     
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 i
n
 t
h
e
 M
e
d
ia
 
P1 
Political bias in the media 15 
Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and 
impartial political reporting in media  
P1 
Political bias in the media 29 
Representation of political views in the 
media 
P2 
Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control 16 
Regulatory safeguards against excessive 
ownership and/or control of mainstream 
media by politicians 
P2 Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control 30 
Political control over media and distribution 
networks ownership 
P2 Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control 31 
Political control over media funding by 
advertising 
P3 
Insufficient editorial independence 32 
Presence of professional associations 
providing advocacy for editorial 
independence and respect for professional 
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standards 
P4 
Insufficient independence of PSM 17 
Fair, objective and transparent appointment 
procedures for PSM professionals and 
management boards 
P4 
Insufficient independence of PSM 33 
Level of independence of PSM considering 
the mechanisms of its financing 
P5 
Insufficient pluralism of news agencies 34 
Independence and ownership of news 
agencies 
 
   
     
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 o
f 
M
ed
ia
 
T
y
p
e
s 
a
n
d
 G
en
re
s 
T1 
Lack of/under-representation of/dominance of 
media types 18 
Regulatory safeguards for the distribution of 
public interest channels on cable, DSL 
and/or satellite platforms 
 
T2 
Lack of sufficient resources to support public 
service media 19 
Regulatory safeguards for the objective and 
independent allocation of adequate, 
consistent and sufficient financial resources 
to PSM 
  
  
   
 
 
Table 2: Table of risk domains and indicators included in MPM2014 2 
 
 
 
  
                                               
2 Legal indicators are seen in red, economic in blue and social-political in green.  
 22 
3. The MPM 2014 Test-Implementation 
 
3.1. The Goal of the Pilot Test Implementation 
 
The overall goal of this research project is to create the conditions for an implementation of 
the MPM in all EU Member States. In order to fulfil this goal, the pilot test implementation 
aims at the following particular goals: (1) re-designing the MPM in order to improve its 
applicability, (2) updating the internet related indicators, (3) creating a full methodological 
operationalisation, standardisation and guidance on the application of each MPM indicator, 
(4) testing and enhancing the applicability and validity of the overall revised instrument.  
The inventory of risks to media pluralism, listed in the MPM2009, attempted to construct 
the Monitor as a comprehensive tool in terms of the variety of media pluralism risks that 
could occur in different media systems. The first goal of the pilot test implementation is to 
keep the general comprehensiveness in terms of risks, yet to focus the instrument in order to 
create a more applicable and manageable, simplified version of the Monitor (the 
simplification of the Monitor is discussed in detail in section 2). In particular, the pilot test 
implementation aims to narrow the focus of the MPM to news and current affairs.  
The second goal is the updating of the MPM, in particular to the technological and societal 
evolution related to the area of the internet. Although the internet had, of course, already 
been included in the MPM2009, recent developments in social media and in portable and 
mobile devices require a more in-depth analysis of the impact of these technologies and the 
penetration of the internet on media pluralism.  
The third goal of the pilot test implementation is the creation and testing of a detailed 
measurement guide, i.e., a full methodological operationalisation, standardisation and 
guidance on the application of each MPM indicator. The MPM2009 had indicated some 
guidance on the necessary measurements. However, the development of a full and detailed 
guide to the research and data collection procedures is crucial in order to guarantee the 
reliable application of the instrument across all countries. It also guarantees the outcome of 
the collection of comparable indicator scores, which can be substantiated with relevant data.  
The fourth goal of the pilot test implementation is to test the feasibility of the MPM’s 
application. Testing the instrument on a sample of nine very diverse EU countries (see 
section 3.2. for details of the sample) provides data that moves a step closer to full 
guarantees for the applicability of the indicators right across the Union. The pilot test 
implementation helps to discover potential problems in the practical application of the 
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indicators, which can be caused by the differences amongst the media systems in Europe. 
The pilot testing also allows a fine-tuning of the instrument that can potentially prepare it for 
permanent application across the European Union.  
 
3.2. Country Selection: Criteria and Selection  
 
The pilot testing of an instrument, especially one as complex as the MPM, requires a 
manageably small sample in order to pay sufficient attention to the implementation of the 
complexities. However, it also requires a sufficiently broad sample to verify the applicability 
of the instrument in a wide variety of settings. Following these two necessities, the CMPF 
decided to select 9 countries in which it would implement the MPM2014.  
The selection itself is based on providing the widest possible variety of cases, according to 
the following criteria: media market size (including the population of the country/number of 
inhabitants and the economic conditions/GDP per capita), geopolitical path or typology of 
media and political systems and geographical criteria, existing political assessments of the 
level of media freedom and pluralism.  
These criteria are selected as structural and political conditions, which determine or 
characterise the functioning of the media markets. The use of a combination of these criteria 
therefore guarantees the highest degree of neutrality and representativeness of the sample to 
allow for a consistent implementation in different contexts and for a verification of its 
applicability as a comparative tool.  
In particular, the selected countries represent all of the broad geographic regions, including 
Western, Southern, Northern and Central-Eastern countries, which come from different 
political background and traditions. The sample includes founding and recently accessed 
Member States. A particular interest in this study is the fact that these countries have 
traditions of different media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, and their subsequent work). 
An additional criterion for ensuring representativeness was the attention paid to problems 
with media freedom and pluralism in the recent past, which is reflected in different 
international studies, as well as in EP resolutions, hearings and reports. Finally, the sample of 
countries was selected by trying to represent both large and small markets, in terms of both 
their population and economic wealth. In the selection, we followed the thresholds indicated 
in the MPM2009 (20 million inhabitants and 23,500 EUR GDP per capita-PPP), but also 
ensured that somewhat more extreme cases are also present, e.g., Estonia as one of the 
smallest Member States, the UK and France as two of the biggest, Bulgaria as the Member 
State with the lowest GDP.  
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Detailed information of the country selection is represented in the table below (Table 3). 
The wide variety of Member States included in the sample will provide an adequate basis for 
ensuring the applicability of the MPM to all of the Member States in the future. The list of 
the countries sampled includes: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy and the UK.  
 
Table 3: Table of Member States to be included in MPM2014 (Data Autumn 2013) 
 
3.3. Local network: Selection and Description 
 
Based on the countries selected, the CMPF identified and established a network of 
outstanding institutions and experts in the field of media and media pluralism. The selection 
of institutions was aimed at independent and neutral institutions, which have established a 
reputation as such in their respective countries. The experts are also people with experience 
in conducting international and comparative research. Each of the countries selected for the 
pilot testing of the MPM2014 is represented by the country’s correspondent team, which 
participates in the study with the scope of collaborating with the CMPF in the 
implementation of the MPM2014 in their respective country. The network of local 
correspondents guarantees the appropriate implementation of the tool, the access to data 
locally, as well as a deeper understanding of the national media market. The list of selected 
institutions includes (in alphabetical order): 
Belgium: KU Louvain |Peggy Valcke 
Bulgaria: Media Democracy Foundation | Orlin Spassov 
Denmark: Roskilde University | Ida Willig 
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Estonia: Tartu University | Halliki Harro-Loit 
France: Science Po | Thierry Vedel 
Greece: Eliamep |Evangelia Psychogiopoulou 
Italy: Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) | Pier Luigi Parcu 
Hungary: Central European University |Kate Coyer/Amy Brouillette 
United Kingdom: Reuters Institute for the School of Journalism | Robert G. Picard 
Each team-leader worked with a team of other local correspondents in order to reflect the 
complex nature of the MPM, which demands expertise in the fields of media law, media 
economics, communications and political science. The actual structure and organisation of 
the local teams was determined by the national team-leaders in consultation with the CMPF 
team. The overall work of the local network was based on a synergy between local expertise 
and the guidance and double-checking of the CMPF team.  
 
3.4. Data Collection and Fieldwork 
 
The data collection and fieldwork are key to the methodology testing. The purpose of the 
data collection and fieldwork is to test the applicability of the indicators in general, as well as 
in different contexts, and to verify the estimations of the necessary resources that are 
involved in the MPM’s implementation. On a more operational level, it also aims to test and 
enhance the User Guide and the procedures of the MPM’s implementation. Following the 
outlined aims, the data collection included two tracks: (1) data about the media pluralism 
risks in the selected countries, and (2) information about the procedural details and 
challenges in applying the MPM.  
The direct data collection is administered by the local research teams under the instruction, 
supervision and quality control of the CMPF. There is an attempt to rely only on official 
data sources, and/or sources with a high level of reliability and trust. If such sources are not 
available, then the procedure requires verification of the data by other independent sources. 
However, an attempt is also made to use the same types of sources across all countries as 
much as possible, in order to keep the comparability between countries fully guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, the lack of data in some countries creates challenges to the application of 
certain indicators (see further details of this problem in section 5.1.). In all cases, the data 
sources that are used for the estimation and calculation of the variable values are thoroughly 
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documented by the local teams in order to be available for double-checking.  
The data collection is conducted following a detailed User Guide (see Appendix 2 for the 
full User Guide), which provides instructions on the data collection procedure and on the 
calculation and estimation of the operational scores of the risk indicators. The User Guide 
includes a short description of each indicator, the method of its measurement, the data 
sources, and a detailed score grid listing all of the variables included in the respective risk. It 
is inspired by the User Guide of the MPM2009, but it is further developed to provide clear 
and executable instructions (guarantees of comparability), separate variables for each 
measured item (operationalising what is measured), and additional definitions and thresholds 
(clarifying what is measured). The User Guide is also fully integrated into the data collection 
platform, thus enhancing its usability for everyone administering the MPM (see section 3.5).  
The User Guide applies a standardised and consistent scoring-grid structure throughout all 
of the indicators. Some variables are continuous, e.g., variables measuring the concentration 
of the market. In order to fit such variables to the scoring grid, border values or thresholds 
are determined and, according to them, the exact variable value falls into one of the three 
scores - low, medium or high risk. Other variables are categorical. In those cases, a 
description was provided to determine which case falls into which of the same three scoring 
categories. The third types of variables, which are present only with the legal indicators, 
determine the existence, or lack, of a particular legal framework. Such variables are also 
categorical variables, but their value scores fall into the categories “yes” (existent; related to 
low risk) or “no” (non-existent; related to high risk).  
A specific case of data collection is the application of a content analysis of media production. 
For the purposes of the pilot implementation, the content analysis was conducted over a 
rather small sample of two days’ news and current affair programming from two television 
stations in each country. The objective and reliable implementation of the method demands 
a significantly longer monitoring period and the inclusion of a significantly wider variety of 
media outlets and platforms. This was not possible due to budgetary limitations. Based on 
that, all scores of the indicator 29 Political bias in the media should be perceived as indicative 
and not conclusive. However, a small methodological testing of the MPM2014 was applied, 
in order to determine its potential for future MPM versions and applications. Television was 
chosen as being the most important media platform that is used by citizens to acquire 
information about news and current affairs (see data collected by the regular Eurobarometer, 
which consistently confirms the importance of television). Although there are age 
differences in the shares of people perceiving TV as their most important information 
source, for the time being, it maintains its position of a dominant media platform. The future 
application of the MPM beyond the pilot-testing format however, need to pay attention to 
media content of a variety of platforms and reflect their contemporary influence. Due to the 
high costs of such monitoring, secondary data analysis is likely to be applied in the future 
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applications of the MPM.  
The content analysis was conducted by the local teams, using special instructions and a 
codebook, prepared by the CMPF, in order to guarantee the reliability and comparability of 
the data collected (see Appendix 3 for further details on the content analysis application). 
This was the only case in which the local teams were asked to produce data, instead of 
merely collecting it from other sources and conducting an initial or secondary analysis. It 
demonstrated the importance and complexity of monitoring media content and outlined key 
aspects of data comparability that should be taken into consideration in the future.  
 
3.5 Setting-up of an Online Platform for Data Collection 
 
The creation of an online platform to collect data from the country teams is one of the 
practical key innovations of the tool developed within the pilot-test implementation, and this 
gives an added value to the feasibility and transparency of the project itself. The MPM2009 
projected results output, in fact, consisted of a Microsoft Office Excel document containing 
13 sheets, six of them to be used to enter the scores of each indicator, calculated according 
to the User Guide, six of them reporting the results of the specific risk domain. Another 
sheet contained the list of indicators and risks. 
The innovations to the platform developed by CMPF are several: firstly, the new tool allows 
an immediate scoring of the risks, as it links the final value of any given indicator to the 
formula for creating a joint score for the included variables, provided by the new User Guide 
to assess the value of the indicator itself. What had previously been achieved through two 
different and separated operations (scoring through the user guide and then filling the Excel 
file) is now possible using a single tool. In addition, this tool makes the transition between 
step one, data collection, and step two, scoring, an automatic operation.  
Secondly, the tool is online and this allows an on-going monitoring of a country’s 
implementation and the possibility to check and compare, in real time, the logic of the 
replies and the results, and the collection of feedback, as well as the scrutinising of the work 
of the country teams. The online platform, in fact, was structured in such a way that it 
allowed the local teams to comment and add information on the sources and assessment 
criteria used for the specific answers to the questions of the MPM’s User Guide. Indeed, one 
of the main criticisms of the MPM2009 was the lack of comparability between the different 
media systems and a lack of comparability in the data (see the debate at the CMPF 
Workshop “A definition of pluralism in the media sector. Comparing the results of the 
European projects with an interdisciplinary approach” 27-28 April 2012 
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http://cmpf.eui.eu/events/definition-of-pluralism.aspx). The possibility of supervision of 
the logic and quality standards of the replies and a permanent discussion and fine-tuning of 
the answers, in the light of constant comparison of the data for the same indicators, helped 
to produce more consistent evaluations and scores for same indicators across the different 
national MPM implementation exercises. 
Thirdly, the use of the online platform is a very important innovation of the MPM2014 as it 
provides a database, as the data collected through the platform can be processed also for 
different and diverse purposes other than the media pluralism assessment. 
Finally, the online platform allows better accountability, verification and transparency for the 
whole research process. It also creates a user-friendly archive of the research process and it 
can be addressed and scrutinised at any point. Considering the importance and sensitivity of 
the area researched, this characteristic of the platform is of utmost importance.  
It is also worth mentioning that, when inserting their answers on the online platform, the 
local correspondents were asked to provide a more practical evaluation of each single 
indicator. In particular, they had to give an evaluation that went from 1 (low) to 5 (high) in 
relation to: the specificity, the measurability, the possibility of accessing data in a reasonable 
way, general agreement on the results, and the timeframe. Very often, the local 
correspondents provided useful practical feedback on the indicators. As part of the next 
implementation of the MPM, the CMPF will analyse this feedback from local 
correspondents, use it for further fine-tuning of the MPM and implement a new version, 
based on the analysis of the application and the feedback from this MPM’s pilot-testing. 
The implementation of the MPM2014, in fact, highlighted in some few cases (see below 
section 5) that the formula that scores automatically the indicator may be considered too 
strict and lead to scores that are perceived as too penalizing.  
The online platform also contains an F.A.Q. section, as well as a list of common sources, 
instructions for the teams and a glossary. These sections allow for constant improvement of 
the support provided by the CMPF to the local teams and responds to any challenges they 
may face. It also allows for an exchange of good practice amongst the country teams 
themselves.  
 
3.6. Use of Panels of Experts and Discussions with Stakeholders 
 
The existence of media pluralism risks that cannot be clearly quantified demands the 
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introduction of qualitative measurement for such risks. In order to guarantee and verify the 
objective evaluation of such indicators, the MPM2014 introduces a special procedure that 
involves a panel of experts in the evaluation of these indicators. The following indicators of 
the MPM2014 are reviewed by the panel of experts: 30 Political control over media and 
distribution network ownership, 32 Presence of professional associations providing 
advocacy for editorial independence and respect of professional standards, 33 Level 
of independence of PSM, considering the mechanisms of its financing, and 34 
Independence and ownership of news agencies.  
Each country organises its separate panel of experts, following clearly defined criteria and 
the approval of the CMPF. The panel is composed of established national specialists with a 
substantial knowledge and experience in the media and communications fields, and with a 
good reputation in the professional community. In order to avoid the risks of leaning 
towards a particular stakeholder bias, the panel consists of media experts from various fields, 
namely:  
2 Academic/NGO researchers on social/political/cultural issues that are related to the 
media;  
1 Academic/NGO researcher in media law and/or economics; 
1 Representative of the media regulators; 
1 Representative of a journalistic organisation; 
1 Representative of a publishers' organisation; 
1 Representative of a broadcasters' organisation.  
The procedure for involving the panels of experts is as follows:  
(1) Following the CMPF’s instructions, the national correspondents select and engage the 
members of the panel of experts prior to the actual period of data collection. The same 
panel of experts is used for all of the indicators that are included in the verification 
procedure.  
(2) The country’s correspondent conducts the data collection and the scoring of the above-
mentioned indicators, as they do for any other MPM indicator.  
(3) Once the scoring has been fully conducted by the local correspondent, the scoring of the 
indicators and its explanation is sent to the panel of experts, requesting from them a 
verification (review) of the scoring, a confirmation of the accuracy of the evaluation.  
(4) The feedback from each member of the panel of experts (i.e., their agreement with the 
accuracy or their suggestions for changes in the scoring) need to be received in writing 
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and this is subsequently documented thoroughly and presented to the CMPF team. Any 
suggestions for changes in the scoring need to include an explanation and/or 
justification that are provided by the respective member of the panel of experts.  
(5) In the case of a disagreement on the indicator scoring between the country’s 
correspondents and the panel of experts, the CMPF examines the justifications for each 
scoring and takes the final decision on that scoring. If a suggestion from the panel of 
experts is rejected, this is also explained, justified and documented as part of the MPM’s 
data collection documentation.  
This procedure has been applied in all countries included in the pilot-testing of the MPM 
and a relation with the local stakeholders has been established. This research pattern has 
been perceived as a novelty in most countries, but has been welcome in principle. Moreover, 
there have been calls for its extension over more MPM indicators. In addition to the above-
described procedure, during the pilot test implementation of the MPM2014, the data 
collected was discussed with wider groups of national stakeholders in each of the countries 
included in the pilot stage, as well as with European level stakeholders meeting with the 
CMPF team. These discussions with the stakeholders have contributed to the better 
understanding of the challenges that the MPM’s application faces. They have also 
contributed to the generation of ideas for further fine-tuning of the instrument and for 
making it applicable in an easier and more reliable way.  
 
 
  
 31 
4. Results 
The analysis of the results from this test-implementation proved to be very useful in terms 
of methodological testing, comparison of countries’ media systems, assessment of media 
pluralism and media freedom risks, and the defining of strategies for a further enhancement 
of the tool in terms of universality and comparability. It has delivered rich data regarding the 
methodological task of testing the monitoring tool. However, the results related to the actual 
evaluation of the media pluralism risk in each country should be considered as indicative and 
not conclusive, based on the fact that the monitoring tool itself needs fine-tuning of the 
indicator measurements.  
Throughout this report the scoring and the graphical representation of the MPM indicators 
is conducted according to the following numerical scale: 1 - low risk, 2 - medium risk and 3 - 
high risk.  
 
4.1 Analysis of the Basic Risk Domain 
The Basic domain is fundamental to the evaluation of the risks to media pluralism: The 
indicators measuring the risk deal with the essential nature of media freedom, the basic 
conditions for the existence of free speech and of an enabling environment for freedom of 
expression. The basic domain is, then, the gauging of the risk to democratic debate in a 
given country. 
The indicators of the basic risk domain that are considered in the MPM2014 version are very 
similar to those that were considered in the MPM2009: They are all legal indicators and they 
cover the regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the 
regulatory safeguards for journalists, the level of independence of the NRAs in the media 
sector, and media literacy. They represent the regulatory backbone of the media sector in 
every contemporary democracy and they cover four different risks: The risk that freedom of 
speech and related rights and freedoms are insufficiently protected (B1), the risk that there is 
insufficient independent supervision in the media sector (B2), the risk of insufficient media 
literacy (B3). A new risk and a new indicator were introduced: the risk of barriers to the free 
flow of digital information (B4) this is evaluated through the indicator on regulatory 
safeguards for the impartial transmission of information on the internet, without regard to 
content, destination or source. 
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Figure 1 Basic domain scores per country 
 
The evaluation of the first risk is made through four indicators that received quite good 
scores across the nine countries of the test implementation. The first indicator is on 
regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression (1): Of the nine countries, three 
scored medium risk (Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary), while the others scored a low risk. 
Most of the countries in the test group benefit from a long regulatory tradition on media 
freedom. Some problems are raised where, notwithstanding the existence of a regulatory 
safeguard, continuous regulatory interventions as modifications of the constitution itself; or 
the introduction of ancillary laws (see the country report on Hungary) can hamper the 
existence of an established right and probably affect the rules of democracy itself; or where 
the implementation of the limits to freedom of expression is too broad; or when other 
restrictions upon freedom of expression (privacy rules, national security rules) are not clear 
and are narrowly defined in law, and are justifiable as being necessary in a democratic society 
(in accordance with Art. 10 ECHR).  
Indicator 2 on regulatory safeguards for the right to information aims to address the 
existence of the right to access information that is held by public administrations. This 
indicator is very broad and it should probably be rephrased in a way that is more focused on 
the existence of a freedom of expression act (FOIA) and its effective implementation. Six 
countries show low risk, while three others show a medium risk (Bulgaria, Hungary, 
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Italy). 
Media pluralism is the specific subject of indicator 3 that deals with the recognition of 
media pluralism as being an intrinsic part of media freedoms and/or as the policy 
objective of media legislation and/or regulation. This indicator is a self-evident starting 
point for any analysis of media pluralism in a given country. According to the scores, four 
countries have a low risk, four a medium risk, and one a high risk. It must be noted, 
then, that the high score is for Estonia, as it belongs to the group of countries in which there 
are few laws that specifically regulate the media field (see Estonia country report). The lack 
of regulation and of policies on media pluralism does not mean a clear and present danger in 
this case, but it does highlight a regulatory void that may potentially create problems and the 
need for a second step in analysis. 
Indicator 4 is on the regulatory safeguards for the journalistic profession. This indicator 
merges and simplifies the three indicators in the Basic domain on the regulatory safeguards 
for the journalistic profession provided in MPM2009. Indeed, it covers the former three 
indicators on journalistic practice, the protection of sources and access to events. According 
to the scores, two countries show low risk, five medium, and two high (Estonia and 
Greece). 
The other risk, of insufficient independent supervision in the media sector (B2), is covered 
through the indicator 5 on the regulatory safeguards for the independence and 
efficiency of the relevant national authorities. This indicator takes into consideration the 
three authorities that are relevant to the media market. It merges the MPM2009 three 
indicators in the basic domain on the regulatory safeguards for the independence and 
efficiency of the media/competition/telecommunications authorities. It is a given, as is 
logically granted, that these authorities exist. Indeed, besides the media authority, any 
organisation that has competence in media policy in a given country must also be taken into 
account. The scoring system is also merged. The scores for this indicator are interesting as 
they show that 4 out of nine countries have low risk, while two has medium, and three 
have high risk. The three countries with high risk are Bulgaria, Greece and Hungary. 
It must be noted, nonetheless, that the structure of this indicator must be revised, as 
the requirements needed to obtain a low risk score are too strict (see below, section 
5.2). 
The third risk that is taken into consideration in the basic domain is insufficient media 
(including digital) literacy (B3). The indicator for this risk is the assessment of the Policies 
and support measures for media literacy (and particularly digital literacy) among 
different groups of the population (6). Media literacy is a condition of universal access to 
information, for the development of critical thinking and awareness, and for effective 
empowerment of the citizen in a democratic society. The lack of a media literacy policy can 
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be assessed as being a risk to media pluralism. Scores: three countries low and six 
medium risk. 
The last risk within the basic domain is the risk of barriers to the free flow of digital 
information (B4): this indicator is a newly introduced one and deals with the openness of the 
internet as a condition for the free flow of information. The indicator for this risk is in the 
Policy measures for the impartial circulation of internet data, without regard to 
content, destination or source. This is an indicator that does not assess the existence of a 
legislative framework and its implementation, but considers whether the country is moving 
towards a regulatory policy on net neutrality. Quoting the EU Parliament, the EU law should 
provide “a lasting guarantee that all internet users can in principle openly access or provide 
any kind of online content, services or applications in accordance with the principle of net 
neutrality” (EP 3/4/2014). This indicator measures the regulatory policies in this respect and 
shows that, so far, the states are not approaching this topic in a systematic way: two 
countries show low risk (Estonia and France), while the rest show a medium risk 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the UK). It must be noted, 
nonetheless, that the fact that these countries are not taking any policy or legislative 
measure to tackle the issue, does not mean automatically a risk for pluralism, as the 
topic of net neutrality is a European issue and still debated at European level. Most 
of the EU countries are waiting for a defined and binding policy from the EU: once 
the policy will be developed, it will be easier to assess if the policy itself will be 
effectively pluralism-oriented and if the country implemented correctly the rules, 
accordingly. 
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4.2 Analysis of the Risk Domain Cultural Pluralism in the Media 
 
Figure 2 Cultural pluralism domain scores per country 
 
The cultural risk domain is the risk domain, which has passed through the most significant 
transformation if comparing the MPM2009 and MPM2014. Due to the more focused 
approach of the MPM2014, which targets only news and current affairs, most of the risks 
related to cultural production and representation have been eliminated from the Monitor and, 
in particular, from this risk domain. One aspect which, however, still remains important for 
the MPM2014, and which is reflected in this risk domain, is the universality of the media in the 
respective countries, including media for minorities and special needs groups. This change of 
focus in the risk domain makes it appropriate to consider a future revision of the name of the 
domain itself, which would better reflect its content. The risk domain consists of four 
indicators - two legal, one economic, and one social-political.  
The legal indicators are indicator 7 Regulatory safeguards for access to airtime on PSM by 
the various cultural and social groups, and indicator 8 Regulatory safeguards for 
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minority & community media. Indicator 7 aims to assess the regulatory safeguards that are 
typically related to internal pluralism, in particular regarding the Public Service Media, which is 
a fundamental element of media pluralism, and the mission of the PSM is to provide access to 
airtime for different cultural and social groups. The risk evaluated is that of the insufficient 
representation of the various cultural and social groups in PSM (C1). The main challenge to 
the implementation of this indicator is the lack of properly politically approved definitions, and 
of internationally harmonised definitions and methods for the measurement of issues related 
to minorities. Despite the efforts of the CMPF to provide a rather robust definition of a 
minority, the differences in the way the phenomenon is treated (conceptualised, measured, 
acknowledged, etc.) in different countries made it difficult to follow a fully unified standard. A 
further need for definition and measurement of functional equivalents regarding minority 
related legislation is needed in the future applications of the MPM. For example, in France, a 
specific legislation on minority media representation is missing, however, there are efforts to 
safeguard access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups. Generally 
speaking, the results of indicator 7 show that access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural 
and social groups is something that needs to be further analysed and tackled, as two countries 
report low risk, three medium, and four high risk (Denmark, Estonia, France and the 
UK). 
Indicator 8 Regulatory safeguards for minority & community media looks at the 
possibility for minorities to access the media system as a whole, i.e., external pluralism, and 
measures the risk of an insufficient system of minority and community media (C2). This 
indicator faces the same challenge related to the definition of minorities that has already been 
acknowledged and used on the national level. Similarly, the results of the indicator are also 
somewhat unsettling and run parallel with indicator 7. Two countries report low risk, two 
medium, and five high risk (Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Greece). 
Since these two indicators examine the same risk, but from different perspectives (i.e., internal 
and external pluralism), the future application of the MPM will consider a secondary analysis 
of these two indicators in relation to each other. The reason for that is that different media 
systems can emphasise only internal or only external pluralism. Since none of the two is 
considered superior than the other, it is possible that the guarantees against minority 
underrepresentation are achieved even only by emphasis on internal or only by emphasis on 
external pluralism. Similar approach will be taken in other occasions related to internal and 
external pluralism.  
Indicator 25 addresses the economic aspects of the Minority and community media and it 
also measures risk from an insufficient system of minority and community media (C2). 
In this case, one of the nine countries has highlighted a low risk, four medium, and four 
high risk (Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary). Following the deficiencies in the 
legal framework in this area, this result also demonstrates that in many countries there are no 
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sufficient non-legal mechanisms that guarantee an adequate level of pluralism in terms of 
minority and community media. The difficulty of measuring the availability of minority and 
community media in relevance to the actual minority composition of the country and the 
demand for such channels is related to the lack of commonly politically accepted definition of 
minority and therefore data about the actual statistics in each country. However, an attempt to 
move in that direction will be considered for the MPM2015. Otherwise, the indicator cannot 
measure the level of sufficiency of provision, which is related to the level of demand, i.e. 
sufficient provision will be different in countries with vastly different presence of minorities.  
Indicator 27 measures the risk of Limited accessibility by special needs people (C3) and it 
addresses a different aspect of the universality of the media system - the Guarantees for 
universal access to media by special needs people. This indicator demonstrates rather 
encouraging results, with no country indicating a high risk, four countries indicating 
medium risk (Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Italy), and five countries a low risk. The 
relative deficiencies in those countries can be explained by the lack of financial resources or by 
the policy tradition in the field, which could be expected to improve without any vested 
resistance. However, we need to acknowledge that it is very likely that this indicator will 
include more variables in the future, reflecting the trend towards raising the standards for 
media access for special needs people.  
The challenges in the implementation of the indicators in this risk domain reflect the difficulty 
of tackling the minority issue in a consistent manner throughout the Union. A further fine-
tuning of the tool will be implemented, and a certain level of centralisation of the data 
collection and analysis may be necessary in order to guarantee the full harmonisation of the 
application of the indicators in this risk domain.  
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4.3 Analysis of the Risk Domain Geographical Pluralism in the Media 
 
Figure 3 Geographical pluralism domain scores per country 
 
Indicators included in the risk domain Geographical pluralism in the media aim to monitor 
the existence of the eventual unequal representation of local and regional communities in the 
media. The indicators look at potential forms of inequalities from both a spatial and social 
perspective. 
Legal indicators controlling the Geographical pluralism in the media include 3 indicators: 9 
Regulatory safeguards and policies for regional and local media, 10 Regulatory 
safeguards for locally oriented and locally produced content on PSM channels and 
services and 11 Regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of the media. 
The risk Insufficient system of regional and local media (G1) is assessed by indicator 9 
Regulatory safeguards and policies for regional and local media, monitoring whether 
there is risk to fair and diverse representation and the expression of local and regional 
communities in the media (falling into the category of external pluralism). According to the 
results that emerged from the pilot-test implementation, the risk to media pluralism related to 
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representation of local and regional communities is low only in three of the nine countries, 
medium in two, and high in four (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece). 
Indicator 10 Regulatory safeguards for locally oriented and locally produced news on 
PSM channels and services assesses the risk relative to the Insufficient representation of 
regional and local communities in news (G2), namely, controlling regulatory safeguards for 
internal pluralism from a geographical perspective. Due to their very nature and mission, PSM 
will guarantee the involvement of regional and local communities in news production. With 
regard to this indicator, some of the local correspondents shared some concerns about the 
obligations and duties that are related to the mission of PSM and these were about potentially 
different national interpretations (this is something that, as will be seen below, emerged with 
other indicators). Looking at the outcome of the 2014 pilot test implementation with regard to 
the country sample, the risk for a violation of this safeguard is, in general, medium-high: three 
countries scored low risk, two medium, and four high (Belgium, Greece, Hungary, the 
UK). The relation of indicators 9 and 10 as covering internal and external pluralism will be 
analysed as part of the MPM2015 fine-tuning.  
Finally, indicator 11 Regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of the media control 
the risk of Insufficient access to media and distribution systems due to geographic 
factors (G3). This is the result of a merging of three former indicators from the MPM2009, 
and it aims to assess, in the logic of progressive convergence, the universal coverage of 
essential services. In particular, it looks at three levels of media coverage, namely PSM services, 
the distribution of newspapers in remote and/or rural areas, and broadband networks in the 
same areas. In 4 of 9 of the selected countries, the risk for a threat to such a safeguard 
resulted as low, while in the remaining five there seems to be either a medium (two) or 
high risk (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary). 
The one socio-political indicator in this risk domain is indicator 28 Guarantees for universal 
coverage of PSM and broadband networks regarding geographical coverage (risk 
Insufficient access to media and distribution systems due to geographical factors - 
G3). This indicator includes two variables that respectively measure the coverage of PSM and 
broadband. These two particular platforms are singled out, as there is a state responsibility to 
construct and maintain such networks and to provide coverage for the whole population. The 
measurement of this indicator has been rather clear and there were no significant challenges. 
As a whole, there are three countries with a low risk, five countries in which there is 
medium risk, and one high (Greece3). This result mainly demonstrates the differences in 
the stages of the development of the broadband networks in different countries. A specific 
case here is Greece - due to the transitional stage of the reform of the PSM in that country, 
                                               
3 The country correspondents provided the elaborated data, but the CMPF team assigned the indicator score. 
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there is no effective coverage of the population with fully functioning PSM. This issue remains 
open, as further and quick developments are expected in this area.  
The list of economic indicators that assess the risk domains in the context of Geographical 
pluralism in the media includes 2 indicators. The risk domain concerning High centralisation 
of the national media system (G4) includes indicators that assess the estimated reach and 
audience share of regional and local media. The high risk is determined in cases where national 
media do not equally reach population over the national territory. This risk is assessed with 
indicator 26 monitoring the Centralisation of the national media system. This indicator 
aims to denote the probability of a threat arising to the external diversity of a media system 
that is perceived as being high, and the growing centralisation of a media system on a national 
scale; and the high and growing concentration of local and regional media ownership. The 
score for this indicator is assigned by aggregating results generated from the following tests: 1) 
The relative strength of local/regional media (daily newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, 
news websites) in a particular media system; 2) The combined ownership of regional/local 
media and national media outlets by the same company; 3) The proportion of regional and 
local television and radio broadcast channels to national broadcast channels; 4) The proportion 
of regional and local newspapers to national newspapers. Although six of nine of the 
countries have highlighted a low risk concerning their national centralisation of media 
systems, one, medium, and Belgium and Estonia reported high risk. Some countries 
experienced a lack of the data required to fill this indicator and therefore, the results are 
inconclusive.  
The new risk concerning the Insufficient quality of the digital infrastructure (G5) is 
assessed with indicator 24, which monitors the Availability and quality of broadband. The 
scoring assessing this indicator differs significantly across countries. Three countries, 
Greece, Hungary and Italy, have scored high risk, while two countries scored medium 
risk, and a final group of four have instead scored a low risk. If the number of 
subscribers to landline, as well as mobile, broadband is indicative of the level of the national 
Digital Divide, the measures relating to the speed of the broadband instead measures the 
quality of the internet infrastructure. Since we should expect that high speed increases the 
usability of online content, including video-streaming, in countries with a broadband speed 
below the EU average (such as Greece, Hungary, Italy), the use of the internet for online 
content consumption might be impeded by the limited bandwidth. At the same time, a low 
available speed is likely to be a serious obstacle for bottom up forms of media production. 
The application of the risk domain on Geographical pluralism demonstrated the need for a 
revision of the approach to the issue as a whole. The MPM2015 will consider the introduction 
of coefficients to some indicators in this domain, in order to reflect the considerable variations 
in the geographic diversity of the EU Member States. Such a revision will aim at the 
improvement of the validity and cross-country comparability of the indicator scores. The 
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relation of this risk domain with the risk domain on Cultural pluralism will also be considered.  
 
4.4 Analysis of the Risk Domain Pluralism and Media Ownership Control  
 
 
Figure 4 Pluralism and media ownership control domain scores per country 
 
The risk domain Pluralism of media ownership and control refers to the existence of 
sufficient media outlets and platforms that are owned, or controlled, by a plurality of 
independent and autonomous actors. It encompasses a plurality of actors at the level of 
media production, media supply and media distribution (i.e., variety in media sources, 
outlets, suppliers and distribution platforms)(MPM2009). In this context, this risk domain 
includes indicators covering the risk of High ownership concentration in the media 
(O1), High concentration of cross-media ownership (O2), and Lack of transparency 
in ownership structures (O3).  
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The risk High ownership concentration in media (O1) includes legal and economic 
indicators that assess the high, medium or low risk that a national media landscape is highly 
concentrated across different media outlets. Media ownership concentration is commonly 
considered one of the key factors that determine a threat to media pluralism. The more 
concentrated the market is, the more exposed it is to a lack of variety in content availability 
in respect of the plurality of the political, cultural and societal diversities that characterise 
each country.  
Among the legal indicators, the 12 Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in media merges five previous indicators (i.e. indicators 
included in the MPM2009 as separate ones) that assess media concentration in different 
media. The rationale behind this merger is the current process of convergence of the 
different types of media. It evaluates the existence and implementation of regulatory 
safeguards on media ownership concentration for TV, newspapers, radio and ISPs and 
assesses the risk to the overall media system accordingly. The score for this indicator is three 
countries low risk, five medium, and one high (Hungary). 
The economic indicators in the ownership domain under the same risk are 21, 22 and 23. 
Indicator 21 assessing the Media ownership concentration controls the concentration of 
the market across the 4 main media outlets: TV, Newspapers, Radio, and ISPs. 4 different 
variables control the media concentration in each of these media outlets. The methodology 
used is the Top 4 method, which is based on market shares, namely, the share of the total 
revenue in a market for each owner of the total market for each media platform. The Top 4 
is obtained by summing the market shares of the 4 major owners in the market. In a case 
where the 4 major owners (Top 4) have a market share below 25%, then there is low risk. In 
contrast, if this percentage is between 25% and 49%, then this indicator scores a medium 
risk. Finally, we register a high risk when the 4 major owners have a market share above 
50%. As a result, and due to the final score that is based on this scoring strategy, all 
countries scored a high risk in media ownership concentration, which is indicative of the 
high concentration that characterises the EU media markets.  
Nonetheless, this indicator, as well as indicator 22, on media audience and readership 
concentration (see below), must be interpreted in the light of the size and wealth of each 
country and of the resources of the market itself. This is an indication that comes also from 
the MPM2009, which provides provisional coefficients that lower the score (and the risk) for 
the economic indicators that assess ownership concentration in specific cases. This is based 
on the understanding that a small country and therefore, with a small media market and/or a 
low GDP, in fact, is more likely to develop a concentrated market, as the existence of many 
operators cannot be sustainable and this creates fragmentation rather than plurality. The 
provisional MPM2009 coefficients however, create rather broad groups and therefore, do 
not introduce the necessary distinctive power. For example, a coefficient of 0.75 is 
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introduced if the country's population is less than 20 million people, which puts countries 
like Malta (less than 0.5 million), Netherlands (just below 17 million) and Romania (just 
below 20 million) under the same conditions. The same applies to the coefficient related to 
the low GDP. In order to reflect the necessity of coefficients with stronger discriminating 
power, the MPM2015 will introduce coefficients related to the market size and 
resourcefulness that will have a higher number of steps. Consequently, the MPM2015 will be 
able to better reflect the country specificities. These coefficients will be applied to all 
relevant indicators.  
Indicator 22 concerning the Media audience and readership concentration assesses the 
audience share per Top 4 owners competing in the media market in 4 different media 
outlets, including TV, newspapers, radio and ISPs. The share is based on the standard or 
most accepted audience/readership/subscription measurement system that is available in the 
country. Similarly to the previous indicator, the Top 4 are obtained by summing the 
audience/readership/subscription shares of the 4 major owners in the market. By using a 
similar rationale to that of the previous indicator, a country scores low risk when the 4 major 
owners (Top 4) have an audience share below 25%. If this value falls between 25% and 49% 
this indicator instead scores a medium risk. Finally, high risk is scored in a case where the 4 
major owners have an audience share that is above 50%. As a result, 7 of 9 countries 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, the UK) scored a high risk; 
the two remaining countries scored one medium, and one low risk. These results again 
should be read as non-conclusive as graded coefficients reflecting the size and viability of the 
markets have not been applied.  
Indicators 13 and 23 cover the risk High concentration of cross-media ownership (O2). 
In the light of media convergence, in the simplification process, the legal indicator 13 on 
Regulatory safeguards against a high degree of cross-ownership between television 
and other media merges two indicators that the MPM2009 assessed as having a high-degree 
of cross ownership in media between television (according to its broad definition) and other 
media. The scores for this indicator are that 4 countries have low risk, and five medium risk. 
Medium risk applies to Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary and Italy. A second level 
of investigation would be useful in these cases in order to better understand the nature of 
the medium risk. 
The economic indicator 23 Number of sectors in which top 8 firms/owners are active 
instead assesses the cross-ownership concentration in the different sectors of the national 
media industry, including television, newspapers, radio and any internet service providers. 
This indicator is assessed by using the Top 8 concentration measure. Similarly to the 
previous indicator, the Top 8 measure is obtained by summing the market shares of the 8 
major owners in the different sectors of the media market. If the result obtained is below 
50%, then we are in a low risk case. If this instead falls between 50% and 70%, the country 
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scores a medium risk. Finally, a high risk is scored when the 8 major owners have a market 
share that is above 70%. As a result, almost all of the countries have scored high risk in 
cross-ownership concentration, including (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Italy, the UK). Only two countries reported a medium risk. This indicator therefore 
shows a generally high risk of cross-ownership concentration across the countries 
monitored.  
The risk of Lack of transparency in media ownership (O3) is evaluated by indicator 14 
Regulatory safeguards for the transparency of ownership and/or control. The 
transparency of the media ownership structures is fundamental for healthy media and 
democratic systems. This indicator merges two fundamental elements of regulation on media 
ownership transparency. Transparency of ownership and/or control is seen both towards 
the public and towards the relevant authorities. This indicator shows a low risk in three 
countries, medium in five, and is high in Denmark, as, according to the data collected, 
this country has no regulatory safeguards on media transparency. This is one of the cases 
where the MPM needs a second-step approach in order to assess the effectiveness of the 
given risk that results from a different media system, culture and legal framework. An 
interesting indication of the media ownership transparency is indeed the accessibility of the 
data necessary for this very Monitor.  
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4.5 Analysis of the Risk Domain Political Pluralism in the Media  
 
Figure 5 Political pluralism domain scores per country 
 
The Political risk domain includes all the risks which are related to political interference in 
the media market and its functioning. The types of indicators included here are legal and 
socio-political ones. There are nine indicators (three legal and six socio-political ones), which 
are the measures of five different risks. This risk domain examines the interaction between 
political actors and the media, and it is reflected in the functioning of political 
communications as a guarantee for the existence of free, open and pluralistic political debate, 
discourses and representation. 
The first risk in this domain is the risk Political bias in the media (P1). It includes one 
legal indicator - 15 Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and impartial political 
reporting in television, and one socio-political one - 29 Representation of political views 
in the media. These indicators cover the regulations and their application, both during and 
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beyond elections. In the pilot test implementation, only television was monitored, as it is still 
the medium with the largest audience, and also audiences consider it to be their most 
important source for news and current affairs information (see the Standard Eurobarometer 
for data that has consistently confirmed this over time). However, future applications of the 
MPM could consider including variables that are also related to the other media platforms. 
This is especially relevant with the shifting focus of audiences onto the internet based media 
outlets, but also to the convergence of the media. Indicator 15 assesses the existence and 
implementation of regulatory safeguards that are essential for guaranteeing political 
information in a fair, balanced and impartial way. Indicator 29 assesses the actual 
representation of different political groups, organisations and personalities in the 
media. Both indicators demonstrate high risk in a number of countries - high risk in three 
countries regarding indicator 15 (Bulgaria, Greece4, Hungary); four regarding 
indicator 29 (Denmark, Greece, Hungary and Italy); medium risk in two countries in 
relation to indicator 15, and three countries in relation to indicator 29; low risk in four 
countries relating to indicator 15, and two countries in relation to indicator 29. It is 
important to emphasise that indicator 29 had been applied on a sample that is far from 
representative and therefore, its results can be only indicative and not conclusive. Due to the 
high level of resources that are necessary for the application of indicator 29, especially when 
implemented with an appropriate sample, there should be a debate on its transformation into 
a second level explanatory indicator (see details in section 5.4.) or to rely on a secondary 
analysis of data already collected by others. However, it should not be ignored, due to its 
crucial role in measuring media pluralism and the relevant risks. 
The second risk is the Excessive politicisation of media ownership/control (P2). It 
includes three risks: one legal - 16 Regulatory safeguards against the excessive 
ownership and/or control of mainstream media by politicians, and two socio-political - 
30 Political Control over media and distribution network ownership, and 31 Political 
control over media funding by advertising. This risk is devoted to the assessment of the 
political pressure on the media system as a whole. It is a key risk covering a number of 
important variables. The legal indicator, 16, examines the effective legislative regulatory 
measures that are needed to avoid the politicisation of media. Somewhat alarmingly, we see 
that there are six countries with high risk here (Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece5, France, 
Italy, and the UK), two countries with medium risk, and one country with low risk. 
Interestingly enough, this risk level is not reflected by the socio-political indicators in this 
risk, where only one country is identified as high risk (Hungary), two countries with 
medium risk, and six countries with low risk for indicators 30 and 31. A closer 
examination of the feedback provided by the country teams, however, uncovers that there 
                                               
4 On the interpretation of this score, please, see the Greek country report in attachment. 
5 On the interpretation of this score, please, see the Greek country report in attachment. 
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are also considerable suspicions of excessive politicisation in regard to these indicators, but 
there is insufficient official data to support or reject this. The scores of these indicators 
should therefore be considered carefully but, even more importantly, in the future, MPM 
should provide special scoring options for cases in which there is a lack of ownership 
transparency, and a lack of transparency in regard to the major advertisers and funders of 
media outlets. Excessive politicisation is an important risk, but the lack of transparency in 
regard to such potential politicisation is a risk to media pluralism with a potentially even 
bigger impact.  
The third risk here is insufficient editorial independence (P3). It is covered by a social-
political indicator, namely, indicator 32 Presence of professional associations providing 
advocacy for editorial independence and respect for professional standards. The 
application of this indicator faced certain challenges in addressing the multitude and variety 
of traditions, institutions and channels for interaction between professional associations and 
editorial boards. The rich information provided by the country teams will be used for further 
fine-tuning and to enrich this indicator. Currently, two countries demonstrate high risk 
(Hungary and Italy), three countries medium risk, and four countries are at low risk.  
The fourth risk is the insufficient independence of PSM (P4). This includes one legal 
indicator - 17 Fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for professional, 
management and board functions within PSM, ensuring independence from 
government / a single political group, and one social-political indicator - 33 Level of 
independence of PSM (mechanisms for its financing). Indicator 17 focuses on the 
procedure for appointing the board of managers of PSM and it is therefore highly relevant to 
assess the structural independence of the PSM from the government. Indicator 33 focuses 
on the mechanisms and procedures for financing the PSM. The combination of the two 
indicators provides a good illustration of the risk of political pressure (or lack of it) over the 
PSM. The results show that there are certain risks in this regard in a number of countries. 
High risk regarding indicator 17 is identified in two countries (Hungary and Italy), 
and three countries relating to indicator 33 (Estonia, Greece and Hungary); medium 
risk - three countries in relation to indicator 17 and in regard to indicator 33; low risk - four 
countries in regard to indicator 17, and three countries in relation to indicator 33. Both 
indicators will also benefit from further fine-tuning in the future, especially indicator 33, 
which should reflect the latest PSM budgetary developments in Italy and include an option 
to measure such cases in these indicators. It should also better reflect the countries where 
PSM is not funded by fees.  
The fifth, and last, risk in this risk domain is the Insufficient pluralism of news agencies 
(P5). It includes one socio-political indicator - 34 Independence and ownership of news 
agencies. This aspect of media pluralism is often ignored, however, it is rather important as 
it creates the foundation for political information content, especially regarding non-domestic 
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issues. The results also demonstrate that there is indeed a risk to media pluralism that is 
related to this indicator in some countries - two countries scoring high risk (Hungary 
and Greece), four countries scoring medium risk, and three countries scoring low 
risk. Considering the rather high level of concentration that is related to medium risk, these 
results should not be ignored. However, it also needs to be acknowledged that until not so 
long ago, news agencies were entirely centralised on a national level almost everywhere. 
There is therefore a need to monitor the developments in this area in the future.  
The political pluralism risk domain presents a rather complex picture and outlines certain 
risks that are related to media pluralism. Many of the indicators included here need further 
fine-tuning and therefore the results presented are not absolute values, but are tentative, and 
they present the orientation of the trends. However, they are a clear indication that media 
pluralism needs increased attention in a number of countries.  
 
4.6 Analysis of the Risk Domain Pluralism of Media Types and Genres  
 
 
 49 
Figure 6 Pluralism of media types and genres, domain scores per country 
 
According to the MPM2009, the risk domain Pluralism of media types and genres “refers to 
the co-existence of media with different mandates and sources of financing, notably 
commercial media, community or alternative media, and public service media, within and 
across media sectors, like print, television, radio and internet. Pluralism of media genres 
refers to diversity in the media in relation to media functions, including providing 
information, education, and entertainment”. This broad definition however, has been 
somewhat re-focused due to the overall focusing of the MPM on news and current affairs. 
This risk domain therefore has been reduced and reshaped significantly. The indicators that 
were selected to form part of the MPM2014 in this domain relate to the remedies that ensure 
that the markets effectively remain plural when it comes to the distribution of information of 
public interest, or the supply of public service media. The risks included in this domain are 
the Lack of/under-representation of/dominance of media types (T1) and the Lack of 
sufficient resources to support public service media (T2).  
Indicator 18 on Regulatory safeguards for the distribution of public interest channels 
on cable, DSL and/or satellite platforms measures evaluates the risk Lack of/ under 
representation of/ dominance of media types (T1). In particular, the indicator analyses 
the existence of "must carry rules" that are imposed when they are necessary to achieve a 
defined public interest objective. In this regard, seven countries scored as being low risk, 
where two scored as high risk (Italy and Greece). 
PSM is considered part of the tradition of the European Member States. A mixed media 
market, where private and public operators are present, is an asset for the circulation of 
different information and for a pluralistic market. It is considered a risk that there is a lack of 
sufficient resources to support PSM (T2). The MPM2014 measures this risk through 
indicator 19 on Regulatory safeguards for the objective and independent allocation of 
adequate, consistent and sufficient financial resources to PSM. This indicator is also 
structurally relevant in assessing the independence of PSM. Indeed, because of their mission, 
underfunded PSM could represent a threat to media pluralism. 
The scores are four countries low, one medium, and four high (Italy, Hungary, Greece 
and Bulgaria). The results of this indicator are interesting and need a second level of 
investigation in the light of the different genesis and the effective role of the different PSM 
in the different countries.  
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5 Analysis of Methodology Testing. Analysis of the Indicators 
 
5.1 Problems and Solutions for the Data Collection - Availability, Reliability and 
Cooperation of Data Collection Outlets 
 
The pilot test implementation of the MPM2014 was successful in reaching its main 
methodological and research goals. It has sketched a snapshot of the media pluralism risks in 
the sample of nine countries in the EU but, most of all, it has successfully tested the 
complex MPM2014 instrument, it has proved its applicability and has outlined particular 
ways to enhance and fine-tune it further. The challenges and future improvements in the 
MPM are in terms of both the structure of the tool and its application procedures. The pilot 
testing has thus outlined the way to make the MPM even more manageable, reliable, 
objective and to produce comparable, informative and rich data regarding media pluralism 
risks in the EU Member States.  
The enhancement of the MPM in terms of its content of indicators will be related 
mainly to resolving the lack of clarity on some definitions and instructions in the User 
Guide, as well as accommodating the variety of cases, practices and structures which have 
not been covered by the previous versions of the MPM. This enhancement of content will 
improve the applicability of the MPM as a comparative measurement, and in its overall 
reliability and validity. The definitions and instructions will include explanations of what the 
functional equivalents that can be considered by the MPM are, whenever a particular 
phenomenon does not exist in the particular country, e.g., purely private terrestrial television 
in Denmark, media law elsewhere, etc. Although very important for the functioning of the 
instrument, these changes are not going to impact on the overall structure and the principles 
of the tool. The enhancements will take place at the level of instructions on the variable 
measurements, additional glossary definitions and thresholds, stricter instructions and 
standards in relation to data sources. Only in a limited number of cases will the list of 
variables in an indicator be enriched.  
A challenge that has impacted on the data collection in a number of countries has been the 
issue of missing data. In some cases, the data is missing, i.e., there is no attention to the issue 
in question as there has been no problem that is related to it. For example, if the advertising 
market in some countries has been rather vibrant and competitive, consequently, state 
advertising would play an insignificant role in it and there would therefore be no need to 
establish mechanisms for monitoring it. However, the lack of the same data could also be 
attributed to the lack of transparency of the politically controlled funds that enter the media 
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outlet budgets. In countries with a less vibrant and competitive advertising market, this non-
transparent state advertising could play a crucial role in the viability of media outlets. A 
significant problem that is related to missing data has been the lack of reliable information 
about the ownership of media outlets in some countries, or the presence of data that is 
limited to owners who represent opaque legal entities with unclear final ownership. 
Following the instructions of the MPM2009, the missing data in these cases led to neutral 
values, i.e., medium risk. The CMPF considers this to demonstrate a lack of validity for the 
measurement. The feedback from the country correspondents strengthened even further this 
concern about the validity of treating missing data neutrally. Based on the experience of the 
MPM2014, the future MPM’s instructions will include special guidance on how to evaluate 
the missing data. As a general principle, unless there is convincing evidence that the missing 
data is caused by the lack of even a potential risk, the missing data will be evaluated as 
demonstrating a lack of transparency and therefore as a high risk. In the name of the full 
transparency of the MPM instrument, whenever the data is requested from official 
institutions and regulators, this principle of dealing with the phenomenon of missing data 
will be communicated together with the data collection request.  
Another change that will be introduced in the MPM2015 is the graded and expanded 
coefficients. The application of the MPM2014 demonstrated the significant need to reflect 
and take into account the demographic, geographic and economic characteristics of each 
country, as well as the importance of each media platform, when estimating the levels of risk 
to media pluralism. The MPM2009 have included coefficients related only to the number of 
inhabitants and the GDP of the country. We consider this to be an insufficient list of 
coefficients, as it does not cover the diversity of the country's population, which is essential 
for determining the demand for pluralism and diversity of media representation. Another 
problematic issue related to the application of the MPM2009 coefficients have been their 
cutting points, i.e. grouping countries into only two groups (large or small, rich or poor) 
without reflecting the considerable diversity within these groups. Due to that they have been 
considered limited, misleading and inapplicable to the MPM2014, but will be replaced by 
coefficients introducing grades and scale.  
The simplification of the MPM2014 has been led by the focusing of the MPM on news and 
current affairs. This has led to the refocusing of some risk domains, in particular the Cultural 
and Geographic ones, as well as the Types and genres domain. A restructuring or merging of 
these risk domains under the umbrella of Universality will be considered. Such a 
restructuring will reflect the current focus of these risk domains on access and representation 
of minorities, regions, special groups, as well as universality of content distribution.  
The analysis of the collected data demonstrated the need to analyse the indicators measuring 
similar issues from the perspective of either internal pluralism, or external pluralism to be 
analysed together. This relation between such indicators will be revised and a methodological 
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link between such pairs of indicators will be considered.  
The enhancement of the MPM in terms of procedures will be related to further 
streamlining of the data collection, verification and communication of the results. Naturally, 
the extension of the MPM application to another 19 countries will lead to an extension of 
the network of national teams working on the MPM. The collaboration with the national 
teams has so far proved to be useful and indispensible, especially in the collection of 
qualitative data, data that is only available in the national language and, moreover, in the 
verification and interpretation of the data. However, it will be beneficial to conduct a 
detailed discussion and clarification of the MPM’s commitment to the potential national 
teams, in order to avoid misunderstandings and a lack of clarity, as well as to secure clearer 
commitments.  
In order to reduce the cost of the data collection itself, some of the data will be collected 
centrally by the CMPF team. This would be relevant only to quantitative data that has 
established EU standards of collection and does not need extensive national interpretation. 
The CMPF also considers the central collection of data that is provided by the NRAs.  
Another important procedural aspect of the MPM’s implementation that will be further 
enhanced is the communication of the results. The successful use of the online data 
collection platform will be extended to communicate the MPM’s results. Different audiences 
will be granted different levels of access to the platform. National teams will keep their 
access to the data collection pages - including all instructional materials and the rights to 
input and change data. As a first platform enhancement step, the communication and the 
data verification of the MPM by the stakeholders of the Panels of Experts will be conducted 
through the platform. Each member of the Panel of Experts will be given access to the data 
already collected and the evaluated scores for his/her country, and will be asked to comment 
on it on the platform. As a final step, the platform will include a third level of users, namely, 
the general public. Any subject will be allowed to see the end results of the MPM’s scoring, 
including the level of variables, as well as the data sources on which it has been based. 
Moreover, the platform will develop further the visualisation of the results, in order to 
present results on the level of risk domain and risk in an even better way.  
 
5.2 Analysis of the Methodology: Legal Indicators 
 
As well as the MPM2009, the MPM2014 is mostly composed of legal indicators (20 out of 
34). The indicators that are in the new MPM, after the elimination of those not dealing with 
news and current affairs, cover all the risk domains. 
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Notwithstanding the legal indicators are still the majority of the indicators in the MPM2014, 
the simplification work on the legal indicators was considerable and challenging. The legal 
indicators in the MPM2009 amounted to 67: after the merging operation and the elimination 
of indicators that did not fit with the narrowed scope of application of the Monitor, most of 
the legal indicators, with the exception of a few in the basic domain, were heavily reshaped 
to fit the concept of the MPM2014, and the total number was reduced to 20. 
From a theoretical perspective, these indicators cover issues that are very relevant and that 
are essential for any evaluation of media freedom and media pluralism. Part of them are not 
directly linked to the scope of the application of the MPM2014 (news and current affairs), 
but are the essential prerequisite for any democratic society and, in this respect, they fit 
perfectly with the logic of the revised MPM. Most of the indicators in the basic domain, for 
instance, must be interpreted in this light. 
Legal indicators are not always very easy to assess, as they deal with concepts and principles 
that live in the work of legislators, administrators and judges within the specificities of each 
country’s legal tradition, constitutional framework and political situation. The challenge of 
the MPM, nonetheless, is to give a score to what is difficult to measure. One way to face this 
challenge is to extend the use of Panels of Experts as a verification panel of some legal 
indicators. Moreover, it must be stressed that different country’s traditions are strictly linked 
to common principles, like those enshrined by the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights and 
those of the European Convention on Human Rights, enforced by the European Court in 
Strasbourg that give a common ground for interpreting the legal framework of the selected 
countries 
When measuring media pluralism according to the legal indicators, the pilot-test 
implementation used the methodology provided by the MPM2009, which proved to be a 
good starting point from which to try to develop common standards of evaluation amongst 
all the country teams for each single indicator. 
The evaluation of the legal indicator was carried out, as the MPM2009 user guide suggests, 
and as explained in section 3.2, using the methodology of first MPM assessing the existence 
of a certain regulatory safeguard and then evaluating the way that the specific regulatory 
safeguard was implemented. 
That meant also that there had to be a re-balancing operation for the weights of “yes” and 
“no” in scoring each legal indicator, where this proved necessary. In general, the scoring 
logic of the merging indicators was also respected in the merged indicator. 
The operation was not very easy, as the variables to assess the score were sometimes too 
broad and sometimes too narrow to clearly fit the peculiarity of each country profile, or were 
univocal. In many cases the country teams highlighted that some indicators were difficult to 
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assess, as it did not perfectly fit the country’s case. In this regard, the CMPF’s interpretation 
of the information and data provided by the local teams helped to define assessments that 
could be consistent in all the countries and could take into consideration the different 
regulatory peculiarities. 
In the light of these issues, the MPM tool needs to be fine-tuned for future implementations. 
In particular, some variables in the indicators will be rephrased, just to allow the indicator to 
take into consideration how the rule of law, or the judicial review work in different 
countries’ constitutional frameworks (i.e., change the wording “Constitutional Court” to 
“Superior Court” or its functional equivalent - i.e., indicator 3). In other cases, the variables 
will be slightly changed to better fit the aim of the indicator itself (i.e., it could be useful to 
better develop indicator 2 with variables that are more tailored to assess the existence and 
implementation of FOIAs according to international standards and to add some specific 
variable on the independence of data commissioners or offices, as often this shapes the 
culture of access to information). The implementation variables will, whenever possible, be 
better tailored to the specific indicator, introducing more measurable criteria for evaluation 
than the general existence of a functioning judiciary and a guaranteed system of appeal. 
In the case of some other indicators, CMPF will consider whether a change in the formula 
may be logical and possible so as to obtain scores that are less “extreme” (as in the case of 
indicator 4 on the regulatory safeguard for the journalistic profession, or 5 on the 
independence of the regulatory authorities, where the formula comes directly from the 
MPM2009’s indicators and may lead to polarised results, since to have a low risk for all the 
variables requires that all the variables are replied to with “yes”, and other studies will be 
taken in consideration (for instance the INDIREG indicators). Another indicator that may 
need some minor formulaic change is indicator 15, which, after merging different indicators, 
is quite "heavy". This indicator covers the major elements of the regulation of political 
communication, specifically, during the electoral period. This can be criticised as in some 
counties a media law that guarantees fair, balanced and impartial representation of political 
viewpoints in news and informative programmes on commercial channels and services can 
be seen to limit freedom of expression. On the other hand, the interpretation of the results 
of the Monitor should take into consideration that in some traditions obligations and duties 
related to the mission of PSM can be considered to go against a strong tradition of editorial 
independence (or editorial freedom) and a strong remit for PSM (Denmark). 
In the case of the legal indicators on media ownership, new variables on the internet must be 
taken into consideration, namely, the role of the companies and applications that operate as 
intermediaries for the content flowing onto the web and the ways in which online advertising 
is shaping the information market. The indicators to media ownership should take the 
revenues of the new internet markets into consideration in a clearer way. Moreover, the final 
assessment for indicator 12 should also take into consideration the different weight of 
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different media in the consumption of news and current affair information, and then create a 
system of coefficients that can be applied to different media and that are based on the 
penetration of the medium in that specific country within a given timeframe. 
In the light of the fine-tuning of the tool, indicator 6 on media literacy, will be shifted to 
the socio-political indicators, as it is based more related to policy evaluations than to 
regulatory arguments. 
 
 
Figure 7: Legal type of indicators. Average of the scores of the MPM legal indicators 
 
5.3. Analysis of the Methodology: Economic Indicators 
 
The simplification work on the economic indicators of the MPM 2014 brought their number 
down from the 39 of the 2009 MPM to only 6. However, this drastic simplification was 
obtained partially through an important process of merging indicators with the aim of 
examining the different media within the economic media landscape of each country, taken 
in view of its integration and not in its isolated parts. Even in this case, as for the legal 
indicators, the concentration on news and current affairs was not the only driver of the 
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simplification process. 
One of the main problems that emerged from the analysis is the result produced by what 
can be considered as the more “traditional” indicator, from an economic viewpoint, 
indicator 21 - assessing Media ownership concentration. The fact that all the countries 
examined present a high level of ownership concentration has different elements that should 
be considered. It cannot be a surprise that the media industries have a traditionally high level 
of concentration: this is a type of industry, at least at the production level, with high fixed 
costs and low or almost non-existent marginal costs. Normally, this is an easy pre-condition 
for high market concentration. However, the indicator seems to show too low a capacity for 
discernment among different situations. Probably a more sophisticated index than one based 
on the cumulative market shares of the Top 4 companies could help to better assess the real 
economic concentration of media ownership in different countries. This is more likely also 
because the set of information that is available could probably allow the effective elaboration 
of a more comprehensive kind of index. However, the improvement could also derive from 
a better weighting of the different media in relation to their importance in terms of revenue, 
audience, importance for the formation of opinion, or other relevant parameters. The same 
list of considerations is certainly valid also for indicator 22, concerning the audience and 
readership media concentration that assesses the audience share of the Top 4 owners 
competing in the media market in 4 different media outlets, including TV, newspapers, radio 
and ISPs. Probably, in this case, a weighting of results that is based on their importance in 
the formation of public opinion, in terms of news and current affairs, is even more urgent. 
Cross ownership between different media, explored through a Top 8 firm market share, 
indicator 23, appears also to be very high in most countries but, even in this case, the grain 
of the indicator can be re-examined to improve performance and the ability to discern the 
risk in different situations. 
The economic indicator relating to internet infrastructure assumes that high speed 
broadband can substantially increase the usability of online content, but the reverse is also 
true, in terms of productive developments: a low speed for the broadband network can 
hinder the spread and growth of new media enterprises that are based on the internet, thus 
limiting pluralism at source. However, in economic terms, it is likely that even the present 
version of the MPM does not cover all the relevant sources of risk, especially if one 
considers the very tumultuous developments in on-line advertising and its effect on the 
survival possibilities for traditional media. Data collection on the pluralistic dimension of the 
internet, or on the digital environments in a broader sense, is facilitated by the fact that, in 
most of the cases, the data consists of numerical values. This makes their collection through 
commonly shared standard measuring mechanisms possible. As a result, monitoring the 
digital environment is facilitated by the existence of a centralised dataset that is available 
through international organisations and governmental bodies, including the OECD and the 
World Bank. For example, concerning the quality of services offered by internet service 
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providers, in the MPM2014 it was possible to rely on comprehensive databases that facilitate 
the data gathering in respect of common methodological approaches, such as Eurostat. It is 
more problematic, but increasingly possible, to acquire reliable data on the value of online 
advertising and its influence on the rest of the media industry. 
The last two economic indicators of the MPM 2014: High centralisation of the national 
media System and System of minority and community media, essentially present 
measurement challenges that will need to be faced to assure consistency in their evaluation 
across countries. The problems, however, are slightly different. The first indicator shows a 
lack of reliable measurements for the phenomenon, at least in some countries, while the 
second presents national peculiarities in a deep manner. Nonetheless, in both cases, 
significant differences among countries have been made evident by the MPM’s application. 
 
 
Figure 8: Economic type of indicators. Average of the scores of the MPM economic 
indicators 
 
5.4. Analysis of the Methodology: Socio-Political Indicators  
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If compared to the MPM2009, MPM2014 includes only a limited number of socio-political 
indicators, respectively 60 indicators in the MPM2009 and 8 indicators in the MPM2014. 
Many of the indicators that have been left aside did not satisfy the criteria for being related 
to news and current affairs in the media. The socio-political indicators are mostly present in 
the political risk domain. The exceptions include one indicator that falls under the cultural 
risk domain, and one that falls under the geographical risk domain. None of the risk 
domains is monitored only by socio-political indicators. However, the socio-political 
indicators are a necessary element of the MPM as they provide important information about 
the actual functioning and context of the legal framework and the media market.  
Sometimes the socio-political indicators partially overlap with the legal indicators, if they 
refer to the implementation of the legal framework. For example, indicator 6, on media 
literacy, which is currently listed as a legal indicator, can very likely be re-classified. On other 
occasions, indicators are intertwined with the economic indicators, especially when they refer 
to the political ownership of media outlets (indicator 30) or to political influence over the 
financial resources available on the market (indicator 31). Such cases demonstrate the strong 
internal links between the different elements of the MPM, as well as the necessity to see the 
tool as a holistic instrument, which should be addressed and analysed in its entirety and not 
element by element. A high score even for one risk could indicate a risk with negative 
consequences for the whole media system of the respective country.  
In discussing the MPM with different stakeholders, it has been obvious that the socio-
political indicators create hesitation in many stakeholders, who suspect that qualitative 
measurement could become synonymous with biased measurement. There are three counter 
factors to these suspicions and objections.  
The first one is that the political and social culture and forces have an undeniable effect on 
the media systems and it is therefore paramount that they are included in the MPM. A 
specific characteristic of the socio-political indicators is that their measurement is 
predominantly qualitative. The second factor is that there have been considerable efforts to 
guarantee that the clear instructions and scoring categories for each variable will result in 
objective evaluations of the socio-political risks to pluralism. The methodological and 
measurement instructions in the MPM2014 use the MPM2009 as an inspiration, but they are 
significantly enriched, clarified, specified, and operationalised. All these improvements turn 
them into a more useful, and better, methodological instruction guide. Following high 
scientific standards for the application of qualitative measurements, including thorough 
documentation and explanatory texts for each score, is a guarantee of the objectivity of these 
indicators.  
The third factor is the introduction of a special method of score verification, namely, the 
Panel of Experts. This methodological step (described in detail in section 3.6) functions as a 
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further guarantee of the objectivity of the measurements and takes advantage of the 
information provided by a wider expert and stakeholder network. This methodological step 
has worked fairly well in almost all of the cases examined in the MPM2014. Apart from its 
purely methodological value, the use of the Panel of Experts has a significant role in the 
provision of a high level of transparency for the MPM as a tool. It is therefore likely that the 
future applications of the MPM would introduce the Panel of Experts’ comparison in 
relation to even more indicators than in the MPM2014.  
The pilot implementation of the MPM2014 has demonstrated that the socio-political 
indicators work rather well, as a whole. Almost all of the challenges to their implementation 
may be overcome in the future with the help of additional editorial work on the 
methodological instructions. Certain descriptions need to be further clarified, and some 
additional definitions need to be introduced in order to guarantee the full comparability of 
the scores of different countries, e.g., the definition of state advertising. This has already 
been partially done, as answers and clarifications have continually been given to the local 
teams during the pilot test implementation.  
The other aspect in which the pilot test implementation has been beneficial for the socio-
political indicators, has been the feedback provided by the local teams regarding specific 
cases, which do not fit the descriptions and classifications of the MPM (neither those of 
MPM2009, nor those of MPM2014), e.g., the lack of purely private terrestrial TV in 
Denmark. All cases like this will be taken into account for the further fine-tuning of the 
measurement instructions. The future MPM indicators will provide a uniform treatment for 
such cases in order to guarantee the complete applicability of the MPM throughout the EU. 
In addition, the recent developments in some of the monitored countries also provide 
important information about variables that are related to the risks of political interference 
and that need to be included in the MPM, e.g., recent changes in taxation policies in 
Hungary (related to indicator 31) or the ways changes in the PSM budget have been 
introduced in Italy (related to indicator 33).  
Indicator 29 Political bias in the media was the only one involving content analysis as data 
collection (see details of this in the Appendix). The method was applied only experimentally 
with a reduced sample and testing period. This testing was focused on the evaluation of the 
applicability of the data collection method, and in no way is it claimed to be fully sufficient 
for the proper evaluation of political bias in the media. Although the experience of the pilot 
testing demonstrates that content analysis provides important and reliable information on 
the measured indicator, there are still question marks about its applicability in the future. The 
data collection, even from this very reduced sample, has been rather demanding of 
resources. If the sample size is enlarged to its necessary levels, the sustainable applicability of 
the content analysis could rapidly become highly problematic. Based on this, it is 
recommended that the use of content analysis be considered either as a second order 
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indicator, which is applied only when necessary to explain the risks that have already been 
flagged up by other indicators; or to work towards the use of content analysis data that has 
already been collected by the national regulators or other official/reliable sources. The first 
recommended option is probably better suited to a short-term interim solution, and the 
second recommended option might be long-term and closer to an optimal solution. 
However, the use of content analysis that is conducted by different external bodies must be 
methodologically comparable and well suited to the purposes of the MPM. A guarantee of 
the availability of such data needs to be examined and coordinated by the CMPF in the 
future.  
 
 
Figure 9: Socio-political type indicators. Average of the scores of the MPM socio-political 
indicators 
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6. Outlook for Further Improvements to the MPM 
 
6.1. Centralisation of the Monitoring  
 
The results of the pilot-test implementation, in terms of methodology, show that the MPM 
tool, as modified and improved by the CMPF project, is usable and can provide results that 
are reliable and comparable. Better: the results are comparable because they are processed by 
a single central body that organises, supervises and compares the information, evaluating and 
interpreting the locally provided data. The “centralisation” of the Monitor is an asset to the 
project as it is a guarantee of a homogeneous application of the tool and of a consistent 
interpretation of the same indicators in different countries. Indeed, the coordination of the 
different local correspondents by the CMPF represents one of the added values of the MPM 
2014, and it is definitely an element that has contributed to the success of the pilot test 
implementation. 
Through the centralised online platform that merges the scoring system with the user guide, 
the new MPM tool’s methodology allows for better traceability and transparency of the logic 
of assessment for the scores for each indicator. Moreover, a “centralised” evaluation and 
interpretation of the data guarantees better consistency in the potential differences in 
assessing the same indicator. It also involves fewer resources and is therefore preferable 
whenever the variable and the data allow it.  
This first pilot-test implementation was an occasion on which to explore the different 
approaches and feedback to the same questions from the different teams in each selected 
country: It was part of the exercise to decide a strategy to cope with this and to define the 
standards of interpretation of the data to overcome the different country’s approaches. 
 
6.2 The Networking of the NRAs for Comparable Data  
 
Another interesting result of the pilot-test implementation of the MPM has been an indirect 
comparison between the activities of the regulatory authorities in the media sector. It is 
known that the media fall under different regulatory competencies in different Member 
States and that the European legislation itself does not require the NRAs to have a specific 
composition, method of appointment, and competencies that are harmonised across Europe 
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(CMPF 2013 and Brogi and Parcu, 2014). Nonetheless, the MPM’s implementation would 
greatly benefit from the collection of data from the NRAs on the same indicators, and 
reliance on common definitions and on the common methodology that the NRAs use in 
collecting the data themselves. In this regard the Commission could consider involving the 
Centre itself in the on-going dialogue between the Commission and the NRAs within the 
ERGA and, in any case, to promote the cooperation of the NRAs with the CMPF in the 
collection of data, according to the MPM’s standards. Such an approach would be beneficial 
not only for the MPM, but also to enhance the overall transparency and information that is 
provided by the NRAs through the exchange of best practice and the establishment of 
minimum standards.  
 
6.3. Two Levels of Variables or Indicators 
 
The pilot test application of the MPM2014 demonstrates that the cases in which 
medium/high risks to media pluralism are indicated may often need additional exploration in 
order to determine the extent to which such a risk is present. Such exploration demands the 
existence of additional variables in the indicators that score high risk. In cases that indicate a 
high risk relating to the risk domain as a whole, even additional indicators may be welcome 
as a clarification. The introduction of such additional variables or indicators, however, would 
make the future versions of the MPM more difficult to apply and more demanding, in terms 
of additional resources for the implementation. Our recommendation is therefore that such 
variables are introduced only for the cases in which there is an indication of high risk. They 
would function as a second level, or as explanatory variables.  
There is a possibility for a few of the current variables to also be converted into such a 
second level variables in order to further simplify the MPM as a tool. In order to reflect the 
nature of these second level variables, the weight they carry for the calculation of the risk 
indicators should be different from the weighting of the first level, or core, variables. This 
adjustment of the weighting would guarantee that there will be no watering down of the risk 
indicator score, but only a more detailed exploration of it.  
Another aspect of a second level analysis that is suggested is the second stage paired-analysis 
of the indicators that cover the same risk, but from the points of view of internal or external 
media pluralism. This second level analysis will take into account the leaning of the particular 
media system towards internal or external pluralism and apply it when evaluating the actual 
risk in the Member State.  
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6.4. Coefficients 
 
Given the above-mentioned fragmentation of the European media landscape, monitoring 
media pluralism across EU Member States consists in identifying a comparative strategy that 
is able to provide neutral and standardised data that is obtained in respect of national socio-
economic peculiarities. Risks to media pluralism differ based on the characteristics of 
countries, and thresholds for alarms cannot be equal, regardless of the country’s specificities, 
but they must be set accordingly. For instance, the level of media ownership concentration 
in smaller countries, where the market is likely to be small and have a limited number of 
competing media owners, cannot be assessed equally with a bigger market, which is likely to 
be characterised by a higher level of market competition. Outcomes and data collected from 
monitoring media pluralism across Europe must therefore be contextualised. In order to 
further improve the accuracy of the monitoring of risk assessment for media pluralism 
according to the demographic, socio-economic and political peculiarities of each EU 
Member State, new coefficients will be designed. Particular attention will also be paid to 
designing new coefficients that weight the importance of the media outlet in each national 
media system in order to relate the level of the risk obtained, as well as the actual social, 
political and demographic diversity in the society, which needs to be reflected upon, 
represented and provided for by the media. A key novelty in these prospective coefficients is 
that they will have scales of application values (instead of clustering countries in only two 
groups), in order to reflect the wide variety amongst EU Member States.  
 
6.5. Internet indicators 
The updating of the digital indicators was limited, in this implementation, to the internet 
infrastructure and access to the services provided by the infrastructure. Access to the 
internet without any restriction was considered a basic condition to be safeguarded per se as 
a guarantee of access to the information on the web, but has just an indirect link to media 
pluralism as meant a condition of the media market. As mentioned in sections 5.2 and 5.3, 
the pilot-test implementation and the still growing importance of the internet shows the 
need to further update the MPM on the new challenges of the digital world, as well as to 
analyse the digital media in parallel and/or in connection with the traditional media market. 
This also includes a special focus on the role of the web intermediaries (search engines 
included) in shaping a plural media landscape and internet specific and/or native media. 
In particular, the CMPF is already working on developing more in detail the indicator and 
variables on internet of the basic domain indicators. Just as examples, the idea is to expand 
the importance and the weight of variables on filtering practices, on blocking of websites, on 
 64 
censorship on social networks. Moreover, the revision of the MPM will consider to assess 
the impact of the European Union Court of Justice on the right to be forgotten when 
measuring freedom of expression, to fine-tune the variables of the indicator on net 
neutrality, to find suitable solution to measure the impact of the intermediaries of the web in 
the media market, on public opinion and political agenda. Moreover, the CMPF will try to 
catch in some variables how consumers’ behaviours themselves and the massive use of 
personal data to profile the internet users can reduce pluralism: information provided by the 
media outlets is more and more tailored on the tastes of the customer, creating a false 
perception of plurality. 
 
6.6. Fine-tuning, Application to the Remaining 19 EU Countries  
 
As a result of the pilot-test implementation, the CMPF has developed a new monitoring tool 
that has a smaller scope of application (news and current affairs) and that foresees 
streamlined procedures for data collection. The test on the sample of 9 countries has shown 
that the present tool still faces some limitations in terms of the validity of indicators (see 
above) and in terms of being updated to the latest developments in the digital environment. 
This means that, for the sake of a better comparability of the collected data and for complete 
reliability of the tool, thanks to this first pilot test implementation, the CMPF now has an 
instrument with which to better “fine-tune” the MPM before implementing it in the 
remaining 19 EU countries. 
The CMPF will, then, apply the fine-tuned version in the 19 EU countries that were not 
included in the test-implementation. The data will be collected through fieldwork and 
through the assistance of a network of local correspondents. The establishment of a local 
network of correspondents (as for the MPM pilot-test implementation in the current project) 
proved to be useful and unavoidable, mainly in the collection of socio-political data. 
After this additional fine-tuning operation, the application of the MPM could become a 
regular process in the EU countries and could also be recommended in the accession 
countries. Moreover, as the digital market is rapidly developing, the tool should be 
“maintained” and regularly updated according to developments in the information society. 
 
6.7. Restructuring of Risk Domains  
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The focusing of the MPM2014 on news and current affairs has led to significant changes in 
some risk domains, in particular the domains Cultural Pluralism in the Media, Geographical 
Pluralism in the Media, and Pluralism of media types and genres. The Cultural Pluralism is 
focused on the universality of the media’s accessibility and representation, especially in 
relation to minorities and special needs groups. The Geographical Pluralism covers the level 
of representation of local and regional communities. The Pluralism of media types and 
genres covers guarantees that the markets remain pluralistic in the distribution of 
information of public interest, or the supply of public service media. Merging these risk 
domains in a single one devoted to Universality can be considered. This new risk domain 
will reflect the current focus of these three risk domains on access and representation of 
minorities, regions, special groups, as well as universality of content distribution.  
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APPENDIX 1: COUNTRY REPORTS  
 
The country reports have been written by the country correspondent and have been edited by the CMPF 
team.  
 
List of country correspondents:  
Bulgaria: Orlin Spassov, Nelly Ognyanova, Nikoleta Daskalova 
Belgium: Peggy Valcke, Ellen Wauters, Pieter-Jan Ombelet 
Denmark: Ida Willig, Christian Berg 
Estonia: Halliki Harro-Loit, Urmas Loit 
France: Thierry Vedel 
Greece: Anna Kandyla, Tania Kyriakou, Evangelia Psychogiopoulou 
Hungary: Amy Brouillette, 
Peter Bajomi-Lazar  
Judith Bayer 
Borbala Toth 
 
Italy: Elda Brogi, Andrea Calderaro, Alina Ostling, 
UK: Robert Picard, Jelena Dzakula 
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COUNTRY REPORT: BELGIUM 
(December 2014) 
 
Introduction  
 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for Belgium shows a low/medium risk for media pluralism in the 
country. The results collected by implementing the MPM in Belgium, show risks in the country as follows: 
23% (8) of the indicators assess a high risk; 12% (4) of indicators indicate medium risk, and 65% (22) refer 
to low risk. 
Despite being a small country, Belgium has three linguistic communities: the Flemish, French and 
German-speaking ones (with powers mainly in the domains of culture (theatre, libraries, audiovisual 
media, etc., education, health care, social welfare and protection of youth), In parallel three Regions - the 
Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-Capital Region are competent in economic affairs [agriculture, energy, 
employment, city and local transport], environmental planning and tourism. During the successive state 
reforms (which started in 1970) the Community authorities have been given more powers to regulate the 
(audiovisual) media markets. As a consequence, each Community has its own media law and a separate 
media regulator (with sometimes varying tasks and competencies). For example, the French Community 
regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA), is authorised to monitor concentration indices 
and to take regulatory action if they conclude that the media market in the French Community is 
becoming too concentrated, whereas the Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (VRM) of the Flemish 
Community only monitors and publishes reports on media concentration.6 During the stakeholder 
workshop, the majority of the stakeholders agreed that media in Belgium had to be assessed along the lines 
of a market for Dutch speaking and French speaking media. 
This linguistic diversity resulted in an economic reality, which has two separate media markets. No 
separate market for German-speaking media has been assessed. This was agreed upon by the research 
team and the stakeholders. The Medienrat, the media regulator of the German-speaking Community in 
Belgium, was contacted to address this issue, and their President, Mr. Yves Derwahl, stated that the 
German-speaking population mostly watches German television. They have three media providers, solely 
offering radio services (BRF, Offener Kanal Ostbelgien and Private Sender). Nevertheless, they have 
access to the Flemish and French Community media outlets. Certain media outlets concentrate on the 
Flemish speaking Community with their predominantly Flemish speaking population, while other outlets 
address the predominantly French-speaking population of the French speaking Community. This widely 
accepted division of the media markets7 results in media markets that are small if compared to 
neighbouring countries, like France, Germany or the Netherlands.  
Moreover, the increased autonomy of regional authorities explains the need to assess the indicators of the 
Media Pluralism Monitor for both markets separately in those aspects, which fall under the competences 
of the regional Communities (e.g., legislation on radio and television broadcasting). Nevertheless, the 
reader should understand that despite the fact that the Dutch speaking media are aimed at the Flemish 
                                               
6 Valcke, P., Groebel, J. and Bittner, M., “Media Ownership and Concentration in Belgium”, in Noam, E., Media 
Concentration around the World – Country Studies (in print).  
7 Valcke, P., Groebel, J. and Bittner, M., “Media Ownership and Concentration in Belgium”, in Noam, E., Media 
Concentration around the World – Country Studies (in print). 
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Community, and that French speaking media are consumed mostly by the French speaking population of 
the French Community, we have considered them to be national media, as opposed to regional media, 
because no one is prevented from accessing all of the available sources provided in both languages, 
irrespective of location. This approach to the Belgian national market is accepted as a working definition 
for this pilot testing of the MPM, however, it needs a better justification, specification and possible 
revision. The media policy of the bilingual region, Brussels-capital, falls within the competencies of both 
the Flemish and French Community. Their results have been taken into account in assessing both markets. 
By contrast, the situation was assessed at national level for those indicators relating to issues regulated by 
the Federal authorities (such as the availability of broadband).  
 
Graph 1: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - Belgium 
 
Legal Type of Indicator Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
In relation to the legal risks to media pluralism, the overall assessment concluded that there is a low risk 
for most legal indicators. Furthermore, the few medium and high risks can be considered within the 
context of some specific aspects of the country. 
Indicator 4 Regulatory safeguards for journalistic profession has a medium risk score, which is due to 
one variable. There is indeed no mechanism in Belgium granting social protection to journalists in the case 
of changes in ownership and consequently the medium risk is justified, as this is a real lacuna in our federal 
legislation. 
Indicator 8 Regulatory safeguards for minority and community media shows a high risk in both the 
Flemish and French speaking Communities. The existing arrangement for the two distinct media markets 
for both big linguistic groups leads to the fact that there are relatively few linguistic minorities and 
communities that are not yet represented in national or regional media. There are therefore few 
stipulations in the media legislation concerning minority and community media. However, community 
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media, amongst other things, are expected to provide for other minorities, e.g., religious minorities. In the 
French speaking Community, community radio stations (radios associatives et d’expression à vocation culturelle ou 
d’éducation permanente) have been recognised for several years. According to Valcke and Lievens “[t]hese are 
independent radios mainly staffed by volunteers with programmes focused either on information, education, cultural 
development and citizen’s participation, or on musical genres that do not belong to the most popular ones”8 Recently, in 
2014, the Flemish Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting changed, explicitly recognising non-profit 
“(local) community radio” as a separate category, besides commercial (local) radio stations. The results of 
this regulatory change can only be assessed in the coming years. This recent legislative initiative further 
shows that, during our assessment of the indicators, the scores for the Flemish and French speaking 
Community may differ. However, the changes did not amount to a different overall score.  
Similarly, indicator 6 Policies and support measures for media literacy (or digital literacy in particular) 
among different groups of population showed differing results between the Flemish and French 
Community. The Flemish Community definitely has seen more media literacy initiatives than the French 
Community. The Flemish government explicitly brought media literacy forward as a crucial aspect of 
policy goals in their policy note, 2009-2013. However, the French Community has increasingly integrated 
media education into their educational system in the last decade. The risk for this indicator for both 
Communities is therefore low, but separate assessment showed that both Communities have a different 
approach when it comes to media literacy.  
The division of media markets also explains a high risk for indicator 10 Regulatory safeguards for 
locally oriented and locally produced content on PSM channels and services. Both the Flemish and 
French speaking PSM send their reporters to local events, without any difficulties or transport related 
issues. In this regard, certain questions seemed irrelevant in Belgium, as we don’t have regional languages 
within the boundaries of each community. However, if media outlets for each linguistic Community are 
perceived as being national media, there needs to be attention also given to the safeguards for each outlet 
presenting content that comes from the other Community. No specific rules exist in this regard.  
Indicator 11 Regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of the media shows a high risk. This 
indicator aimed to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for universal 
coverage of the media (which is regulated at a federal level). Today, Belgium does not have rural areas 
without access to broadband networks. The Communications Committee of the European Commission 
acknowledged this in their Working Document stating that “[in] Belgium (…) all the homes are already 
covered by fixed broadband technology.” The same applies to the distribution of newspapers in Belgium. 
Every area can receive both Flemish and French newspapers, without exceptions. Certain questions thus 
had to be answered negatively, especially those concerning the State’s active measures to promote access 
to broadband networks. The State takes no active measures, since there are no homes that lack fixed 
broadband technology.  
Indicator 20 Policy measures for the impartial circulation of internet data, without regard to 
content, destination or source results in a medium risk for Belgium. Belgium is aware of the issue of net 
neutrality and started discussing measures to address this, but thus far no firm obligations have been 
adopted. The Federal Parliamentary Commission for Infrastructure continued working on this topic and 
developed extensive guidelines that will eventually result in more stringent legal requirements concerning 
net neutrality. Furthermore, the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications already has 
certain powers to intervene if necessary. In conclusion, Belgium has not yet introduced strict legal 
obligations for operators requiring them to respect net neutrality as, e.g., the Netherlands has (which 
                                               
8 Valcke, Peggy and Lievens, Eva, Media Law in Belgium, Kluwer, Alphen aan de Rhijn, 2010, p. 86.  
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justifies the medium risk). However, policy makers are aware of the issue and have kept net neutrality on 
their agenda.  
 
Economic Type of Indicator Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The scores for the economic indicators in Belgium show a more problematic situation if compared to the 
legal indicators, and this demands further explanation. Most economic indicators need assessment at the 
regional level (only the low risk indicator 24 Availability and quality of broadband concerned federal 
legislation, which could lead to the demonstration of a higher risk for media concentration. Due to the 
relatively small market, only a few companies own all of the newspapers and/or television channels in 
both the Flemish and French Community. For example, Concentra owns all of the Flemish regional 
newspapers (there are only two) as well as some of the regional TV channels. In the French speaking 
community, the Sudpresse group has the largest market share.  
This means that these indicators are obviously high for the Flemish and French speaking Communities 
due to the small size of the markets. Furthermore, the media sample used in indicator 26 Centralisation 
of the national media system seems to be too big for smaller countries, as there are not 10 national daily 
newspapers in the Flemish, nor in the French speaking community. The same goes for national radio 
stations. 
To conclude, there is a high level of ownership concentration in the Flemish Community in the market for 
television, radio, newspapers and the internet. For the French speaking Community, the level of 
concentration is even higher. Recently, there has been intense criticism following a number of mergers in 
the media sector. The pluralism of media ownership is clearly affected by this high concentration. This 
may eventually also have a negative impact on the diversity of media content. However, in order to 
maintain the economic viability of the Community’s media companies, a high level of concentration seems 
inevitable.  
 
Socio-political Type of Indicator Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
With regard to the socio-political risks to media pluralism, the general impression is that, in Belgium, risks 
in these areas are rather low. Comments on some of these indicators have been addressed by the 
stakeholders. Two indicators scored a medium risk: 33 Level of independence of PSM considering 
mechanisms of its financing and 34 Independence and ownership of news agencies. With regard to 
the level of independence of PSM, the stakeholders indicated that license fees in the Flemish Community 
and the Region of Brussels-Capital were abolished several years ago, although license fee is still applicable 
in the Walloon Region. Most experts agreed that the risk was rather low. However, one of the experts was 
opposed to this view and was of the opinion that there is no public discussion and no real democratic 
control on the budget of the PSM of the French speaking Community.  
With regard to the independence and ownership of news agencies, there is also a medium risk. Only one 
main national news agency provides for both the Flemish and French speaking Community: Belga. The 
shareholders of Belga are the publishers of print and audiovisual media. Since Belga is the only news 
agency, it has a market share above 50%, resulting in a high risk on that particular question. On political 
affiliation and dependence, the risk is indicated as low. Both experts and stakeholders agreed that the 
overall risk for this indicator is medium.  
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Concerning indicator 30 Political control over media and distribution networks ownership, the 
experts agreed that the overall risk is low. However, some indicated that there is a subtle link between 
politics and media ownership, albeit not a dangerous one. They also indicated that these links are very 
difficult to prove.  
 
 
Graph 2: Level of risk for each risk domain - Belgium 
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COUNTRY REPORT: BULGARIA 
(June 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for Bulgaria shows a medium/high risk for media pluralism in the 
country. In general, the risks to media pluralism in Bulgaria are divided as follows: 32% (11) of the 
indicators fall within the zone of high risk; 53% (18) indicate medium risk, and 15 % (5) refer to low risk.  
 
 
Graph 3: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - Bulgaria 
 
Legal Type of Indicator Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The legal indicators show low (four indicators), medium (nine indicators) or high (seven indicators) risks 
for the different aspects of media pluralism in Bulgaria. 
Low risk has been identified in the following indicators: Regulatory safeguards for access to 
airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups (7); Regulatory safeguards for locally 
oriented and locally produced news delivered by PSM channels and services (10); Fair, objective 
and transparent appointment procedures for PSM professionals and management boards (17); 
Regulatory safeguards for the distribution of public interest channels on cable, DSL and/or 
satellite platforms (18).  
The indicators concerning PSM fall into this group with one exception (indicator 19 Regulatory 
safeguards for the objective and independent allocation of adequate, consistent and sufficient 
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financial resources to PSM). The formerly state-owned radio Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) has been 
transformed, relatively successfully, into a public radio with seven regional centres in the country and one 
regional radio programme for the capital, Sofia.  
The formerly state-owned television, Bulgarian National Television (BNT), has four regional centres 
situated in the cities of Blagoevgrad, Varna, Plovdiv and Russe. BNT and BNR have regional 
correspondents. PSM are regulated by the law both strictly and in detail. A broad spectrum of measures 
aimed at transparency and grounded on objective criteria for appointments and dismissals in PSM have 
been implemented. Nevertheless, the independence of PSM is still not fully protected in practice. The 
effective implementation of the legal safeguards for appointment and dismissal procedures in PSM is a 
function of the independence of the Council for Electronic Media (CEM) and varies according to its 
composition. 
The legal measures are also effective – must-carry and must-offer rules were introduced at the initial stage 
of the liberalisation of the market for the main programme services of the PSM (cable and satellite must-
carry). BNT and BNR provide at no charge (FTA) programme services to their cable, satellite and digital 
terrestrial broadcasting. 
A large number of commercial TV programme services have been licensed for mandatory DTT 
transmission. Nevertheless, the absence of must-offer obligations for commercial TV stations, combined 
with the high costs of DTT transmission, is reducing the number of commercial FTA programme services 
that are transmitted terrestrially. 
Medium risk has been identified in the following indicators: Regulatory safeguards for freedom of 
expression (1), Regulatory safeguards for right to information (2), Recognition of media pluralism 
as intrinsic part of media freedoms and/or as a policy objective of media legislation and/or 
regulation (3), Regulatory safeguards for the journalistic profession (4), Policies and support 
measures for media literacy (and digital literacy in particular) among different groups of 
population (6), Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of ownership and/or control in 
media, high degree of cross ownership between television and other media, for transparency of 
ownership and/or control (12–14) and policy measures for the impartial circulation of internet 
data, without regard to content, destination or source (20). 
Communication rights are explicitly recognised in the Constitution. Bulgaria has signed and ratified the 
relevant Treaty obligations with no significant exemptions. According to these, the press and the other 
mass information media are free and shall not be subjected to censorship. Individuals have criticised the 
government without official reprisal. Freedom of expression online is generally respected. The media’s 
regulatory environment is generally accepted as meeting international standards, but observers point to a 
continuing trend to biased implementation of the rules protecting media freedom. The existing laws do 
not provide fully effective protection for the access to information— the rules are bypassed, or they are 
selectively implemented.  
As a policy objective, media pluralism is envisaged in the Radio and Television Law concerning PSM only, 
according to which PSM shall reflect the different ideas and beliefs in society. The Constitutional Court 
recognises media pluralism as an intrinsic part of media freedoms. However, the principle of media 
pluralism is not respected in practice. A main problem is the lack of effective legal remedies against media 
concentrations and the non-transparency of media ownership. According to the European Commission’s 
first EU Anti-Corruption report, media ownership in Bulgaria is increasingly concentrated, thus 
compromising editorial independence.  
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Access to the journalistic profession is open. The protection of journalistic sources has generally been 
enforced. The ethical codes envisage a clear distinction between editorial decision-making, the commercial 
policy of the media and the protection of the editorial independence. Nevertheless, infringements of the 
rules are commonplace; self-regulation has proved ineffective in raising the standards of professionalism 
among journalists, as had been hoped.  
The promotion of media literacy is not the statutory duty of the media regulatory authority in Bulgaria. 
Academic centres and NGOs provide the specific knowledge that is necessary for different types of digital 
competency and media literacy.  
The risk in the field of media concentrations is medium. This conclusion is based on the fact that the 
media sector is not excluded from the scope of the implementation of the competition law. According to 
public opinion, however, non-transparent media ownership and the concentration of media outlets within 
a few conglomerates remain the weakest features of Bulgarian media, and the problem has continued to 
become more acute. Hidden forms of media ownership and control accompany the process of the 
liberalisation of the Bulgarian media market. No sector-specific competition measures are envisaged in 
Bulgarian law. The media have no obligation to publish their ownership structures on their websites or in 
documents that are accessible to the public.  
High risk has been identified in the following indicators: Regulatory safeguards for the 
independence and the efficiency of the relevant national authorities (5), Regulatory safeguards for 
minority and community media (8), Regulatory safeguards and policies for regional and local 
media (9), Regulatory safeguards for the universal coverage of the media (11), Regulatory 
safeguards for fair, balanced and impartial political reporting in media (15), Regulatory 
safeguards against excessive ownership and/or control of mainstream media by politicians (16), 
Regulatory safeguards for the objective and independent allocation of adequate, consistent and 
sufficient financial resources to PSM (19). 
The Council for Electronic Media (CEM) is defined by law as being an independent specialised body, 
which is guided by the public interest, protecting the freedom and pluralism of speech and information 
and the independence of media service providers. The competencies of the Council are sufficient, but 
some additional areas of competence are under discussion, such as: media pluralism evaluation, new media 
services’ evaluation in the context of the remit of PSM, etc. The members of the media regulator have 
often been nominated by civil society organisations and then elected after public hearings. The 
competition regulator in Bulgaria is the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC). The 
regulator in the area of electronic communications in Bulgaria is the Communications Regulation 
Commission (CRC). The risk of political and economic influence over the regulatory bodies varies, but 
their independence is generally assessed as being problematic. Apart from the political leanings of some 
members of the regulatory authorities, there are also cases when political pressure is suspected.  
Ownership of media by politicians is not explicitly prohibited or limited in Bulgaria, but interference is 
generally prohibited by law: The Radio and Television Law guarantees the freedom of media service 
providers and of the activities thereof from political and economic interference. When politicians are 
public office holders, in terms of the Conflict of Interest Prevention and Ascertainment Act, they have an 
obligation to disclose any private interest.  
Another domain of high risk is PSM funding. BNT and BNR are being financed via a state subsidy, 
defined year-on-year in the respective annual State Budget Act. BNT and BNR are allowed to include in 
their programming services a very limited amount of advertising. The state subsidies are calculated 
according to a ‘per hour of programming’ principle as detailed in the law. The Vice-President of the 
European Broadcasting Union, Claudio Cappon, during his visit in 2014, urged Bulgaria’s top politicians 
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to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for PSM. "Bulgarian public radio and television receive only a 
quarter of the EU’s average public funding, which i about 30 euros per capita. PSM need funds in order to 
be able to carry out their mission – something topical for all states in the European Union", he said. 
Budgets for public media are insufficient and their remit cannot be realised with the current level of 
funding, warned the President, Rosen Plevneliev. The National Assembly’s President confirmed that the 
Parliament is aware of the problem and is committed to finding a solution.  
Media law does not contain specific provisions for minority and community media. The Council for 
Electronic Media is obliged by the law to grant individual radio and television broadcasting licenses to 
radio and television broadcasters for national/regional programming services. The Bulgarian legislation 
does not envisage the reservation of frequencies for regional and local media, or must-carry rules for such 
media. Experts from CEM declare that, in practice, the specific experience of applicants from 
corresponding regions has been taken into account. There are regional newspapers in the major cities 
throughout the country, as well as local newspapers. 
Fair, balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and current affairs programmes 
on PSM channels and services is subject to regulation by the Radio and Television Law. There are no 
specific requirements concerning impartiality in news and current affairs programmes on the commercial 
channels and services. The access of political actors to airtime on PSM during election campaigns is not 
covered by media legislation because the election campaigns are regulated by the Election Code. 
 
Economic Type of Indicators Assessing the Risks to Media Pluralism 
There are significant economic risks to media pluralism in Bulgaria. Four of the six economic indicators 
are indicative of high-risk domains. There is one medium-risk domain. One indicator is evaluated as low 
risk, but its evaluation is under the circumstances of data shortages and lack of ownership transparency, 
which is a risk to media pluralism in its own right. 
Low risk has been identified in the domain of 26 Centralisation of the national media system. 
Regional media are relatively well developed in terms of the numbers of titles and outlets. According to 
data from the National Statistical Institute, the proportion of regional and local TV and radio channels to 
national channels is above 80% of the proportion of regional to national population. The proportion of 
existing regional and local newspapers to the national newspapers is under 80% of the proportion of 
regional to national population. The audience share of local and regional TV stations is estimated by the 
Council for Electronic Media to be between 5-15% and the audience share of local and regional radio 
stations is estimated to be between 10-30%. Although general evaluation is of low risk, the lack of accurate 
data on all aspects of media system centralisation is already indicative of structural deficiencies within the 
system.  
Medium risk has been identified in the domain of 24 Availability and quality of broadband. Fixed 
and mobile broadband penetration in the country is below the EU average. The quality of available 
broadband, however, is of a high level. Both download and upload speeds are higher than the EU average. 
In addition, the country is among the top 3 member states within the EU with the highest growth rates in 
fixed broadband penetration. 
High risk has been identified in the domains of 21 Media ownership concentration; 22 Media 
audience and readership concentration; 23 Number of sectors in which Top 8 firms/owners are 
active; 25 Minority and community media. 
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Concentration of media ownership is very high. The Top 4 major owners in the television sector have an 
aggregated market share (based on advertising revenue only) of 93.35%. The Top 4 major owners of daily 
newspapers have an aggregated market share of 79.7%. The Top 4 major ISPs have an estimated market 
share that is above 50%. The market shares of owners of radio stations cannot be evaluated. 
Audience and readership media concentration is also very high. In television, the Top 4 major owners 
have an audience share that is above 70%. An aggregated audience share of the Top 4 major owners in the 
radio sector is 83.16%. The Top 4 major newspaper owners have an estimated readership share between 
25-49%, and the subscription share of the Top 4 major ISPs is estimated to be above 50%. 
A precise evaluation of cross-ownership is difficult to track due to deficiencies in the data. As far as the 
data that are available are concerned, they point to the assessment that the Top 8 major owners have a 
market share that is above 70% across the different media sectors.  
Minority and community media development is another high-risk factor. There is no television or radio 
channel that is dedicated to ethnic, linguistic or national minorities. Existing minority newspapers are very 
few and far smaller than the proportional size of the minority population.  
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Generally, there are medium socio-political risks to media pluralism in Bulgaria. All eight socio-political 
indicators (27–34) are indicative of medium-risk domains. 
Policymaking in regard to the promotion of access to media content and services by special needs groups 
is underdeveloped. There is a national strategy that envisages an effective legal framework obliging all 
media to provide content in an adequate and appropriate way to people with disabilities, as well as access 
to all types of media content (print, broadcast, audio, audio-visual, online). Such standards, however, have 
not yet been effectively introduced. As a whole, access to television content by people with hearing 
disabilities is limited.  
The universal coverage of PSM and broadband networks in relation to geographical coverage faces some 
difficulties. It has been calculated that less than 98% of the population (96.2%) is covered by the public 
TV channels’ signal (terrestrial broadcasting). Some compensatory measures are being taken by the state to 
guarantee access to digital television for those individuals who are deprived of the free television signal. 
More than 99% of the population has access to public radio broadcasting. The rural coverage of DSL is 
less than 75%. The rural coverage of cable modem exceeds 15%. The relatively low general internet 
penetration in rural areas remains a problem.  
The evaluation of political bias in the media during the election campaign for the European Parliament in 
May, 2014, indicated that the selected media represent the main political actors in a relatively balanced 
manner (one group – “other actors” – is more than 20% above the balanced representation of 25% per 
group, but this fact can be assessed as being a reflection of the presence of a wide variety of opinions). 
The proportion of the one-sided portrayal of political actors in the selected media items is low (under 
25%).  
Data on the political affiliations of media owners are generally insufficient. There is a deficit in 
transparency in regard to media ownership (especially of the press). A precise evaluation of the market 
shares, based on the total revenues of the media companies operating in Bulgaria, is hardly feasible. As a 
whole, the politically affiliated owners of leading media distribution networks who have been identified 
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tend to occasionally discriminate against other market players.  
The ratio of the state advertising and the audience share are relatively balanced in television and radio; 
there is no transparency for the press. Public service media receive comparatively low funding. A relatively 
small number of companies make use of public funds to a greater extent than do others. The law allows 
(for electronic media) the resources to be granted without public procurement, which is a precondition for 
subjectivism and political influence. Some of the campaigns have an unproven effectiveness.  
Two alternative Codes of Ethics coexist in Bulgaria. As a result, the ethical standards are split according to 
the interests of different media groups. In practice, professional and trade union protection of journalists 
is very ineffective. With a few exceptions, there is a lack of confidence in the organisations that have 
declared such goals. Instead of turning to the trade unions, journalists are increasingly looking for support 
and protection directly from the NGO community. 
The major mechanism for financing the public Bulgarian National Television (BNT) and Bulgarian 
National Radio (BNR) is the annual state budget subsidy. The state subsidy exceeds 25% of the total 
budget of both BNT and BNR. The government does not decide on the wages for the PSM’s employees. 
The wages of the employees are decided by the managing bodies of BNT and BNR. 
The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA), the largest news agency, is owned by the state. The market share 
of BTA is estimated to be between 30% and 50%. The appointment of key personnel at BTA is 
considered to be mainly based on professional criteria. The institution has a reputation for high 
professional standards and political independence. In Bulgaria, there are two large private news agencies. A 
few more private media organisations call themselves “information agencies”, but they essentially operate 
as news sites that do not have many of the formal characteristics of a news agency.  
 
Graph 4: Level of risk for each risk domain - Bulgaria 
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COUNTRY REPORT: DENMARK  
(November 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for Denmark shows a low/medium risk for media pluralism in the 
country. According to the results obtained through the implementation of the MPM in Denmark, the risks 
in the country are divided as follows: 20% (7) of the indicators fall within the zone of high risk; 18% (6) 
indicate medium risk, and 62% (21) refer to low risk.  
 
 
Graph 5: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - Denmark 
 
Legal Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The overall conclusion of the legal indicators is that they pose relatively low risk. This conclusion is based 
on the fact that 14 indicators of 20 score low risk, 3 indicators score medium risk (6, 16 and 20), and the 
remaining 3 indicators assess a high risk (7, 9 and 14).  
The system functions based on the arm’s length principle, and it is relatively simple as the rules are 
adhered to. There is no general media pluralism legislation on ownership, but mergers and acquisitions 
have to be effectuated in accordance with the general competition rules. The media system is highly 
influenced by the public service media, especially in radio and television, but also online. This has resulted 
in recent discussions on competition between public and private media, especially in relation to digital 
media provisioning. Small markets like the Danish one, with a population of about 5.6 million, will have 
difficulties in securing the provisioning of sufficient content without some degree of intervention from the 
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state. The Danish model has been one of relatively limited regulation of the private commercial media in 
terms of content and ownership. However, it has stricter rules on advertising and product placement if 
compared to the UK, for example. Overall, the system provides an outcome of media pluralism, while 
taking into account that ownership does not necessarily reduce pluralism of content, but can be necessary 
to ensure sufficient turnover in order to have a profitable media sector. Nevertheless, potential risks 
should be explored.  
Regarding freedom of information and freedom of speech, the Danish legal system follows the practice of 
the European court of Human Rights (see also the report from the Mediadem project 
[http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Denmark.pdf]). Denmark does not 
have a Constitutional Court as such, but its Supreme Court can be considered to have the same functions. 
There have been no legal cases (litigation) regarding media pluralism, or regarding limitations on media 
pluralism. There are no specific laws in Denmark regarding media pluralism, for instance, regarding media 
concentration, but the issue is covered by the general competition regulation. It is also important to note 
that the Danish laws on public service radio and television demand diverse programming and that all 
public service media have editorial freedom. Furthermore, there is a media subsidy system (innovation 
pool and direct subsidies) for editorial content for the written press online and in print, which is based on 
a perspective on pluralism. The Danish media system has various boards which function independently of 
the political system and that work as defined in law and following their statutory obligations. Finally, 
pluralism of the media and of content is a general principle of the media laws, especially concerning public 
service and media subsidies. 
However, there are three indicators that are assessed as high-risk indicators. For all of them it is important 
to note, that this is the result of a methodology that is comparative and not finely tuned to the Danish 
media system in particular. The definition of the indicators and the empirical questions does simply not fit 
policies in Denmark. Therefore, the risk assessment ‘high’ for the three indicators should not be read as a 
conclusive empirical analysis, but an issue to be examined further.  
Indicator 7 Safeguard for access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups is one 
of them as the PSM due to the tradition of editorial independence are not limited by law in any way in 
terms of choosing who should and should not have access to airtime – outside of elections, where there is 
an obligation. For instance §10 in the Radio and Television act state that “The overall public service activities 
shall, via television, radio and the Internet or similar, provide the Danish population with a wide selection of programmes and 
services comprising news coverage, general information, education, art and entertainment. Quality, versatility and diversity 
must be aimed at in the range of programmes provided. In the planning of programmes, freedom of information and of 
expression shall be a primary concern. Objectivity and impartiality must be sought in the information coverage. Programming 
shall ensure that the general public has access to important information on society and debate. Furthermore, particular 
emphasis shall be placed on Danish language and culture. Programming shall cover all genres in the production of art and 
culture and provide programmes that reflect the diversity of cultural interests in Danish society.” 
(https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=161625). This is also reflected in the public 
service contract, valid until end of 2014 (own translation): “DR in its supply of public service must pursue quality, 
versatility and diversity. When scheduling, the emphasis must firmly be on the need for freedom of information and freedom of 
speech. For information, emphasis must be placed on objectivity and impartiality.” 
(http://kum.dk/uploads/tx_templavoila/DRpublic%20service-kontrakt%20af%203%20%20juni%202013.pdf). The 
condition that various cultural and social groups do not have access to airtime per definition should not be 
necessarily considered a risk indicator. Note that various cultural and social groups are not excluded, but 
they do not have a right to access airtime directly, nor a right for having their own content distributed on 
the PSM. Nevertheless, there are provisions for services for different social groups. 
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Another indicator that demonstrates high risk is indicator 9 Regulatory safeguards and policies for 
regional and local media. Here, the variables must be considered too unspecific for the Danish case, 
especially variables 3 on media regulation that prohibit networking arrangements between regional/local 
media and national media and variable 4 on must carry rules). As such, there are regulatory safeguards and 
policies for regional and local media in Denmark which include the presence of minorities in community 
radio and television stations, but the way the indicator are defined makes the risk factor high contrary to 
actual policy.  
The last legal indicator scoring high risk is 14 Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership 
and/or control. In Denmark, there are no separate rules on transparency for media companies. Instead 
they follow the general rules as stated in the Financial Statements Act 
(https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=135933). Private limited and co-operative 
companies have to state all owners with more than 5 % ownership. All ownership above 20 % of the 
shares has to be stated in the annual accounts. The fact that media companies follow the general rules 
does not mean that there is no transparency or that information is not available. Firstly, everyone can 
access the annual accounts of media companies, although there is a fee at the company register (cvr.dk), 
and most companies have the accounts on their website. Furthermore, in terms of ownership of media 
companies, the Danish Agency for Culture from 2014 publishes a report, including information about the 
ownership of the main media companies. It is also made publicly available. Additionally, there is an 
ownership register on its way and it should be ready in early 2015.  
 
Economic Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Denmark is a dual media system with strong public service media. The general competition is an oligopoly 
in radio, television and print. The online environment is also heavily influenced by competition from the 
legacy platforms, but remains a bit more diverse, albeit dominated by Google and Facebook. Domestically, 
the strong public service media (DR, TV 2) dominate the market for radio and television, closely followed 
by their private commercial competitors SBS Discovery Media (radio and television) and MTG 
(television). The print/news publisher JP/Politikens Hus and Berlingske Media dominate the national 
news print market (and also have strong hyperlocal weeklies), but there are strong regional competitors for 
local news. In recent years there have been a set of mergers and acquisitions within commercial media. 
Furthermore, the existing media have particularly increased the number of television channels and digital 
offers (i.e., apps, streaming services, and so on). 
The public service media system consists of DR (with the following television channels DR1, DR2, DR3, 
DRK, Ramasjang and DR Ultra, as well as the following radio channels P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6 BEAT, P7 
MIX, P8 JAZZ, DR RAMASJANG/ULTRA), TV2/Denmark A/S (the public service channel TV 2, TV 
2 Zulu, TV 2 Charlie, TV 2 NEWS, TV 2 Fri and TV 2 FILM), eight regional television stations and 
24syv, a privately owned public service radio channel. 
The principal commercial television stations are SBS Discovery Media (with the television channels Kanal 
4, Kanal 5, 6’eren, ID, EUROSPORT 1, EUROSPORT 2, Discovery Channel, Discovery World, 
Discovery Science, Discovery HD Showcase, TLC, Animal Planet, Animal Planet HD, as well as the 
following radio channels NOVA, Radio 100, The Voice, myROCK, Radio Soft, as well as a 40 % share in 
Pop FM) and MTG TV A/S (TV3, TV3+, TV3 PULS, TV3 Sport 1, TV3 Sport 2, MTV og VH1). Note 
that the private commercial television companies are all registered in the UK, using the country of origin 
principle in the AVMS directive. Nonetheless, they still purchase Danish productions and thus help to 
sustain the funding ecosystem for audiovisual productions.  
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The television market has seen an increase in channels in recent years in both public and private media, 
through the establishment of numerous new channels. The public service media, while having suffered a 
loss in their main channels, have managed to diversify their product to more specifically target groups like 
small children (DR Ramasjang), and children who are a little older (DR Ultra), but also through a 
specifically cultural channel (DR K). The private media have done something similar, by targeting their 
channels to specific groups. 
The principal print media companies are the duopoly of JP/Politikens Hus and Berlingske Media on the 
national level, and an oligopoly of media on the local/regional level, with Nordjyske Medier, Sjællandske 
Medier and Jyske Fynske medier (a current merger between the regional news publishers Fynske medier, 
Jyske Medier and Syddanske Medier). In recent years there has been a significant increase in online 
advertising, while print advertising has dwindled. This has left the print press in a dilemma where their 
turnover from advertising in the print editions has decreased, while that for the digital services has not – 
yet – to the same degree overtaken the reduction in turnover. Nonetheless, the main revenue for news 
publishers – for now – still comes from the print editions. The media system is in hasty development, but 
the development in media use remains evolutionary, rather than being related to a revolutionary 
introduction and take-up of digital services. 
The overall conclusion of the economic indicators is that the risk is generally high. 2 of 6 economic 
indicators score low risk (indicators 24 Availability and quality of broadband and 26 Centralisation of 
the national media system), 1 scores medium risk (indicator 25 Minority and community media) and 
3 - high risk (indicators 21 Media ownership concentration, 22 Media audience and readership 
concentration and 23 Number of sectors in which top 8 firms/owners are active).  
This result can be explained by two factors: 1) Denmark is a small media market, and 2) the Danish state is 
a large domestic media owner, owning the two large broadcasting companies as well as 8 regional public 
service broadcasters (based on license fee funding), with one regional television channel each and regional 
windows on the largest television channel TV 2, if measured by audience. In regard to the relatively small 
size of the Danish media market, this is the case for most media commodities and is especially the case for 
news media and the production of domestic audiovisual content, for instance, high quality drama and 
content for children. As the population is just above 5.6 million, there is a limited number of consumers to 
pay for media content. In order to secure pluralism of media content, there is a tradition of broad political 
support for the existence of strong public service media and some degree of subsidy for editorial content 
in printed and online news media (a new scheme was implemented on 1st January, 2014) as well as 
subsidies for community radio and television.  
Nevertheless, these indicators should also be examined in combination with other indicators in order to 
see if the risk to external media pluralism is compensated by the presence of well-safeguarded internal 
pluralism, which is, in principle, typical of PSM. Regarding the fact that the Danish state is a very large 
domestic media owner, it is important to stress that the state does not attempt to influence the media or 
the media content. On the contrary, there is a strong political commitment to the arm’s length principle. 
The remit defining the role and obligations of the public service media is set in media agreements (usually 
for a four year period), often such agreements represent most parties, meaning that even after an election 
the agreement continues to hold. 
Furthermore, in regard to ownership concentration, the basis of the oligopoly should be included. In 
general, oligopolies are the trend, especially in the television and newspaper markets in small countries, 
although there are exceptions.  
Due to the new media environment, with increased competition for advertising from companies like 
Google and Facebook, but also with increased news provisioning online, which has reduced circulation 
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and subscription revenue, there has been a period of consolidation, especially for printed news companies 
(especially regional news providers) but also for national radio.  
In regard to the economic indicators, we would like to note that the questions regarding minorities seems 
more suited to a particular media system other than a democratic-corporatist media system. Minorities do 
have community radio- and television stations, which can receive funding from the State. A new system 
for community television is being implemented this year (2014), which aims to increase quality and to 
secure a local connection. The result is a reduced number of local community channels, but with increased 
airtime and higher subsidy per channel. State advertising is based on clear criteria, and there is no 
indication of favouritism. The same is the case for advertising from the municipalities.  
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The overall conclusion of the socio-political indicators is that they pose a low-medium risk, except for 
indicator 29 Representation of political views in the media, where the result is a high risk. Other 
indicators score the following level of risk: 5 of 8 assess a low risk (indicators 27, 30, 31, 32 and 33) and 2 
indicators score medium risk (indicators 28 Guarantees for universal coverage of PSM and broadband 
networks regarding geographic coverage and 34 Independence and ownership of news agencies). 
The high risk scoring of indicator 29 however can be attributed to the limited scope of the content 
analysis conducted as part of the MPM. Additionally, there is a challenge in the sampled and analysed 
media formats. Neither of the two Danish broadcasters show political talk shows, which is a genre more 
common in, for instance, the UK and the south of Europe. In Denmark, there are political interviews in 
relation to general newscasts, and there are soft talk shows where politicians are interviewed on current 
affairs, but no political talk shows as such. A bigger sample and a more qualitative approach could uncover 
a different scoring for this indicator of political bias.  
In relation to the medium risk scoring of indicator 34 Independence and ownership of news agencies, 
it is important to note that the largest Danish news agency is owned by the media (or, more precisely, by 
most of the Danish media, both electronic and print) as this explains the high degree of ownership 
concentration.  
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Graph 6: Level of risk for each risk domain - Denmark 
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COUNTRY REPORT: ESTONIA9  
(July 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for Estonia shows a medium risk for media pluralism in the 
country. The results collected by implementing the MPM in Estonia, show risks in the country as follows: 
35% (12) of the indicators assess a high risk; 18% (6) of indicators indicate medium risk, and 47% (16) 
refer to low risk. 
 
Graph 7: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - Estonia 
 
Legal Structure Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Indicators assessing the national legal framework show the following level of risks: 7 indicators highlight a 
high risk (indicators 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 16), 5 indicators show a medium risk (5, 6, 10, 12 and 13), and 8 
indicators score low risk (1, 2, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20).  
 
Freedom of expression (indicator 1), freedom of information (indicator 2) are generally guaranteed. 
Estonia belongs to the group of countries in which there are few laws specifically regulating the media 
field. Indicator 3, technically, scores high risk, as there is no over-regulation in the media sector. 
                                               
9 This report is partially edited by CMPF: it is mostly based on the narrative report and on the information uploaded 
in the online platform by the country team.  
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Indicator 4 on regulatory safeguards for journalistic profession scores high risk: the profession is open. 
Journalistic sources are protected according to the law: the effective implementation in court cases of this 
principle is difficult to assess, as protection of sources cases in Estonia are rare. It must be stressed that 
the Supreme Court of Estonia ruled that online media are responsible also of comments posted online by 
the users. The case of the portal Delfi, that was considered responsible by the Estonian Supreme Court, 
was submitted to the European Court of Human Rights that decided with a controversial ruling, that there 
was no infringement of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ruling was referred 
to the Grand Chamber of the Court10. 
Estonia is a country running liberal economic principles, introducing the value principles that are directed 
by the EU. The Electronic Communication Act foresees that two agencies are empowered to supervise 
the sector. The medium risk for indicator 5 comes from the fact that most government agencies are 
underfinanced, thus there is no particular discrepancy with the agencies for the media sector.  
In Estonia, the law does not address media ownership concentration (except for Article 32 in the Media 
Services Act, which, however, is a mere declaration and is hard to implement in real life) The results of the 
pilot-test implementation on this country must be evaluated in the light of the size of the media market 
(indicator 12) A small country, with a small media market and low GDP, in fact, is more likely to develop a 
concentrated market. Transparency of ownership (indicator 14) has been legally granted – e.g., access to 
the commercial register is available online 24/7. The data on a legal entity are stored at the commercial 
register, the contents of which are publicly available over the internet. Journalists seldom use this 
information. However, in cases of media acquisition, the media’s attention is strongly drawn to the topic.  
Indicators 7, 8, 9 all relate to how media content is regulated. In this respect the last 20-25 years of liberal 
tradition applies, and the government generally avoids legislating on media content. The risk for indicator 
7, for instance, is high, because there is no regulation granting access to the PSM by various social and 
cultural groups. However, the law prescribes among the functions of the public service that it must (1) 
"distribute the programmes and media services introducing Estonian culture and society all over the 
world", and (2) "transmit programmes which, within the limits of the possibilities of Public Broadcasting, 
meet the information needs of all sections of the population, including minorities" (Art. 5). The autonomy 
of the journalistic output is the most esteemed value. In the field of broadcasting it has been insisted upon, 
both for the public broadcaster (Art. 3 in the Estonian Public Broadcasting Act) and the private 
broadcasters (Art. 13 in the Media Services Act). 
internetInternet traffic management is exceptional (indicator 20) and open internet is de facto protected11.  
The medium risk for indicator 5 on Regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency of the 
relevant national authorities comes from the fact that most government agencies are being 
underfinanced.The Competition Authority – more than in any other field in Estonia – regularly specifies 
the natural monopolies in the field of electronic communication and it imposes the relevant obligations on 
those who dominate the market. Again, in a small market, a question about the reasonability of 
fragmenting the market due to economic policy always stands. 
When it comes to political communication (indicator 15, low risk), commercial broadcasters have a 
regulation in one Article of the Media Services Act (regulating communication during the active pre-
election period - providing all political subjects with equal opportunities. Before the adoption of the Media 
                                               
10 CMPF 
11 CMPF (source http://www.openforumacademy.org/library/ofa-
research/OFA%20Net%20Neutrality%20in%20the%20EU%20-%20Country%20Factsheets%2020130905.pdf) 
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Services Act the then Broadcasting Act stipulated that there should be equal access to the electronic 
media. The regulation of the code of conduct applies also to all broadcasters. Beyond that, the PSB has its 
own detailed regulation through the Estonian Public Broadcasting Act 1 which states that "the 
programmes of Public Broadcasting shall be politically balanced." (Art. 6). These principles have also been 
enforced by the Principles of Good Practice. In regard to political balance, the document (approved by the 
PSB's Broadcasting Council) stipulates that in programmes in which political actors have been involved, 
the principle of airtime balance shall be applied. As to making complaints, one can apply to the 
corresponding supervisory body - the Broadcasting Council, in the case of the PSB, and to the Technical 
Surveillance Authority for cases deriving from the Media Services Act. According to the Constitution, 
anyone has the right to appeal to the courts under any circumstances, in order to uphold his/her rights. 
The issues are not very frequently monitored by the supervisory agencies. 
Tthere is no advertising allowed in the PSB’s output  
The law does not offer provisions against excessive ownership and/or control of mainstream media by 
politicians (indicator 16, that, therefore scores high risk), however it does not appear that there is an acute 
need for this in Estonia. It is unwritten good conduct that politicians do not interfere with media, 
especially in a disguised manner. It has not been the case in Estonia that politicians hold shares in media 
undertakings. However, there is not legal framework to prevent them from doing so if they decide to.  
The code of ethics for the Estonian press stipulates that "Freedom of communication is the basic premise 
for a working democratic society, and the free press are the means and prerequisite for attaining it." (cl. 
1.1); "the press and other media shall serve the right of the public to receive true, fair and comprehensive 
information. The critical observation of the implementation of political and economic power is the main 
obligation of the press." (cl. 1.2) and "Editorial staff members may not be obliged by their employer to 
write or perform any like activity contradicting their personal convictions" (cl. 2.4).  
The National Public Broadcasting Act declares that "Public Broadcasting shall be independent in the 
production and transmission of its programmes, programme services and other media services and shall be 
guided exclusively by the requirements of law." (Art. 3). 
Indicator 17 scores low risk as to the PSM council. This is appointed by the Parliament's permanent 
commission (committee) on culture and the law, which also clarifies rules here (Art.-s 13-22). Inter alia, 
every political party represented in the Parliament shall be represented by one member on the Council, in 
addition to four expert members.  
Indicator 19 scores low risk, as regulatory safeguards for the objective and independent allocation of 
resources to PSM exist. Indeed, this result should be read in the general context of the overall budgetary 
possibilities in Estonia, but studies indicate that even proportionally the PSB is underfinanced for long-
term goals. Whilst the financing is not long-term based (allocations given annually from the state budgets) 
the PSB still writes three-year development plans which indicate the financial needs in detail. On the other 
hand, the state policy is not to plan the annual state budget by various laws, thus not leaving room for 
political debate over the state budget allocations. The option to politically determine the financial 
allocations thus leaves room for the possibility to politically manipulate the PSB. However, this has 
actually not been the case (i.e., the implementation of politically motivated punitive measures against the 
PSB).  
The official documents of ERR (the PSB) indicate that the public broadcaster has been underfinanced and 
needs additional professional resources (Loit, U. (2013) Mapping Digital Media. Estonia Report 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/mapping-digital-media-estonia, 34, referring to the 
Development Plan 2012-2015). 
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Economic Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Four indicators concerning the economic dimension of media pluralism in Estonia assess a high risk (21, 
23, 25 and 26), while only 2 indicators (22 and 24) show a low risk. In Estonia, the media market has an 
oligopolistic character – as it is tiny and thus cannot accommodate too many owners. The most 
problematic aspect here is the paucity of local and regional media. Local terrestrial television is disabled 
due to technological restrictions that are related to the digital turn – it needs to fit into a multiplex that is 
provided in the state radio frequency plan and, cost wise, it would be preferable to have a national 
terrestrial coverage, even for local content (as in the case of Tallinn Television (Tallinna Televisioon, TTV). 
The only locally licenced terrestrial television (Alo TV) ceased to exist after the digital change over on 1st 
July 2010, and continued on two national cable networks after that. The above-mentioned Tallinna 
Televisioon, in the capital city, is the only terrestrial television providing local news, but it is broadcast 
nationally all over the country. This TV-station is predominantly financed by the city government and has 
been heavily criticised for political favouritism towards the single-party sway in the capital city. The 
mainstream media also criticises the newspapers issued (and paid for) by local municipalities – mainly for 
“infringing” the local advertising market. The counter-claim is that the “big media” do not cover local 
issues sufficiently and the local powers need alternative ways to disseminate their messages. 
Journalistically, the output varies from papers published under conventional journalistic standards to 
papers under political influence (offering self-promotion for the local politicians and administration, rather 
than offering objective information).  
The share of local radios is also diminishing. There is no media policy addressing the local media, thereby 
providing support for the production of high-quality output. The local advertising market is indigent in 
providing enough resources to run comprehensive media content. Yet, the audience still very much wants 
this and, for instance, the Estonian Rescue Board relies on local media (especially radio) for crisis 
management. The latter, again, has no financial backing. 
Media for minorities is mostly related to the Russians and Russian speaking minorities. The Estonian 
media system as a whole has not succeeding in addressing Russian-language Estonian media to this 
segment of the population. It must be outlined that many Russophones appear to be culturally bound to 
media produced in Russia, which, for financial reasons, has the capacity to offer incomparably more 
diverse content than any of the Estonian channels. Daily papers in Russian have not proven to be 
profitable, whilst the public service Radio 4, in Russian, has been the most, or the second most listened to 
radio station among Russophones.  
There are some linguistic (dialectal) minorities in south-Estonia (Võro, Seto, Mulgi), who receive some 
subsidies to run their newspaper and newscasts on the national public radio. 
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
A generally low risk is assessed by combining the indicators included under the socio-political structure. In 
particular, 6 out of 8 indicators assess a low risk (27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32), only one indicator (33 Level of 
independence of PSM considering mechanisms of its financing) scores a high risk, while the 34 
Independence and ownership of news agencies assesses medium risk. However, indicator 29 Political 
bias in the media, which was measured by a content analysis of TV programmes over only few days, 
appears to be problematic. During the week designated for the data gathering, the real European 
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Parliament pre-election campaign was in its very initial stages and the full debate occurred only the 
following week. Either way, the monitored period of time is rather short to be representative.  
Indicator 27 Guarantees for universal access to media regarding special needs groups, is essential as 
an indicator and scores low risk. Indicator 31 Political control over media funding by advertising 
would benefit from a more detailed definition of “state advertising”. In Estonia, both state and public 
institutions buy advertising in all media types (public awareness campaigns) and give grants for producing 
specific programmes or articles. However, “state advertising” does not appear to be a tool with which to 
unequally distribute state funds among media organisations. In Estonia, the media plan is made by media 
agencies, based on target audiences and the actual ratings of the chosen media. Some public campaigns are 
run through the Broadcasters Association, during which the particular ad is on air in all member stations. 
Altogether, this is a “grey area” in terms of the transparency in using state funds, and this is difficult to 
track. However, there is no evidence that advertising that is bought by the state institutions would 
unavoidably induce “political control over media”.  
Since 2002 the law prohibits advertising on PSM and therefore its only source of financing would be 
allocations from the state budget. The allocations are not made by the government, but by the Parliament 
according to routine parliamentary procedures. They include at least some political debate and economic 
reasoning. It is the general level of national need, which influences the distribution of funds. This was a 
political decision not to bind PSM's financing with long-term state obligations. In the years of economic 
recession the finances of the PSM have also been cut (indicator 33). 
 
 
Graph 8: Level of risk for each risk domain - Estonia 
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COUNTRY REPORT: FRANCE 
(September 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for France shows a low/medium risk for media pluralism in the 
country. In general, the risks to media pluralism in France are divided as follows: 15% (5) of the indicators 
fall within the zone of high risk; 26% (9) indicate medium risk, and 59 % (20) refer to low risk.  
 
 
Graph 11: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - France 
 
Legal Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Overall, the legal risks to media pluralism are low in France. Existing laws and regulations comply with 
major safeguards that are measured by the legal indicators: freedom of expression, right to information, 
recognition of media pluralism, and independence of regulatory agencies, concentration limitation. 
France’s government is developing policies for media literacy, net neutrality, and open data. 
An important trend (not captured by the MPM’s indicators, since it is a change over time) should be 
noticed regarding the balance between privacy protection and freedom of expression/right to information. 
Traditionally, France has strong legislation to protect individual privacy. However, since 2008, under the 
influence of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, French courts take the general 
interest – and the right of people to be informed on important matters - when judging defamation cases 
and breaches into privacy, into account more than they used to do. 
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There are some MPM indicators that show high risks. Indicators 7 Regulatory safeguards for access to 
airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups and 8 Regulatory safeguards for minority 
and community media demonstrate high risk. The reason for this is the so-called "Republican model" 
(as opposed to the Communitarianist model) that the French constitution and legal practice have 
established: French law does not recognise ethnic origins, national minorities, or some other communities. 
Special safeguards thus do not exist in regard to those groups. It would be appropriate to introduce into 
the MPM a second level measurement, in order to examine the actual risk to pluralism relating to minority 
groups under the principles of the Republican model.  
There is high risk related to indicator 16 Regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or 
control of mainstream media by politicians. This high risk is due to the lack of legislation, but does not 
necessarily means that there is an excessive politicisation of French media. This indicator needs to be 
examined together with the socio-political indicators that are related to this risk, which do not demonstrate 
high risk.  
Regarding concentration of ownership (indicator 12 Regulatory safeguards against high concentration 
of ownership and/or control in media and indicator, 13 Regulatory safeguards against high 
degree of cross ownership between television and other media), there is a complex set of legal 
safeguards to prevent too much concentration in all platforms, but for internet service providers. 
However, the effective implementation of these safeguards can be questioned, given the insufficient 
legislation on financial transparency (indicator 14 Regulatory safeguards for transparency of 
ownership and/or control), which does not guarantee easy access to financial information. 
Indicator 4 Regulatory safeguards for the journalistic profession shows low risks for the safeguards 
for the journalist profession. Yet, the legal situation for journalists in France is not fully satisfactory. There 
is no deontological code that is recognised by law, and no press council to monitor deontological 
breaches. The legislation on the confidentiality of sources has improved, but a law reinforcing the 
protection of journalists is still under discussion. This indicator should thus be looked at in the context of 
other measurements and the MPM’s indicators.  
Finally, it should be noted that the legislation against terrorism (which is currently being increased) might 
affect freedom of expression over the internet. Around the ban on the burqa (law of 10th October, 2010) – 
which was also upheld by the European Court of Human Rights on 2nd July 2014, there has also been a 
debate in France about the freedom of religious expression (which France traditionally limits to within the 
private sphere).  
 
Economic Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism 
Overall, according to MPM’s indicators (21 Media ownership concentration, 22 Media audience and 
readership concentration and 23 Number of sectors in which top 8 firms/owners are active), the 
French media system exhibits a moderate to high level of concentration. However, this general assessment 
will be nuanced when we get into the details of the media system. 
Regarding newspapers, we must differentiate between national and regional newspapers. Four groups (Le 
Monde, Figaro, Les Echos, Le Parisien) dominate the national newspapers market and the number of 
national titles has been declining over time (France Soir, which used to be one of the major French dailies, 
disappeared in 2011; La Tribune moved to an online only edition; there are current difficulties for 
Libération). 
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On the regional newspaper market, there are around 60 major titles and, nationwide, the market appears to 
be moderately concentrated. There is no single group dominating the regional dailies market and the 
biggest groups have a market share that is below 18%. Yet, in any particular French region, a single 
newspaper title frequently enjoys a de facto monopoly position with, at best, some competition from smaller 
local papers, the national dailies and, in the larger towns, local editions of free newspapers. 
In the broadcasting sector, there is reasonable diversity of ownership at both national and sub-national 
levels. Besides the public company, Radio France, four commercial groups dominate radio nationwide: the 
RTL group, the NRJ group, Lagardère and Next Radio (a newcomer which has been steadily developing 
over the last ten years). In addition to national networks, there are several hundreds of local radio stations 
(some of them being grouped in an independent network). In the larger French cities, more than 15 radio 
stations are typically available. However, local radio stations generally devote little airtime to news and 
current affairs, and the pluralism of information is mainly ensured by national radio networks. 
In television, there are four dominant players: TF1 owned by the Bouygues group, the public company 
France Télévisions (with two over the air channels: France, especially France 2 and France 3), the M6 
group (Bertelsmann), and the Canal Plus group (which operates a pay TV channel over the air). It was 
hoped that the shift to Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) would lead to a reduction in ownership 
concentration in the television sector. While some new players did enter the market, notably BFM (Next 
radio) and NRJ, two groups coming from the radio market, and some other minor groups, new channels 
have been mainly allocated to the traditional TV groups, including Canal Plus, which now has a 
nationwide free TV station (D8).  
It should be noted that, with the development of DTT, the supply of TV news is now particularly strong 
in France. In addition to the news editions offered by the traditional channels, two 24-hour news channels 
(BFM, i-télé) are freely available. There are also the two so-called Parliament channels (LCP and Public 
Sénat), which provide news editions and magazines (with independent teams of journalists).  
Cross media ownership and vertical integration are low in the French media system. French media groups 
tend to operate on one market only, with a few exceptions. There is virtually no cross-ownership between 
news dailies and television, and only some limited cross-ownership between regional dailies and local radio 
stations. Only one group is significantly present in both radio and print media (Lagardère), and there is 
only one group (RTL group) that is significantly present in both radio and television (NRJ, an important 
player for radio, is only a minor player for television). In comparison with other major EU countries, 
France has no equivalent of a company on the scale of News Corporation in the UK, Bertelsmann in 
Germany, or Mediaset in Italy, which all have extensive cross-media activities.  
Finally, the French media system is mainly operated by domestic firms. However, there are some foreign 
companies that operate media ventures, notably in the print magazine sector where the German Prisma 
group (Bertelsmann), the British EMAP, the Italian Mondadori and, more recently, the Belgium Roularta 
group, hold significant positions. In the broadcasting sector, Bertelsmann is also significantly present 
through the M6 Company (the second commercial TV group) and RTL (the first radio network). 
A peculiar feature of the French media system is that media ventures are not purely media players but are 
often part of larger commercial and industrial conglomerates. Again, this makes France different from the 
UK, Germany and Italy, where the major media companies are almost exclusively focused on media-
related activities. Moreover, these industrial conglomerates often bid for state contracts in France (e.g., 
Dassault in military aircraft production and sales, and Bouygues in construction), or their interests are 
subject to state regulation (for instance, Bouygues and telecommunications). This situation has been 
criticised, since it creates a sort of conflict of interests between the French state and some conglomerates. 
It has been feared that these conglomerates might be tempted to obtain state support that is beneficial to 
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their industrial activities by providing a good media coverage of government activities. However, this 
aspect of the market needs to be measured by additional socio-political types of indicators that tap into the 
political dependencies of the media.  
On the internet access market, there are five dominant players: Orange, SFR, Bouygues, Numéricable and 
Free. Over the last 15 years, the latter has developed an aggressive rates policy - with a typical subscription 
rate of 30 euros/month for broadband access through fixed lines - which has contributed to an 
enlargement of the base number of internet users (currently around the 75% of French population). 
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The MPM’s indicators show low to moderate socio-political risks to media pluralism. French people enjoy 
an excellent, nation-wide access to French media outlets (indicator 28 Guarantees for universal 
coverage of PSM and broadband networks regarding geographic coverage). Through a mutualised 
(though very costly) distribution system, print media are available throughout French territory. In all 
regions, all major television and radio networks are accessible. There are a few so-called dark zones, where 
terrestrial reception is difficult due to geographical constraints, but they represent less than 0.5% of the 
French population. Access to the internet with sufficient speed (at least 2 Megabits) is problematic in 
some rural zones and this may become a political issue in the near future, as some reports estimate that 
only 77% of the French population is well covered by ADSL. 
Indicators 30 Political control over media and distribution networks ownership and 31 Political 
control over media funding by advertising show that there is no excessive politicisation of the French 
media system. No major daily newspaper and no broadcaster is either owned by, or has close links with, a 
political party or another political organisation. In 2001, L'Humanité, once the official daily of the 
Communist party (PCF), was officially separated from the PCF, and its ownership was opened up to new 
stakeholders, including 20% by a holding in which the Lagardère group and TF1 had stakes. 
In terms of content and editorial line, French newspapers rarely identify too closely with a particular 
political party or ideology. This is most apparent in regional newspapers. Due to the dominant position 
they occupy in their markets, they tend to avoid too marked political stances, which could upset sections 
of their wide readership. They devote to politics only a tiny proportion of their content, and they adopt 
so-called legitimist editorial lines, which focus on institutionalised politics and elected officials’ activities. 
National dailies and news magazines are more politicised. They are supportive of peculiar values or 
policies, which makes them more in-line with the external pluralism model.  
Political pluralism in broadcasting is mostly based on the so-called principle of reference, and is monitored 
by the CSA. Outside of electoral campaigns, politicians from the parliamentary opposition should receive 
at least half the time given to government and politicians from the parliamentary majority combined. In 
2009, the interventions of the President that are linked to domestic politics were included in the 
government share of their output. However, this approach was criticised for being too quantitative. More 
importantly, there is no obligation in regard to political parties and organisations, which are not 
represented in Parliament. About a decade ago this was an issue with respect to the National Front 
(extreme right), which, compared to its electoral results, had been under-represented in French media. 
However, French media have now adjusted to the reality of the National Front, and they provide an 
accurate coverage in quantitative terms (although not necessarily in qualitative terms). Whether the 
National Front is a "regular" party or should be treated in a specific way due to its populist nature (and 
some would add its xenophobic stand), is a matter for debate in France (as it is in other European 
countries in which there are similar parties). 
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During electoral campaigns, candidates must first be covered in an equitable way (i.e., in proportion to 
their importance in public opinion and the importance of their campaign activities), then in an equal 
fashion during the last part of the campaign (usually two weeks before Election Day). Thanks to these 
regulations, but also to the professionalisation of French journalism, the coverage of French politics does 
not show any outstanding political bias (indicator 29 Representation of political views in the media). 
Reports by the CSA show that broadcaster airtime is devoted according to regulations (with some 
occasional deviations, generally not in the same direction through time), but since it is different to the 
reference values of the MPM, indicator 29 scores medium risk. The content analysis performed for the 
MPM shows that the portrayal of political actors is generally neutral or ambivalent. 
 
Graph 12: Level of risk for each risk domain - France 
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COUNTRY REPORT: GREECE 
(June 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for Greece shows a medium/high risk for media pluralism in the 
country. The results collected by implementing the MPM in Greece, show risks in the country as follows: 
44% (15) of the indicators assess a high risk; 38% (13) of indicators indicate a medium risk, and 9% (3) 
refer to low risk. Three indicators were not scored due to lack of data. 
The pilot-test implementation of the MPM on Greece is valuable in terms of suggestions on methodology, 
structure and formula for the MPM’s fine-tuning. 
 
Graph 9: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - Greece 
 
Legal Type of Indicator Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Overall, the regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression in the Greek legal system pose a medium risk 
for media pluralism. Freedom of expression is explicitly recognised in the Constitution and Greece has 
signed and ratified the relevant international treaty obligations. Citizens have legal remedies in cases of the 
infringement of their freedom of expression, and free speech is generally respected, including on the 
internet. However, there are interpretive problems regarding national security laws. The rules on 
blasphemy are also not very narrowly defined and defamation provisions abound in the Greek penal code 
(1-medium risk). 
The right to information is explicitly recognised in the Constitution and in national laws. There are appeal 
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mechanisms in place. However, these are slow. Moreover, the parallel existence of multiple legal 
provisions on the right to information/access to public documents ends by creating problems in regard to 
the implementation of this right. In addition, there is evidence of systematic non-compliance with the 
relevant rules. The score for this indicator appears to be “low risk”. In our view, the risk is higher than the 
one calculated by the MPM (2). 
Media pluralism is explicitly recognised both as an intrinsic part of media freedom and as a policy 
objective. In practice, however, not all aspects of media pluralism are respected. Media pluralism is mostly 
threatened in Greece by the high concentration of media power and the underlying interdependence 
between political, economic and media elites (3-medium risk). 
There is currently no licensing of journalists in Greece and access to the journalistic profession is open. 
However, those who want to become members of the journalists’ associations (membership is optional) 
need to fulfil the membership criteria set by the respective associations, which also function as journalists’ 
trade unions. According to the self-regulatory Code of Conduct of the Journalistic Profession, journalists 
should not accept money or any other type of compensation, which may affect their 
credibility/independence/objectivity. In principle, Greek courts recognise the protection of journalistic 
sources. However, the relevant variable was considered as not fulfilled, because the law was not 
considered to be in line with ECHR standards. The protection of press freedom also includes the 
protection of access to all sources. There is systematic evidence that media entrepreneurs intervene in their 
employees work (4-high risk)12. 
As far as the independence of the relevant national authorities is concerned: 
1) The National Council for Radio and Television is fully funded by the State and its members are 
selected by the Conference of Chairmen of the Greek Parliament, a cross-party parliamentary 
college, seeking unanimity or an increased majority of four fifths of its members. The ability of 
the political parties that are in opposition to veto the nominations of their counterparts does not 
preclude nominations based on political affiliation and ideological identification. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of transparency in the process of nomination.  
2) The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Hellenic Competition Commission are elected by 
the Conference of Chairmen of the Greek Parliament. The remaining board members are 
appointed by the Minister of Finance.  
3) The President and the two Vice-Presidents of the National Telecommunications and Post 
Commission are appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Minister of 
Infrastructure, Transport and Networks. The other six board members are appointed by the 
Minister of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks.  
The above factors, combined, constitute a high risk to media pluralism (5). The existing policies on media 
literacy are only nascent and the measures taken are fragmented (6-medium risk). NERIT, the Greek PSM, 
is bound by law to serve the democratic, social and cultural needs of the society and to contribute to 
pluralism. The scarce rules regarding the accessibility of minority groups and the content of programmes 
seem to be complied with. However, given that the existing rules on cultural pluralism are restricted 
mainly to the accessibility of the disabled, one cannot safely conclude that such compliance amounts to an 
adequate representation of different cultural groupings (7-medium risk). 
                                               
12 The formula of this indicator should be fine-tuned for further applications, as it is too strict.  
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The Greek media law does not contain any specific provisions on minority or community media. In fact, 
there appears to be no particular policy strategy for minority media or community media (8-high risk). 
Media legislation does not ensure access by regional and/or local media to platforms of electronic 
communication network providers. It also does not prohibit networking or affiliation arrangements 
between regional/local media and national media (9-high risk). 
NERIT is not obliged a) to have a minimum proportion of regional and/or local communities involved in 
the production and distribution of its programme; b) to have its own regional correspondents; or c) to 
have the balance of journalists coming from various geographical groups (10-high risk). 
With respect to universal coverage, NERIT’s coverage is the entire geographical area of Greece. 
Greek regions participate in the operational programme “Digital Convergence”, which seeks to promote 
the use of ICTs. The Rural Broadband infrastructure project aims to reduce the digital gap in rural and 
remote areas. The Greek print media is supported by considerable indirect state subsidies in the form of 
distribution subsidies (11-medium risk). 
Different ownership rules apply to electronic (TV and radio) ‘information’ media and electronic ‘non-
information’ media (12-medium (for the most part)). There are also some restrictions on the ownership of 
the printed media, depending on type and geographical reach. The media legislation does not contain 
specific thresholds or limits to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or 
control as regards ISPs (12.3-high risk). However, it has introduced media-specific competition rules to 
curb a high degree of cross-media ownership (13-medium). 
As far as transparency of media ownership/control is concerned, newspapers and magazines must indicate 
their owner, publisher and director. They must also indicate the director of the undertaking responsible for 
printing. The capacity of owner, partner, main shareholder or management executive of an information 
media enterprise is incompatible with the capacity of owner, partner, main shareholder or management 
executive of an enterprise that undertakes works towards the public sector. In order to be licensed, TV 
and radio undertakings must submit to the NCRT a statement on their shareholders. Any transfer of 
ownership (above 1% of the capital of a licensed TV or radio undertaking) has to be notified to, and 
approved by, the National Council for Radio and Television (14-medium risk). 
Concerning political reporting, according to Art. 15(2) of the Constitution, state control over public and 
private radio and television ‘shall aim at the objective and on equal terms transmission of information and 
news reports’. As regards PSM in particular, NERIT shall serve the democratic, social and cultural needs 
of the society and contribute to pluralism. Art. 15(2) of the Constitution also provides for the mandatory 
and free-of-charge transmission of the electoral campaign messages of the political parties. In pre-election 
periods, the PSM and the free-to-air commercial channels, as well as the providers of radio and television 
subscription services of any kind are required to make time available for the transmission of messages 
from political parties free of charge. “Access to airtime on PSM (and commercial channels and services 
during election campaigns) for political parties is determined on the basis of their performance at the 
previous elections. The extent to which these rules promote political pluralism is questioned as they are, 
each time, determined by means of the agreement reached by a cross-party committee”13 (high risk). The 
interpretation of the data for this indicator shows that indicator 15’s formula needs to be fine-tuned for 
future implementations and that the risk should be assessed as lower.  
                                               
13 Source: MPM implementation Greece.  
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On the issue of excessive political control of the mainstream media, the Constitution renders incompatible 
the duties of member of Parliament and those of owner/manager partner or shareholder or governor or 
administrator or member of the board of directors or a deputy thereof, of an enterprise that either 
publishes a newspaper of country-wide circulation or engages in radio or television broadcasting services. 
The aforementioned duties are also incompatible with the duties of a Member of the European 
Parliament. As regards PSM in particular, the duties of a member of the Supervisory Board and the 
Management Board of NERIT are incompatible with those of member of the Ministerial Council, Deputy 
Minister, Secretary (General and Particular) of a Ministry or Secretariat, Member of Parliament, Mayor and 
Deputy Mayor, Head and Deputy Head of a region and civil servant (16-high risk). It must be stressed that 
the interpretation of the data provided for this indicator show that the score coming from the application 
of the MPM is too high. The text of the indicator should be fine-tuned to include the assessment of the 
constitutional level of regulation. Moreover, when the report was finished (June, 2014), it was not possible 
to assess how the PSB’s incompatibility rule was going to be implemented14. 
With respect to PSM appointment procedures, these are for the most part transparent (17-medium risk). 
There are currently no specific must carry rules in media legislation guaranteeing distribution of public 
interest channels on cable, DSL and/or satellite platforms (18-high risk) 
Concerning PSM financial resources, NERIT enjoys financial autonomy and derives income through a 
mandatory licence fee, advertising and other sources. The level of the licence fee is determined by the 
Minister of Finance and the Minister responsible for NERIT upon proposal of its management board. 
NERIT’s yearly budget is subject to approval by an inter-ministerial committee (19 -high risk). 
There is no regulation on net neutrality in Greece. Nevertheless, the National Communications and Post 
Commission, the regulator on electronic communications networks and services, monitors developments 
on net neutrality at the European level and has declared a commitment on coming up with a five-year 
action plan (20-medium risk). 
 
Economic Type of Indicator Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
There is a high ownership concentration in television, radio and ISPs and a medium ownership 
concentration in newspapers (21-high risk). It should be noted, however, that in Greece there is no data 
on the total revenue of media outlets. Market shares are calculated on the basis of imputed advertising 
expenditure (i.e., sales of advertising space/time by media outlets to advertisers). 
A medium level risk to media pluralism stems from audience/readership concentration. In particular, there 
is a high audience concentration in television and subscriber concentration in internet service provision, 
and a medium readership concentration in newspapers. There is currently no available data on the 
audience shares of radio outlets (22). 
The concentration of media ownership across the different media sectors cannot be scored due to the 
non-disclosure of data as regards ISPs (23). 
Both fixed and mobile broadband penetration is lower than the respective EU average penetration (this is 
a high risk to media pluralism). Concerning the two variables that assess the national average fixed internet 
                                               
14 CMPF 
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speed measured in Mbps in download/upload compared with the respective EU average (24), Greece 
scores low risk in upload and high risk in download.15 
None of the questions concerning minority and community media (25) can be answered. This indicator 
provides for the scoring of the ratio of television channels/newspapers/radio channels, which are 
dedicated to ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to the total number of domestic television 
channels/newspapers/radio channels. First, the only recognised minority in Greece is a religious minority 
(the Muslim population of Thrace). Second, there are no television/radio channels/newspapers of national 
range formally recognised as minority media. 
Similarly, the indicator concerning the centralisation of the national media system (26) cannot be scored 
due to the non-availability of data. 
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
With respect to indicator 27 Guarantees for universal access to media regarding special needs 
groups, policy-making bodies are aware of the issue and have started taking measures, but the existing 
policies are only nascent and the measures taken are fragmented. The risk is therefore evaluated as a 
medium one. 
On the issue of universal coverage, addressed by indicator 28 Guarantees for universal coverage of 
PSM and broadband networks regarding geographical coverage, NERIT, which only started 
operating in May, 2014, is bound by its law to have a 100% geographical coverage. However, this aim has 
not yet been achieved. As a result, currently there is no effective coverage with PSM transmissions. The 
rural coverage of DSL is higher than 95%, but availability of cable internet is rather low. Based on all this, 
the risk for indicator 28 is evaluated as high16.  
Another indicator with a score of high risk is indicator 29 Representation of political views in the 
media. The content analysis exercise has shown that Greek media are deeply politically biased. However, 
it needs to be noted that this indicator has been applied within a rather constrained methodological frame 
and the issue needs further exploration.  
On indicator 30 Political control over media and distribution networks ownership, the connections 
of media owners with political elites in the country have formed the object of substantive investigation by 
journalists and media activists. Rather than disclosing media owners’ allegiance to specific political parties, 
reports have focused on the interplay of the media with politicians, and the development and evolution of 
interconnecting interests between the media, the government and the business sector. The lack of 
sufficient transparency and data however, prevents addressing and reflecting on these concerns in the 
scoring of the indicator.  
With respect to indicator 31 Political control over media funding by advertising, despite the fact that 
there are clear and transparent rules regarding the distribution of public advertising, their actual 
implementation does not portray an equally transparent environment. The lack of readily available and 
reliable statistical data across the different media sectors prevents the proper evaluation of this indicator. 
                                               
15 This variable has been assessed by the CMPF according to the guidebook, suggesting the use of the centralised 
available database offered by “Ookla”.  
16 The country correspondents provided the elaborated data, but the CMPF team assigned the indicator score.  
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Concerning indicator 32 Presence of professional associations providing advocacy for editorial 
independence and respect of professional standards, vying for editorial standards and editorial 
independence, the unions of journalists have been quite active in campaigning on matters related to 
journalists’ employment conditions. At the same time, however, they have proved ineffective in enforcing 
the Code of Conduct of Journalists, which is the reason for the less than perfect evaluation of the risk 
here. However, the indicator itself needs further specifications and fine-tuning of the descriptions of the 
different ways and degrees of professional associations' involvement, in order to better reflect cases like 
Greece.  
On indicator 33, measuring the Level of independence of PSM considering the mechanisms of its 
financing, Greece scores a high risk. The reason for this is that the government decides on the licence fee 
of the PSM without any public discussion. 
High risk to media pluralism is also demonstrated by indicator 34 Independence and ownership of 
news agencies, as there is only one Greek-based national news agency. In addition, ANAMPA (the only 
news agency) is owned by the government, and the government is involved in the personnel appointment 
and/or editorial policy.  
 
 
Graph 10: Level of risk for each risk domain - Greece 
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COUNTRY REPORT: HUNGARY 
(December 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for Hungary shows a situation of high risk for media pluralism in 
the country. The results collected by implementing the MPM in Hungary, show risks in the country as 
follows: 50% (17) of the indicators assess a high risk; 47% (16) of indicators indicate medium risk, and 3% 
(1) refer to low risk. 
 
 
Graph 13: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - Hungary 
 
Legal Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Low risk was assessed for one of the 20 legal indicators: 18 Regulatory safeguards for the distribution of 
public interest channels on cable, DSL and/or satellite platforms. 
Medium risk was assessed for 14 of the 20 legal indicators: 1 Regulatory safeguards for freedom of 
expression; 2 Regulatory safeguards on freedom to information, 3 Recognition of media pluralism as 
intrinsic part of media freedoms and/or as policy objective of media legislation and/or regulation, 4 
Regulatory safeguards for journalistic profession, 6 Policies and support measures for media literacy (or 
digital literacy, in particular) among different groups of population, 7 Safeguards for access to airtime on 
PSM by the various cultural and social groups; 8 Regulatory safeguards for minority and community 
media, 9 Regulatory safeguards and policies for regional and local media; 13 Regulatory safeguards against 
high degree of cross-ownership between television and other media; 14 Regulatory safeguards for 
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transparency of ownership and/or control’, 16 Regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or 
control of mainstream media by politicians; 20 Policy measures for the impartial circulation of internet 
data, without regard to content, destination or source.  
 
Freedom of expression and media freedom-related indicators (1-4) scored as a ‘medium risk.’ These fundamental 
rights are guaranteed in the Constitution and in the media legislation, respectively, however additional 
statutes limit the full exercise of these rights, both formally and in practice.  
Freedom of expression is guaranteed in Hungary’s Constitution. However, lawmakers passed an 
amendment to the Constitution that restricts political advertising in media outlets during elections. This 
amendment has been found by election observers to add undue restrictions to freedom of expression and 
information rights (indicator 1). 
Media pluralism and freedom (indicator 3) is formally guaranteed in the 2010 media legislation.17 However, 
the legislation contains a number of provisions that weaken regulatory safeguards that ensure a diverse 
media marketplace and fair competition among market participants. These include a high risk for the 
politicization of the media regulatory authority (see “high risk’ section below); the centralization of public 
media under the management of the media regulator, National Media and Telecommunications Authority 
(NMHH); and insufficient anti-concentration safeguards; lack of transparency of media ownership 
structures, among other factors. In addition, journalists in Hungary are bound by criminal and civil 
defamation and libel laws. Under the criminal code, media are subject to increased punishments and 
liability for offenses.18  
Regulatory safeguards for right to information also scored as a medium risk (indicator 2): Access to 
information is provided for the Act CXII of 2011 about information self-determination and freedom of 
information, which also created a new authority, the National Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information Authority (Naihan), responsible for overseeing compliance with the legislation. A recent 
amendment to the legislation introduced new restrictions to access to information and FOIA requests in 
Hungary has curtailed the former scope of the law and restricts the public's and media's ability to request 
information. In practice, the Hungarian courts tend to decide in favor freedom of information requests, 
although systematic and comprehensive data on court rulings in Hungary is difficult to obtain, other than 
rulings by the Constitutional Court.  
Access to the journalistic profession is open (indicator 4). Self-regulatory codes emphasize the 
independence of editorial content and other professional standards such as objectivity, although such 
standards are often not implemented in practice. Protection of journalistic sources is recognized by law 
and by the Constitutional Court. Following a Constitutional Court ruling, the media law is now in line with 
Recommendation (2000) 7 CoE, and only courts may oblige a journalist to reveal his or her sources and 
the case must be specifically justified.Access to events for news reporting is not explicitly recognised by 
the law. The media legislation obliges the state, public authorities and institutions, state-owned enterprises 
and their leaders as well as public servants to help the work of journalists by providing them with timely 
information.19 In practice, there have been several recent cases in which journalists and/or media outlets 
                                               
17 Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules of Media Content, (Smtv.), 
http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/152/Smtv_110803_EN_final.pdf 
Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media, (Mttv), 
http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf. 
18 §226 and §227 of the Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, (as amended 2013) in Hungarian at: 
http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1200100.TV. See English-language translation of the 1978 
Criminal Code (§179 with almost identical language to 2012 Criminal Code) at: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/hu/hu019en.pdf 
19 § 9, Smtv, http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/152/Smtv_110803_EN_final.pdf 
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have been denied necessary press credentials for accessing Parliament and/or election events. In addition, 
access to the plenary sessions of Parliament has been a reason for concern for more than a decade now. 
Private television channels may not take footage of these sessions but can only purchase footage that is 
produced and distributed by a company specially commissioned by Parliament.  
The 2010 Media Act obliges the Media Council to promote media literacy (indicator 6).20 The legislation 
also specifies that it is the obligation of the PSM to “promote acquisition and development of knowledge 
and skills needed for media literacy through its programmes and through other activities outside the scope 
of media services.”21 Basic media skills are taught as part of the curriculum in general education. Other 
forms of education are provided sporadically by civil organisations. Media and communication BA and 
MA studies are provided by 21 higher educational institutions and at least 16 non accredited schools. 
Because of budget restrictions and under government pressure, the number of such institutions has been 
steadily declining in recent years..  
Indicator 7 Safeguards for access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups scored as a 
medium risk. The 2010 Media Act specifies a range of ‘objectives’ for the PSM, which include: to “provide 
media services which are comprehensive in both the social and the cultural sense, aiming to address as 
many social classes and culturally distinct groups and individuals as possible, b) to support, sustain and 
enrich national, community and European identity, culture and the Hungarian language, c) to promote and 
strengthen national cohesion and social integration, and to respect the institution of marriage and the 
value of family.”22 In practice, the PSM in Hungary -- as in many countries in Europe -- struggles with 
political independence, and often reflects the ideas and opinions of the governing party in power. This is 
especially evident since PSM’s restructuring under the 2010 media laws.  
Indicator 8 Regulatory safeguards for minority and community media scored as medium risk. The 2010 
Media Act specifies a range of programming provisions and obligations for linear community media.23 
According to these provisions, community media are “a) intended to serve or satisfy the special needs for 
information of and to provide access to cultural programmes for a certain social, national, cultural or 
religious community or group, or b) are intended to serve or satisfy the special needs for information of 
and to provide access to cultural programmes for residents of a given settlement, region or reception area, 
or c) in the majority of their transmission time such programmes are broadcasted which are aimed at 
achieving the objectives of public media services.”24 In practice, community radio licensing has been 
highly politicized since 2010, due to the National Media and telecommunication Authority’s (NMHH) 
tendering practices generally favour outlets that provide government-friendly, conservative and/or 
religious programming.25 In addition, “community media” should be considered as a distinct category 
from "minority media," which is a non-existent category in the Hungarian context.  
Local and regional media are existing categories in the media legislation but with no specific mission or 
obligation defined in the law. Frequency allocation is managed by the National Media and 
Communications Authority. Networking is permitted for local linear media within the terms of an 
operators’ licensing agreement with the NMHH. In Hungary, the local and regional markets lack 
transparency, due to a significant absence of market data and monitoring of these sectors. A consequence 
of the 2010 Media Act is the observable trend toward greater concentration in local media markets and the 
establishment of media enterprises owned by the local government that are engaged in multiple market 
                                               
20 §132(k) Mttv., http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf  
21 §82(2)(c), Mttv., http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf  
22 §83(1), Mttv., http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf  
23 §66, Mttv., http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf  
24 §66, Mttv., http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf  
25 See Mertek analysis of local radio tendering practices, “Media Council Redraws Radio Market,” 
http://mertek.eu/en/reports/media-council-redraws-the-radio-market-report-on-the-frequency-tendering-by-the-
media, November 2013, and “The Transformation of the Radio Market in Budapest,” September 2012, 
http://mertek.eu/en/article/the-transformation-of-the-radio-market-in-budapest 
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segment activities. This is a very risky process from the point of view of local news’ diversity. Several 
municipalities have established their own cross-media undertakings that provide all types of local media 
services (television, radio, newspaper). 
Indicator 13 Regulatory safeguards against high degree of cross ownership (scored as medium risk. The 
2010 Media Act removed prior restrictions on cross-ownership; in Hungary, a company may now operate 
numerous brands (channels or titles) in the same market within the anti-concentration restrictions 
specified by the 2010 Media Act.  
There are no criteria that sets limits on the number of licenses. The NMHH establishes criteria for 
tendering and licensing. The 2010 Media Act gives the Media Council wide discretion to allocate of 
licenses and to conduct procurement decisions. The process of licence allocations has been highly 
controversial and politicized since the Hungarian broadcast market was initially privatized under the 1996 
media law. On a number of occasions these tendering and licensing decisions have run counter to 
principles of media pluralism and diversity. The 2009 tender of two national commercial radios conducted 
by the former regulator ORTT has since been found illegal by national and international arbitration courts. 
Controversial and politicized tendering practices have continued since the new media system and 
regulatory body were introduced in 2010.26 In addition, the practice of non-disclosure of contractual 
agreements signed between the regulator and commercial operators obstructs the transparency of market 
operations and agreements in relation to allocations of public resources (frequencies).27  
The Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, GVH) is responsible for ensuring the 
proper functioning of the markets without improper competition practices or concentration occurring. 
However the 2010 Media Act entitles the Media Council to intervene in a merger/acquisition approval 
procedure conducted by the Competition Authority in the cases where the provisions of the 2010 Media 
Act related to concentration in the media market possibly apply. The 2010 Media Act requires the 
Hungarian Competition Authority to obtain a position statement of the Media Council for the approval of 
concentration of enterprises that bear editorial responsibility and the primary objective of that enterprise is 
to distribute media content to the general public via an electronic communications network or a printed 
press product. The position statement of the Media Council binds the Hungarian Competition Authority 
(GVH) and the Competition Authority must consider and apply that position statement in determining the 
approval or rejection of the merger/acquisition. The Competition Authority cannot legally decide against 
or without the consent of the Media Council; however the Media Act permits the Competition Authority 
to still disapprove of transactions approved by the Media Council or to add additional conditions to the 
transaction that the Media Council did not propose.  
Indicator 14 Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership and/or control14 is scored as medium 
risk. The rules regarding transparency of media ownership do not provide sufficient safeguards to ensure 
public accountability for compliance with anti-concentration rules. The former 1996 Act on TV and Radio 
required private national and regional TV, and national radio channels to operate in the form of a 
company in which members were publicly available, or in the case of a share company, it was required to 
issue only registered shares.28 The 2010 Media Act contains no requirements for what “type” of entity can 
operate media services, which reduces prior formal safeguards regarding market-ownership transparency.29 
                                               
26 See “Klubradio Wins Frequency Fight,” Hungarian Media Monitor, March 2013, 
http://mediamonitor.ceu.hu/2013/03/klubradio-wins-frequency-fight/ 
27 ‘‘Court: Media Council must reveal contracts with top TV stations,’’ The Hungarian Media Monitor, CMCS, 5 
February 2013, http://mediamonitor.ceu.hu/2013/02/court-media-council-must-reveal-contracts-with-top-tv-
stations/ 
28
 See § 85 of the 1996 Act on Radio and Television, 
http://english.nmhh.hu/dokumentum/150103/1_1996_torv_media_en_lekt_20070514.pdf 
29§41(3) Mttv, http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf . 
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These new rules therefore limit the availability of public data on shareholders, as well as to assess whether 
ownership structures are in breach of the “controlling interest” provisions in the 2010 Media Act.  
 
 
High risk has been identified in 7 of the 20 legal indicators, namely the following ones: 5 Regulatory 
safeguards for the independence and efficiency of the relevant national authorities, 10 Regulatory 
safeguards for locally oriented and locally produced news on PSM channels and services; 11 Regulatory 
safeguards for universal coverage of the media, 12 Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in media, 15 Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and impartial political 
reporting in media, 17 Fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for PSM professionals and 
management boards, and 19 Regulatory safeguards for the objective and independent allocation of 
(adequate, consistent and sufficient) financial resources to PSM.  
The independence of the Media Authority/Media Council is formally specified in the media law (Act 
CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Communication). However, the appointment procedures 
do not provide adequate legal safeguards for independence in cases in which the government has a 
majority in Parliament (as is currently the case), despite amendments to these procedures based on Council 
of Europe recommendations.30 The modifications, which now require the President of Hungary to 
approve the Prime Minister’s nomination for the head of the Media Authority, fail to provide sufficient 
formal safeguards ensuring the political independence of all appointees. Rules of incompatibility and 
eligibility of members are specified in the media law, however these regulations have not ensured objective 
and transparent appointment procedures in practice. 
The score of indicator 10 Regulatory safeguards for locally oriented and locally produced news on 
PSM channels and services is high because as a result of the 2010 media laws, the PSM in Hungary has 
been highly centralised in terms of both management and programme production. The PSM is now 
managed by the MTVA, a body supervised by the Media Council. Hungary has six national public service 
radio broadcasters. There are no regional or local PSM channels. As specified in the Media Act, Hungary's 
national news agency MTI has been granted the "exclusive right" to produce news programmes for the 
country's public broadcasters. The law also placed MTI in charge of the online news portals and products 
of the public media and their on-demand media services. In addition, MTI provides news content free of 
charge to other media in Hungary, as a result of which many commercial radio stations rely solely on its 
news services. 
Indicator 12 Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of ownership and/or control in 
media scores medium/high risk. The 2010 Media Act introduced a new audience-share model for 
regulating media concentration, the aim of which is prevent market participants from increasing their 
positions once they reach a certain audience-reach threshold. While analysts prefer the audience-share 
model to anti-concentration rules of the former media law (1996 Act on TV and Radio), a key deficiency of 
the 2010 legislation is the lack of adequate or clear legal remedies once these audience-share thresholds are 
reached. In addition, the presence of thresholds, while important, may not alone be enough to signal 
positive regulatory controls for ensuring media diversity. For instance, the 35 percent threshold on market 
share in the Hungarian context (for broadcasting) is fairly high given Hungary's small market size. 
Likewise, in practice there are no formal, transparent, public mechanisms to ensure that compliance with 
concentration regulations are being met.  
Appointment procedures for PSM professionals and management boards (indicator 17) scores as high risk. 
The 2010 media legislation brought each of Hungary's public service media outlets—three national TV, 
                                               
30
 ‘Council of Europe and Hungarian Government agree on changes to media laws’, The Hungarian Media Monitor, 
6 March 2013, http://mediamonitor.ceu.hu/2013/03/1108/ 
 107 
three radio stations and one national news service—under a new body, the MTVA, which manages 
funding for the PSM. The MTVA is managed by the Media Council. The chairperson of the Media 
Council appoints, sets the salary for and exercises full employers' rights over the Fund's director general. 
The chairperson of the Media Council also appoints the Fund's deputy directors, as well as the chairperson 
and the four members of its Supervisory Board. The Media Council is responsible for approving the 
Fund's annual plan and subsidy policy and for determining the rules governing how MTVA's assets can be 
used, managed, and accessed by the public media. The Fund's annual budget is approved by Parliament. 
Regulatory safeguards for the objective and independent allocation of (adequate consistent and sufficient) 
financial resources to PSM (indicator 17) scores as high risk. The allocation of financial resources to the 
MTVA of PSM is defined by law. However, there is no formal procedure for setting the amount of the 
MTVA budget. Although there are consulting and supervising organs linked with the individual public 
service media companies, in reality all public service activities are carried out by the MTVA, which is not 
supervised publicly and its operation is lacking in transparency. In addition, how the MTVA distributes 
funding to PSM channels for programming lacks oversight and transparency.  
The Media Act specifies that PSM channels and services should provide fair, balanced and impartial 
representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes.31 In practice, the content of 
PSM since the system was restructured in 2010 has been marked by a demonstrable pro-Government bias. 
Content analyses provided by the Media Council shows that between 2011 and 2013 government and 
Fidesz MPs were given roughly 75 percent of airtime on public media news programmes.32  
While net neutrality has not been raised as an issue so far in Hungary (indicator 20), other questions 
relating to internet freedom have become salient. For example, the Constitutional Court (CC) has recently 
ruled that internet content providers are legal liable for any comment that readers add to their posts, even 
if they immediately remove sensitive comments. In addition, the Government introduced a proposal in 
Oct 2014 to tax Internet usage based on traffic. The proposal was withdrawn after mass demonstrations.  
 
Economic Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Overall, Hungary scored as high risk for a majority of the economic indicators (4 out of 6 indicators). 
Medium risk is scored by indicators: 23 Number of sectors in which Top 8 firms/owners are active, and 
26 Centralisation of the national media system. High risk is scored for indicators: 21 Media ownership 
concentration, 22 Media audience and readership concentration, 24 Availability and quality of broadband, 
and 25 Minority and community media.  
In Hungary, as in other post-communist countries with limited audiences and advertising markets,33 the 
media are frequently exposed to economic pressures. In recent years, the growing number of media 
outlets, triggered by the rise of the internet and of digital broadcasting, has generated more intense 
competition for audiences, while advertising revenues have been shrinking since the global economic and 
                                               
31 83 (1), Mttv. http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf . 
32 See NMHH content analysis of top TV channels, http://nmhh.hu/tart/polstat?lang=en&year=2014  
33
 Sparks, Colin: (2012) ‘‘The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Transitional Societies,’’ in Central and Eastern 
European Media in Comparative Perspective. Politics, Economy and Culture, pp. 41–61, ed. by John Downey & 
Sabina Mihelj, Farnham, Surrey, England.. 
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financial crisis hit the country in late 2008.34 
Indicator 23 Number of sectors in which top 8 firms/owners are active and indicator 26 
Centralisation of the national media system score as medium risk. A precise evaluation of cross-
ownership concentration is difficult to track due to deficiencies of data for all market sectors. As far as 
data are available, the major 8 media firms have aggregate market shares of more than 50% of the market.  
Indicator 21 Media ownership concentration and indicator 22 Media audience and readership 
concentration score as high risk. The major Top 4 owners have an aggregate market and audience shares 
above 50 per cent in the TV, radio, newspaper and online media sectors.  
In Hungary, the public service broadcaster has a legal obligation to provide minority programming. Apart 
from the PSM's Romani programme, there is neither other programme or television channel for Hungary's 
largest ethnic minority, nor for the linguistic or national minorities. The minority programmes on the PSM 
are not aired during prime time hours, but generally, early in the morning or early in the afternoon. Print 
Roma magazines established after the political transformation of 1989/1990 do not exist any more 
according to the registry of the Media Authority.  
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Hungary scored high risk for a majority (6 out of 8) of the socio-political indicators. 
Indicator 27 Guarantees for universal access to media regarding special needs groups scored as medium 
risk. The media law stipulates that audiovisual media service providers need to provide programmes 
accessible for the hearing impaired, stipulating that more programmes need to be provided with subtitles 
or in sign language every year. In 2014, the PSM and the two leading national commercial television 
channels need to provide at least ten hours of programming per day with subtitles or sign language 
between 6-24 hours. Some programmes of the PSM and the leading commercial national television 
channels are subtitled. The media authority found that in 2013 1Q 53% of the programming of the PSM 
and RTL Klub and TV2 were providing subtitles/sign language, but there were troubles with the quality: 
the subtitles were not providing the full meaning and they were sometimes late compared to the visuals. 
The most popular programmes and the news bulletins do have subtitles but of not satisfactory quality.  
Indicator 28 Universal coverage of PSM and broadband networks regarding geographic coverage is 
assessed at medium risk. All public service television channels are distributed via digital satellite and 
terrestrial broadcasting and can be accessed by more 99 percent of population via DVB-T. The public 
service radio station MR1 Kossuth Radio has a 100 percent coverage over the country (also reaching some 
of the neighbouring countries), while the coverage of other public service radio stations is below that level 
(MR2 Petofi Radio: 86%, MR3 Bartók Radio 68%, MR4 National broadcasting - for nationalities - 92%). 
Universal access for broadband (fixed line and mobile) has not been achieved in Hungary. Both fixed line 
and mobile broadband subscriptions are below the EU average. The NMHH is pursuing strategies and 
tenders aimed at the expanding frequencies for and improvement of the current broadband coverage, 
including with a 4G mobile network.  
High risk is scored by indicators: 29 Representation of political views in the media, 30 Political control 
                                               
34 ‘A Magyar Reklámszövetség bemutatja: 2012-es Reklámtorta’ (The Hungarian Advertisers Association presents the 
advertising pie of 2012), http://www.adverticum.com/hirek/osszes/171/ (accessed 19th June, 2014). 
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over media and distribution networks ownership, 31 Political control over media funding by advertising, 
32 Presence of professional associations providing advocacy for editorial independence and respect of 
professional standards, 33 Level of independence of PSM considering mechanisms of its financing, and 34 
Independence and ownership of news agencies.  
The Hungarian media landscape is, in general, highly partisan and politicized along ‘pro-Government’ and 
‘opposition’ lines. The broadcast sector in particular lacks independent watchdog media outlets from 
which citizens can obtain objective information regarding government policies or public issues with the 
notable exception of the evening news bulletins of RTL Klub, the most popular nationwide commercial 
television channel. 
The PSM in particular is dominated by Government views. Commercial broadcasters also display clear 
partisan biases on both sides of the political spectrum. Unlike the legacy media, new media are more 
independent and many actively perform their watchdog roles. Many online news outlets offer investigative 
and public-interest stories and accounts of both the incumbent government and the opposition. However, 
online media are mainly consumed by younger Hungarians and coverage delivered by these outlets is not 
often re-circulated by broadcasters and therefore tends to remain in within the online media silo.  
The MPM content evaluation of political bias in the broadcast media during the election campaign of 
European Parliament in May 2014 indicates that the government was more frequently portrayed in a 
positive light, while the opposition, including both the centre-left parties and the far-right party, were 
more often put into a negative context. The majority of the news items covering the governing parties and 
the government on national commercial TV2 were of a neutral tone. The opposition had no coverage at 
all in the studied period. On the major public service television channel M1, many of the reports covering 
the government and the governing parties were of a positive tone, yet the vast majority of the news 
coverage was neutral. However, one third of the news items covering the opposition were critical or highly 
critical.  
In Hungary, where political parallelism is on a high level, i.e., most news outlets are informally associated 
with political parties (indicator 30); favouritism is the rule with regard to the distribution of state-
controlled advertising resources (indicator 31). Outlets loyal to the government in power are granted state 
advertising and other funding, while media critical of government policies are denied these key revenue 
streams. Moreover PSM funding allocation is not transparent (indicator 33). As the fragmentation of the 
audiences has accelerated, commercial revenues have been on the decline, thereby increasing the role and 
market power of state advertising (by ministries, municipalities and state-owned companies).35 The 
Hungarian state has therefore become an important player in the advertising market; private advertisers 
have also followed suit by placing their ads in government-friendly outlets. Such trends have created 
market distortions, wherein pro-Government outlets with lower market shares are generating larger 
advertising revenues than ‘opposition’ media outlets with bigger audiences.  
A new law imposing a special advertising tax on media companies, passed in mid-June, 2014, further 
undermines the position of independent broadcasters. The tax is widely believed to target RTL Klub, a 
subsidiary of the German multinational Bertelsmann Group, which is the most popular commercial 
television channel in Hungary, whose evening news bulletins had been lightly critical of the incumbent 
                                               
35
 See Czibik, Ágnes et al., ‘Print media expenditure of government institutions and state-owned companies in 
Hungary, 2003–2012,’ May 2013, Corvinus University of Budapest, http://www.crc.uni-
corvinus.hu/download/media_ah_2012_report1_130518.pdf; see also Urbán, Ágnes: ‘Állami reklámköltés, 2008 – 
2012’ (State advertising 2008–2012), 17th March, 2014, Measure Media Monitoring, 
http://mertek.eu/sites/default/files/reports/allami_reklamkoltes.pdf (both accessed 19th June, 2014). 
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government.36 
Indicator 32 Presence of professional associations providing advocacy for editorial independence and 
respect of professional standards scores as high risk. There are several professional journalist associations 
in Hungary, although their enforcement capacities remain weak. The major organization is the Hungarian 
Journalists Association (Magyar Újságírók Országos Szövetsége, MÚOSZ) with some 5,000 members. The 
organisation has a code of ethics and practice based on the Anglo-Saxon standards of journalism (such as 
objectivity, neutrality, the separation of news from views etc.). In practice, however, partisan journalism is 
the rule in most of the print and broadcast media. The organisation also has an Ethics Commission, 
which, however, does not have the means to enforce standards. MÚOSZ was not involved in any 
meaningful way in the drafting of the 2010 Media Laws. While MÚOSZ is commonly associated with left-
wing journalists, there also are some minor journalists' associations of right-wing journalists such as the 
Hungarian Journalists Community (Magyar Újságírók Közössége, MÚK) and the Hungarian Catholic 
Journalists Association (Magyar Katolikus Újságírók Szövetsége, MAKÚSZ). While the three organisations 
also have a joint code of ethics and of practice, co-operation between the three is lacking. There also is a 
Press Union (Sajtószakszervezet), whose ability to enforce journalists' interests is, however, limited. 
Currently there is no collective contract protecting journalists' rights vis-a-vis employers.  
Indicator 34 Independence and ownership of news agencies scores as high risk. The Hungarian 
Wireless Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda, MTI), which is part of the PSM structure, has a de facto 
monopoly in the country. Since 2010, the MTI news agency has provided most of its media content free 
of charge. At the same time, its only private domestic competitor, the Independent News Agency, lost 
many of its subscribers and ceased to exist.37 Various commercial broadcasters and print media outlets 
across the country now rely on the news provided by MTI. 
 
Graph 14: Level of risk for each risk domain - Hungary  
                                               
36 Fehér, Margit: ‘Hungary Adopts Tax on Advertising Revenue,’ The Wall Street Journal, 11th June, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/hungary-adopts-tax-on-advertising-revenue-1402511876 (accessed 19th June, 2014). 
37 ‘Bezár a Független Hírügynökség’ (The Independent News Agency is closing down), 25th May, 2014, emasa 
(MÚOSZ), http://www.emasa.hu/cikk.php?id=8473 (accessed 19th June, 2014). 
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COUNTRY REPORT: ITALY 
(September 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for Italy shows a medium/high risk for media pluralism in the 
country. Of 34 indicators, 30% (10) show high, 61% (20) medium and 9% (3) low risk. One indicator was 
not scored, due to lack of data. 
 
Graph 15: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - Italy 
 
Legal Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The legal indicators for Italy show a medium/high risk for media pluralism in the country. 
Low risk was identified only in the basic first legal indicator on regulatory safeguards for freedom of 
expression, which recaps the fundamentals on this right. Medium risk was identified for the indicators: 
Regulatory safeguards on freedom to information (2), Recognition of media pluralism as intrinsic 
part of media freedoms and/or as policy objective of media legislation and/or regulation (3), 
Regulatory safeguards for journalistic profession (4), Regulatory safeguards for the independence 
and efficiency of the relevant national authorities’ (5), Policies and support measures for media 
literacy (or digital literacy, in particular) among different groups of population (6), Safeguards for 
access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups (7), Regulatory safeguards for 
minority and community media (8), Regulatory safeguards and policies for regional and local 
media (9), Regulatory safeguards for locally oriented and locally produced news on PSM channels 
and services (10), Regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of the media (11), Regulatory 
safeguards against high concentration of ownership and/or control in media (12), Regulatory 
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safeguards against high degree of cross-ownership between television and other media (13), 
Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership and/or control (14), Regulatory safeguards 
for fair, balanced and impartial political reporting in media(15), ‘Policy measures for the impartial 
circulation of internet data, without regard to content, destination or source (20). High risk was 
identified for indicators on Regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or control of 
mainstream media by politicians (16), on Fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures 
for PSM professionals and management boards (17), on Regulatory safeguards for the distribution 
of public interest channels on cable, DSL and/or satellite platforms (18) and Regulatory 
safeguards for the objective and independent allocation of (adequate, consistent and sufficient) 
financial resources to PSM(19).  
With regard to indicator 1, freedom of expression is protected by article 21 of the Constitution, and Italy is 
committed to fostering it, having signed and ratified the relevant international treaties that defend human 
rights and freedom of expression as, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
ECHR, in particular, according to the case law of the Constitutional Court, works as a sub-parameter for 
assessing the constitutionality of a law. When it comes to assessing the limits of freedom of expression, 
privacy laws still enable, to a great extent, public debate on issues of public concern, and freedom of 
speech is generally respected for online expressions. The case law of the Superior Courts has slowly 
developed during the last fifteen years towards more consistent interpretations of the scope and limits of 
freedom of expression online. 
This indicator scores low risk, notwithstanding that defamation is a criminal offence, and notwithstanding 
the chilling effect that this may provoke. The impact of this law is partially balanced by case law as, under 
specific circumstances, the application of the constitutional principle of freedom of expression prevails in 
the public interest over the claim of defamation. 
Medium risk: indicator 2 was assessed as showing a medium risk. Article 21 of the Constitution is 
interpreted as covering freedom to access information and the laws in force guarantee access to acts, 
documents and information held by the public administrations by those who have a qualified interest. 
Recently, Legislative Decree 33 of 2013 made a step further in the direction of freedom of information, 
acknowledging that “everybody” has the right of access to documents and information of the public 
administrations. Nonetheless, the Italian law stresses more transparency obligations by the administration 
than the right to access to information. In this regard, the right to access is strictly linked to what the 
public administration is asked to disclose. It must be stressed therefore, that Italy still lacks of a proper 
freedom of information act (FOIA) according to international standards.  
As regards indicator 3, media pluralism is a principle that was interpreted by the Constitutional Court as 
stemming from Article 21 Const., on freedom of speech. Moreover, the principle is recalled in general 
media regulation. Notwithstanding that media pluralism is a principle that is enshrined in laws and that is 
often recalled in case law, the indicator scores a medium risk, due to variable on the effectiveness in its 
implementation.  
Indicator 4 presents medium risk, due to potentially restrictive regulation: in Italy, the journalistic 
profession is ‘closed’ by law (a professional journalist must be enrolled in the Albo dei Giornalisti (Register 
of Journalists), kept by the Ordine dei Giornalisti) (Order of Journalists). 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency of the relevant national authorities (5) exist, but 
they are not well implemented in practice. The score is medium, as, while the law formally foresees for the 
media authority appointment procedures that should guarantee transparency, should be democratic and 
objective and designed to minimize the risk of political or commercial interference, in practice, according 
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to commentators and scholars, the appointment of the commissioners follows political and economic 
criteria. 
Media and digital literacy (indicator 6) is a very broad an important topic. It was assessed that the existing 
policies are not tackling the problem in a systematic way. 
Indicator 7 Safeguards for access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups 
shows a fragmentation of competencies among the bodies that regulate access to PSM. 
Regulatory safeguards for minority and community media (8) are variously present in the legislation. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess if the independence of the minority or community media is 
safeguarded in practice. 
Indicator 9 shows that the legislation provides regulatory safeguards for local and regional media, in 
the light of geographical pluralism. Regional and local television and radio, for instance, are a very 
important part of the market in Italy, in terms of the number of operators, and the administrative and 
socio-political structure of the country itself, which calls for regional-level media. Policies on the 
development of local and regional media have become less clear in recent years. Regulatory safeguards 
for locally oriented and locally produced news on PSM channels and services (10), Regulatory 
safeguards for universal coverage of the media (11) exist, but policies and remedies to safeguard them 
could be improved. 
Indicator 12 shows the existence of regulatory safeguards on media ownership concentration; 
nonetheless, the sanctioning/enforcement powers by the media authorities to impose proportionate 
remedies, has not been very effective. Regulatory safeguards against a high degree of cross-
ownership between television and other media (13) are in place, but there are some cases where their 
poor implementation has been politically sensitive. In particular, the law that bans cross ownership with 
newspapers for those that run a national television business and get more than the 8% of the revenue of 
the “integrated system of communications” has been raising many criticisms in public opinion, as it is a 
temporary rule that every year is renewed by a governmental law-decree and because its elusion in the case 
of the ownership of the newspaper “Il Giornale” has been highly relevant in political terms. When it 
comes to Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership and/or control (14), it must be 
stressed that the Constitution itself calls for laws that can disclose the financing methods of the press. A 
corpus of laws that aim to disclose the structure of a media firm is in force. Nonetheless, this is not 
enough in terms of the disclosure of effective influence on the media. The law could provide obligations 
to ensure better accessibility to the data by the general public. For instance, the data available in the 
Register of Communication Operators, kept by AGCOM, are only partially available to the public. 
Indicator 15 deals with the rules for political communication and electoral campaign. This indicator 
assesses the existence of regulatory safeguards for fair and objective coverage of political viewpoints, 
taking into consideration also electoral campaigns. Regulatory measures exist but the risk is that, when 
violated, the sanctions are not very effective. 
Policy measures on indicator 20 Regulatory safeguards for the impartial transmission of 
information are nascent, and not very well defined and developed. 
High risk. The regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or control of mainstream 
media by politicians (indicator 16) scores high risk due to a lack of regulation on this area. The law on 
the conflict of interest can be taken into consideration to some extent, but this is a general law and it does 
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not contain specific limitations to direct and indirect ownership/control of media by politicians, 
sanctioning only ‘privileged support’ of the politician by the media outlets. 
As regards indicator 17, it must be noted that the composition of the Council of Administration of RAI 
usually reflects the political situation in the Parliament. Moreover, a representative of the government is 
part of it. These can be considered to be limits to the independence of PSM. 
Indicator 18 scores high risk on must carry rules. This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective 
implementation of regulatory safeguards (in accordance with Article 31 Universal Service Directive) for 
access of public interest channels to cable, DSL and/or satellite platforms. There are no specific rules 
stemming directly from the EU Directive. Regarding the transition period from analogue to digital 
broadcasting, there was an obligation for the national digital operators to reserve 40% of capacity on a 
multiplex for independent channels. There are also rules in place for reserves of network capacity for local 
operators. RAI has must offer obligations.  
A specific mention should be devoted to indicator 19, which was measured again after the Law Decree 66 
of 2014 regarding urgent measures on competitiveness and social justice came into force. This legislative 
decree, in fact reduced the fee-revenue to the PSM for 2014 by 150 million euros. This indicator shows 
how a government’s unilateral decision, taken after no specific public debate, can break an established 
method of financing. This, in the logic of the MPM, can be seen as a potential threat to the independence 
of PSM. 
 
Economic Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
Economic indicators show a risk concerning ownership concentrations, including Ownership 
Concentration (21), Readership/Audience Concentration (22) and Cross-Ownership 
Concentration Number of Sectors in which Top 8/owners are active (23). High risk is also assessed 
concerning the Availability and Quality of the broadband (24), which showed that broadband 
infrastructure, is still less accessed and slower than the EU average. The indicator assessing the 
Centralisation of the National Media System shows a low risk, while the lack of data on this matter 
has not made the implementation of the indicator assessing Minority and Community Media possible. 
High risk. The high risk assessed by indicator 21 on Ownership Concentration is generated by 
combining the high risk that is highlighted by measuring the Ownership Concentration in the Television, 
Radio and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). In contrast, the large numbers of newspapers have resulted in 
low risk in the press.  
Similarly to the Ownership Concentration, indicator 22 on Readership/Audience Concentration also 
shows high risk in the television, radio and ISPs sectors, while a medium risk is assessed in newspapers. 
Taking into consideration the revenues of the TOP 8 media outlets of the entire media sector in Italy, the 
market’s revenues are split as follows: TV 3,257.26m Euros, radio 461.26m Euros, newspapers 983.02m 
Euros, internet 1,465.78m Euros. Internet here refers to search engines (such as: Google and Yahoo), and 
social media (such as Facebook). These data lead to the highlighting of a high risk in cross-ownership 
concentration. 
Indicator 24 shows a high risk due to the limited access to Broadband infrastructure, including landlines 
and mobile connectivity, which is below the EU average. Indicators assessing the quality of the 
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broadband, namely, the landline broadband speed, also show high risk, given that this is lower than the 
EU average. 
Low risk: indicator 26 is the only low risk assessed among the economic indicators. This shows a high 
decentralisation of media system, due to the high distribution of local media outlets. This outcome is 
justified by the rich presence of local newspapers, regional television and radio. Although national media 
outlets play a dominant role in the Italian media system, local media outlets are widely distributed. 
As already mentioned, it was not possible to assess indicator 25 on Minority and Community Media, 
due to the lack of data. 
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The socio-political indicators generally show a medium risk for media pluralism in Italy (five of eight 
indicators score as ‘medium’). The exceptions are the indicator on Independence and ownership of 
news agencies, showing a low risk, and the indicators Presence of professional associations 
providing advocacy for editorial independence and respect of professional standards and ‘Political 
bias in the media,’ showing a high risk. 
The low-risk indicator 34 Independence and ownership of news agencies is mainly based on the 
assessment of the market share of the leading news agency and its political affiliation. The leading news 
agency in Italy is Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ANSA), although no recent data about its market 
share could be found to confirm this. Given that ANSA is a cooperative company consisting of 34 
shareholders, it does not seem connectable to any specific political affiliation. 
Medium-risk indicators focus on guarantees for universal access and coverage of media, political 
control in the media, and the level of independence of PSM. Indicator 27 Guarantees for universal 
access to media regarding special needs groups scores as medium because public service TV channels 
provide quite extensive measures to promote access to media content and services by special needs 
groups, but no relevant data could be found on the two leading private terrestrial TV channels (also part 
of the sample). Indicator 28 Guarantees for universal coverage of PSM and broadband networks 
regarding geographic coverage shows a medium risk given that one of the sub-indicators scores as 
medium (DSL coverage in rural areas), one sub-indicator is lacking data (public radio signal 
coverage), while the other two sub-indicators score as high-risk (public TV signal coverage and rural 
population passed by cable) as, in Italy, cable has not traditionally been developed.  
Indicator 30 Political control over media and distribution networks ownership has too many sub-
indicators to go into the detail of each one in this report. The sub-indicators all show low to medium risk. 
Generally, the data on ownership and audience shares in Italy are publicly available, even if it is not easy to 
find them online. However, when it comes to the political affiliation of media owners, there seem to be no 
official sources of data and, apart from a few very well known cases, the political affiliation of media 
owners is disclosed only as result of journalist investigation or press articles. 
In terms of indicator 31 Political control over media funding by advertising, in Italy, there is no 
regulation, nor are there parameters, that establish the relationship between state advertising and audience 
shares. Moreover, there seem to be no relevant statistics. The Department of Information and Publishing 
(Dipartimento per l’informazione e l’editoria pubblica) collects quantitative information on different 
communication campaigns, but the data are provided only to the public entity in charge of the campaign 
in order to do quantitative analysis of the campaign’s impact. Hence, Variable 1 cannot be scored. 
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Moreover, there are no rules regarding the distribution of state advertising (high risk). Given the absence 
of data on the first variable and the high risk of the second, this indicator could potentially score as high-
risk.  
The level of independence of PSM (indicator 33) shows a high risk with regard to the PSM finance 
mechanism. Although the relevant Ministerial Decree suggests economic considerations, in practice the 
level of public financing is subject to political discretion. This is evident from the fact that, in 2014, the 
government decided that the revenues from the license fee to RAI should be cut by EUR 150 million, 
suddenly and without any public discussion. The other two sub-indicators are low-risk, given that there is 
no direct government financing for the PSM and that the government does not decide on the wages for 
PSM employees. 
High risk indicators: The first high-risk indicator is 32 Presence of professional associations 
providing advocacy for editorial independence and respect of professional standards, which shows 
a medium risk with regard to the sub-indicator on presence and activity of professional associations 
providing advocacy for editorial independence and the respect of professional standards. The reach of the 
Ordine dei giornalisti and the National Federation of the Italian Press (FNSI) is limited. The other variable, 
which evaluates the mechanisms that allow professional associations to conduct advocacy for editorial 
independence, shows a high risk. However, given that the key term ‘mechanisms’ is not defined (as 
pointed out by the respondent and three of the panel experts), the assessment leaves space for subjective 
interpretation. This indicator relies on expert opinion. The second high-risk indicator 29 Political bias in 
the media shows a high risk that is related to unbalanced representation of the different groups of 
political actors in the selected media sample; and a medium risk related to the one-sided portrayal of 
political actors in the media. However, the data here is based on a rather small sample and cannot be used 
to derive conclusions.  
 
 
Graph 16: Level of risk for each risk domain - Italy 
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COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM 
(July 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The implementation of the MPM2014 for the United Kingdom shows a low/medium risk for media 
pluralism in the country. The results collected by implementing the MPM in UK, show risks in the country 
as follows: 18% (6) of the indicators assess a high risk; 20% (7) of indicators indicate medium risk, and 
62% (21) refer to low risk. 
Risks to media pluralism in the United Kingdom are relatively small overall, but some deficiencies and 
challenges create risks, and potential risks, due to media concentration, limited attention to issues of 
cultural and geographical pluralism, and influence over the financing of publicly supported media. There 
are also insufficiencies resulting from intervals in updating existing policy to include newer digital media 
activities. 
The highest risks to media pluralism in the United Kingdom are economic, with some risks identified in 
the legal/regulatory regimes, followed by socio-economic risks. 
Although generally suitable and effective, the pilot UK implementation revealed some issues with the 
Media Pluralism Monitor’s instrument and the methods that should be considered. These involve the 
measurement of sectorial and cross-sectorial ownership and revenues, limitations in audience 
measurement systems that are particularly related to regional and digital media, and some absolutism in the 
measurement categories. 
 
 
Graph 17: Average level of risk for each type of indicator - UK 
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Legal Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism  
The United Kingdom has a well-developed legal and regulatory system that are related to media that are 
governed by the rule of law and that generally exhibits effective implementation and processes (indicator 
1, low risk). The United Kingdom protects freedom of expression, affords information access (indicator 2, 
low risk), provides for independent media and competition regulatory authorities (indicator 5, low risk), 
maintains specific media pluralism and competition policies (indicator 3, 12, low risk), regulates cross-
ownership involving operators of broadcast channels (indicator 13, low risk), and requires political 
impartiality in broadcasting (indicator 15, low risk). 
The assessment of risks to media plurality involving the legal/regulatory frameworks in the United 
Kingdom did not reveal substantial issues. The majority of indicators were measured to exhibit low risk, 
however, some indicators revealed certain problematic issues. These do not appear to be immediate 
significant threats to media pluralism, but they should receive attention from policymakers. 
The regulatory framework related to recognition of media pluralism as an intrinsic part of media freedoms 
and/or as the policy objective of media legislation and or/regulation (indicator 3) was evaluated as not 
posing a threat overall to media plurality in the UK. However, media pluralism is not explicitly linked to 
media freedom in the relevant legislation, and the policy might, in general, be improved to deal with 
pluralism as a specific factor. Nevertheless, the issue of media pluralism is salient and recognised. There 
have been a number of recent developments in the United Kingdom that are relevant to this issue, such as 
the Leveson judicial enquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the press (2012), and the House of 
Lords Select Communications Committee Enquiry into media plurality (2013-2014). It remains to be seen 
whether these result in a more robust regulatory framework for media plurality.  
The issue most often rising in pluralism debates in the United Kingdom is assessed by indicators 12 and 
13, involving regulatory safeguards against a high concentration of ownership and/or control in the media 
(both in terms of horizontal and cross-media ownership).  
Although certain legislative provisions exist, the regulation was largely relaxed by the Communications Act 
2003 that removed the upper limit of 15% of the audience share that one company could control. The 
Media Ownership (Radio and Cross-media) Order, 2011, removed the restrictions on radio ownership, 
including the provision that one person cannot hold more than one national radio multiplex. There are no 
specific provisions when it comes to newspapers and ISPs. Nevertheless, a high level of concentration of 
ownership can be prevented via merger control rules under competition regulation. The Enterprise Act, 
2002, section 58, applies a public interest test to mergers. There is a consensus emerging among media 
policy specialists, however, that this provision is not adequate, especially since ‘sufficient plurality’ is not 
defined.  
Three media merger cases since the implementation of the act have illustrated the complexity of existing 
arrangements that arise from the number of regulatory bodies being involved (competition, media, 
consumer affairs) and the vagueness of the wording of the public interest test. None of the cases 
specifically raised significant concern in regulatory bodies about plurality, although media critics and media 
policy analysts were particularly concerned about plurality in relation to News Corporation’s takeover bid 
for BSkyB. The way these cases have been handled, combined with Ofcom’s continuous suggestions that 
ownership rules should be further liberalised, cast a negative assessment on the sub-question I. 3. in 
indicator 12, regarding pro-active policy making and implementation.  
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Another concern that is relative to ownership arises in indicator 16, which assesses the existence and 
implementation of regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or control of 
mainstream media by politicians (high risk). Although provisions exist to prohibit media ownership by 
politicians in the Broadcasting Act 1996, they have neither been amended to include video on demand 
(VoD), nor do they apply to newspaper ownership. Further, there are no self-regulatory measures that 
stipulate editorial independence in audiovisual and print media (sub-question E.3). Despite these 
weaknesses, political ownership of media is generally not an issue in the UK:1) none of the major media 
(broadcasting or press) are owned by politicians; 2) broadcasting regulations require impartiality in news 
and public affairs, and compliance is high, 3) there is an active print press that represents the range of 
political opinion represented in Parliament. Consequently, ownership by politicians has not presented 
issues that have been deemed to require additional legislative or regulatory action. There have been 
occasional critiques about the political behaviour of certain owners, evidenced by the Leveson Enquiry, 
for example, but those have not involved politicians as owners. 
The Monitor identified no major legal/regulatory threats to media plurality, although a number of 
indicators contain issues that have been identified as being minor risks. The assessment of regulatory 
safeguards for the journalistic profession (indicator 4, medium risk) revealed that although certain 
journalistic rights are both enshrined in law and respected in practice, no laws/regulations or self-
regulatory codes prevent commercial influence on the editorial content (indicator 4, E.2). This has been an 
issue in the United Kingdom and has most recently been revealed in journalistic practices that were 
exposed during the Leveson Enquiry. In addition, there are no mechanisms for granting social protection 
to journalists in cases of changes of ownership (indicator 4, I.2.). Although the right of journalists to 
access events for news reporting is not explicitly recognised in law or regulation (indicator 4, E.5.), there 
are no reports indicating that this is not respected in practice (indicator 4, I.5.).  
No legal or regulatory provisions safeguard access to airtime on public service media for various cultural 
and social groups (indicator 7, high risk). There is no official evidence that this has been an issue in 
practice in the UK, although various cultural and social groups are becoming more vocal about their 
degree of representation among public service media personnel. Assessment of the impartiality of political 
reporting on television (indicator 15, low risk) revealed that, although there are provisions regarding fair, 
balanced and impartial political reporting on television, the rules have not been updated and expanded to 
cover non-linear broadcasting (indicator 15, I.6.). This might not present a significant threat currently, 
because the video on demand market involving news and public affairs has not developed in the United 
Kingdom to the extent that a significant number of services are carrying political content that has not 
originated on linear broadcast channels. 
Weaknesses were found in policy regarding local public service broadcasting, and they indicate attention is 
required, especially given the centralisation of media in London and the devolution of governance to 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and other parts of the country. Although regulatory provisions for 
locally oriented and locally produced content on public service channels and services exist in the United 
Kingdom (indicator 10), they lack regulatory safeguards involving the obligation to maintain regional news 
correspondents, the installation and maintenance of local production and transmission facilities, and the 
obligation to have a balance of journalists coming from various geographical groups (indicator 10, E.2., 
E.3., E.4.). indicator 10, then, scores high risk.  
The United Kingdom has significant regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of audiovisual media 
(indicator 11), but does not require measures to promote the distribution of newspapers in rural areas 
(indicator 11, E.4., I.5). Nevertheless, the overall risk to plurality from insufficient geographical coverage 
of the media is assessed as low.  
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A risk related to the level of independence of public service media in the United Kingdom, stemming 
from appointment procedure and the composition of their governing bodies (indicator 17), was identified. 
Although there is no direct evidence that the general principle of independence from government is not 
being respected, the risk was assessed as medium because neither the regulators, nor the government 
actively monitor the implementation of appointment procedures (indicator 17, I.2.). 
The issue of net neutrality (indicator 20) was deemed to create a medium threat to media pluralism. Net 
neutrality policy in the United Kingdom is considered underdeveloped because little political debate on the 
topic has occurred, Ofcom has issued few discussion documents, and a number of ISPs have adopted a 
voluntary code that is related to information about traffic management. The United Kingdom has yet to 
implement the net neutrality policies and neither the Government nor Ofcom have developed specific 
measures.  
  
Economic Type of Indicator Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism 
Some significant economic risks to media pluralism are evident in the data. High concentration is manifest 
in television, newspapers and internet services’ provision, as measured by revenue and public 
consumption. Media institutions and content providers are strongly centralised at the national level and 
operate primarily from London, which creates some geographic pluralism risks. Those risks are increased 
because regional broadcasting services are relatively weak. 
The highest economic risk to media plurality results from high ownership concentration and high audience 
and readership concentration (indicators 21 and 22). There is high concentration of ownership in 
television, newspapers, and Internet Service Provision (indicator 21) that presents both pluralism and 
consumer risks. Combined revenue of the Top 4 players in the television market (BSkyB, BBC, ITV, and 
Channel 4) represents 73.85% of the £12.3bn television market (indicator 21, question 1). The Top 4 
companies in the newspaper market have revenues worth 70.78% of the total £3,714m annual revenue 
(News UK, Associated Newspapers, Trinity Mirror, and FT Group) (indicator 21, question 2). 4 players 
dominate the ISP market (BT, Virgin, BSkyB, and TalkTalk) and jointly command 92.14% of the total 
market revenues of £3.7bn (indicator 21, question 3).  
This financial dominance is related to audience and readership figures (indicator 22). The Top 4 players in 
each category remain the same. Together the Top 4 television operators have a joint audience share of 
75.4%. The Top 4 newspaper firms command 67.8% of newspaper circulation, and the Top 4 Internet 
Service Providers account for 86.8% of internet subscribers. There is a relationship between indicators 21 
and 22 because greater financial resources tend to result in content and system investments that attract 
large audiences/user groups, and larger audiences/user groups create increased revenue.  
High risk to media plurality also stems from the market share of the Top 8 players across media sectors 
(indicator 23). The number of sectors in which the Top 8 firms/owners are active produces a combined 
market share of 92.77%.  
Some risks are evident in the development of broadband services (indicator 24, medium risk). Although 
the penetration rate for both fixed and mobile broadband is significantly higher than the EU average 
(indicator 24, questions 1 and 2), both download and upload speeds are considerably lower than the EU 
average (UK download 12Mbps - EU average 20.12Mbps; UK upload 1.4Mbps – EU average 5.19Mbps) 
(indicator 24, questions 3 and 4). 
Centralisation of the national media system poses some threats to media plurality (indicator 26, overall 
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score: low risk), despite the presence of regional media. The risk mostly stems from the newspaper market, 
since there is high concentration of ownership when it comes to specific regions in the UK (indicator 26, 
variable 2). Trinity Mirror is dominant in three of the five cities that were analysed. In Birmingham and 
Cardiff, Trinity Mirror owns the three largest regional dailies. These are the only dailies published in these 
cities, which means Trinity Mirror essentially controls 100% of the local market. It also has a dominant 
stake in Glasgow, where it controls 67.6% of the local market. The circulation of national dailies published 
by Trinity Mirror represents 13.35% of the total circulation of national newspapers, so its local strength is 
not equally matched at the national level.  
There is a disparity between the circulation of national dailies published in the capital and the circulation 
of regional/local dailies that presents a geographically based threat to pluralism involving the presentation 
of regional news and views (indicator 26, questions 1 and 5). The circulation of national dailies represents 
84.64% of the total newspaper circulation in the United Kingdom. This dominance is to some extent 
offset by the relative strength of regional/local radio and internet services.  
 
Socio-political Type of Indicators Assessing Risks to Media Pluralism 
The study revealed few significant risks to media pluralism related to socio-economic factors in the UK. It 
provides relatively good service to audiences with special needs (indicator 27, low risk), pursues 
universality of the broadcast and broadband services (indicator 28, low risk), and the politicisation of 
media tends to be present only in the national press (indicator 29, medium risk). It does exhibit low risk in 
the financing mechanisms for PSBs. 
A few minor issues have been identified when it comes to assessing the guarantees for universal coverage 
of public service media and broadband networks regarding geographical coverage (indicator 28, low risk). 
The percentage of the population covered by sufficient quality of signal for all public TV channels is 
98.7% (question 1), and the percentage of the rural population effectively passed for cable is 5% (question 
4). This risk is somewhat offset by the availability of multichannel free and paid digital broadcast television 
services and growing broadband distribution capabilities.  
Some political bias in the media is seen in over-representation of the government and leading parties and 
in the highly limited media representation of other political actors (indicator 29, medium risk). The results 
of the content analysis conducted as a part of the assessment indicate that this representational bias poses 
a high risk to media pluralism in the UK, but this requires more extensive follow-up investigation because 
of the limited nature of the analysis used in the Media Pluralism Monitor’s method. Furthermore, the 
second element of the indicator (question 2) needs to be clarified because it is somewhat ambiguous in its 
assessment of a ‘one-sided portrayal’.  
A risk of political control over media funding by state advertising was revealed, because there are no rules 
regarding the distribution of state advertising (indicator 31, medium risk). However, the analysis of the 
distribution of state advertising did not reveal any significant current disproportional distribution.  
There is a medium risk to media plurality coming from the mechanism of providing financing to the PSM 
by the government (indicator 33, variable 1). The licence fee in the UK is used for BBC services and, as of 
2011, for S4C, the Welsh language broadcaster. The level of the licence fee is determined by the BBC’s 
Royal Charter, which sets its role and remit. The BBC Charter is renewed every 10 years following lengthy 
negotiations, research and consultations. In addition, the conclusions and recommendations of Ofcom’s 
review of the PSB are taken into account, which are also informed by both in-house and independent 
research and comprehensive consultations. Despite two of seven panel members claiming that these 
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public discussions are of no influence, the indicator has been assessed as medium risk with the opinion 
that the robust debate regarding the BBC and the licence fee in the UK does carry some weight, and that 
the role and influence of public opinion and the way it feeds into the regulatory process is a much wider 
and theoretical question. In addition, the 2010 interventionist incident, when the BBC’s licence fee was 
frozen after a few days’ negotiations behind closed doors with the newly elected coalition government, and 
as a part of the post-recession cuts, has not had a decisive influence on the assessment of this indicator, 
since it does not represent common practice in the 68-year-long tradition of the licence fee.  
 
Graph 18: Level of risk for each risk domain - UK 
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APPENDIX 2: USER GUIDE TO MEDIA PLURALISM MONITOR 2014 
 
LEGAL INDICATORS 
 
1. Regulatory safeguards for freedom of  expression 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards for freedom of  expression. A country may have good laws relating to freedom of  expression, 
but they may not be implemented or enforced. In addition, constitutional guarantees may be eroded by 
exceptions and derogations from international treaty obligations or by contradictory laws covering, for 
example, state secrecy or criminal defamation. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Is freedom of  expression explicitly recognized in the Constitution and/or 
national laws? 
+ - 
E.2. Has the Member State signed and ratified relevant Treaty obligations with 
no significant exemptions (e.g. ECHR, ICCPR, and Children's Rights Treaty)? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Do citizens have legal remedies in cases of  infringement of  their freedom of  
expression? Are barriers to appealing the decisions reasonable? 
+ - 
I.2. Do defamation laws still enable public debate about the conduct of  officials 
or official entities? 
Before giving an answer to this question, answer the questions below. 
• I.2.1. Do defamation laws provide for sufficient legal defences, e.g. that the 
disputed statement was an opinion, not an allegation of  fact; that publication or 
broadcasting of  the disputed fact was reasonable or in the public interest; or 
that it occurred during a live transmission and/or before a court or elected body? 
YES/NO 
• I.2.2. Do defamation laws provide for a regime of  remedies that allow for 
proportionate responses to the publication or broadcasting of  defamatory 
statements? YES/NO 
• I.2.3. Is the scope of  defamation laws defined as narrowly as possible, including 
as to whom may sue? YES/NO 
• I.2.4. Can defamation suits only be brought by natural persons (and not by public 
bodies whether legislative, executive or judicial)? YES/NO 
+ - 
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If  you answered 'NO' to the above questions two times or more, mark the NO/- column on 
the right. 
 
I.3. Do privacy laws still enable public debate about issues of  public concern, i.e. 
restrictions are narrowly defined in law, rather than being subject to executive 
discretion? 
+ - 
I.4. Do national security laws still enable public debate about issues of  public 
concern, i.e. restrictions are narrowly defined in law, rather than being subject to 
executive discretion? 
+ - 
I.5. Are other restrictions upon freedom of  expression (e.g. rules on blasphemy) 
clear and narrowly defined in law and justifiable as necessary in a democratic 
society, in accordance with Article 10 ECHR? 
+ - 
I.6. Is free speech generally respected in the Member State? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, 
on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic infringements of  free speech in 
the domain of  the media, tick ‘NO’). 
 Sources of  reference: national case law, case law of  the European Court on 
Human Rights on the basis of  Article 10 ECHR. 
+ - 
I.7 Is freedom of  expression generally respected on the internet? (If  so, tick 
‘YES’). If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  any law/case law that 
unreasonably restricts freedom of  expression on the internet (e.g. filtering of  
information, blocking of  websites, control on social networks), tick ‘NO’). 
 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements, etc.), case law and regulatory decisions.  
 
Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:  
 EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-
europe  
 Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities; 
 Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and  
 Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/  
Policy documents: 
For instance: 
Council of Europe (1982). Declaration on freedom of expression and information, 29 April 1982; 
Council of Europe (2001). Recommendation 1506 (2001) on freedom of expression and information in 
the media in Europe, 24 April 2001; 
Council of Europe (2003). Recommendation 1589 (2003) on freedom of expression in the media in 
Europe, 28 January 2003; 
Council of Europe (2007). Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
protecting freedom of expression and information in times of crisis, 26 September 2007: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1188493  
Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating safeguards for freedom of expression: 
For instance: 
Council of Europe (2013). Online Freedom of Expression, Assembly, Association and the Media in 
Europe MCM (2013) 007, available at: 
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http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/belgrade2013/Online%20freedom%20of%20expressi
on,%20assembly,%20association_MCM(2013)007_en_Report_IanBrown.pdf  
Council of Europe (2013). Report on Freedom of Expression in Europe, available at: 
http://academicrightswatch.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Freedom-of-Expression-in-Europe.pdf  
Index on Censorship (2013). Time to step up: The EU and freedom of expression, available at: 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Time-to-Step-Up-The-EU-and-
freedom-of-expression.pdf  
European Broadcasting Union (2013). Public Service Media and Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, available at: http://www3.ebu.ch/sites/ebu/contents/policies/eu---policy/public-
affairs-and-legal-issues/public-service-media-and-article.html  
EUMAP (2005). Television across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence (2005), available at: 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-regulation-policy-and-
independence  
European Institute for the Media on behalf of the European Parliament (2004). Information of the citizen in 
the EU: obligation for the media and the Institutions concerning the citizens right to be fully and objectively informed, 
available at: http://edz.bib.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-ma/ep/04/pe358896-en.pdf  
Council of Europe (2002). Media Diversity in Europe, Report prepared by the AP-MD, H/APMD (2003) 
001, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/H-APMD(2003)001_en.pdf  
European Parliament (2004). Report on the risks of violation, in the EU and especially in Italy, of freedom 
of expression and information (Article 11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), 5 April 2004, A5-
0230/2004 (Report Boogerd-Quaak). 
European Parliament (2004). Report on the EU Charter: Standard settings for media freedom across the 
EU, 21 May 2013, A7-0117/2013 (Weber Report). 
Transparency International, Anti-corruption handbook.  
Open Society Foundation, Mapping digital media 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/mapping-digital-media 
Websites providing more information: 
For instance:  
www.ifj.org,www.hrw.org, www.freedomhouse.org, www.indexoncensorship.org, www.rsf.org, 
www.epra.com and http://en.unesco.org/  
 
2. Regulatory safeguards for right to information 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards relating to the right to information. A country may have good laws relating to the right to 
information but they may not be implemented or enforced. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Is the right to information explicitly recognised in the Constitution and/or 
national laws? 
+ - 
E.2. Has the Member State signed and ratified relevant Treaty obligation with no 
significant exemptions (e.g. ECHR, ICCPR, Directive 2003/04/EC of  28 January 
2003 on Public Access to Environmental Information, Directive 2003/98/EC 
of  17 November 2003 on the re-use of  public sector information)? 
+ - 
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Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and 
whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the 
meaning of  Article 267 TFEU?; 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
(mark “+”if  both are “+”and “-” if  just one is “-”) 
+ - 
I.2. Are restrictions on the grounds of  protection of  personal privacy 
narrowly defined so as to exclude information in which there is no 
legitimate public interest? 
+ - 
I.3. Is the right to information generally respected in the Member State? (If  
so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic non-
compliance with the relevant rules, tick ‘NO’). 
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  
independent bodies or NGOs, etc.  
 
+ _ 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law, regulatory decisions 
Idem as indicator 1  
Policy documents: 
Idem as indicator 1 ; 
Council of Europe (2002). Recommendation Rec (2002)2 on access to official documents by the 
Committee of Ministers; 
Council of Europe (1994). Recommendation No. R (94) 13 on measures to promote media transparency, 
22 November 1994; 
Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating safeguards for the right to information: 
Idem as indicator 1 ; 
World Bank Institute (2011). The Right to Information and Privacy: Balancing Rights and Managing 
Conflicts. Working Paper Series, available at: 
http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-
acquia/wbi/Right%20to%20Information%20and%20Privacy.pdf  
OSCE (2008). Access to information by the media in the OSCE region: Country Reports, 
http://www.osce.org/fom/24893  
Websites providing more information: 
Idem as indicator 1 , www.freedominfo.org and http://www.statewatch.org/foi/foi.htm  
 
3. Recognition of  media pluralism as an intrinsic part of  media 
freedoms and/or as policy objective of  media legislation and/or 
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regulation 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence of  the recognition of  media pluralism as an 
intrinsic part of  media freedoms and/or as a policy objective of  media legislation and/or regulation. In 
most national legal systems, the concept of  pluralism is not explicitly recognised in constitutional statutes, 
but can be found in the rulings of  constitutional courts that treat this as a constitutional principle. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Is media pluralism explicitly recognised in the Constitution and/or 
national laws as an intrinsic part of  media freedoms?  
+ - 
E.2. Is media pluralism explicitly recognised as policy objective of  media 
legislation and/or regulation? 
+ - 
E.3. Does the Constitutional Court recognise in its case law media pluralism 
as an intrinsic part of  media freedoms and/or as policy objective of  media 
legislation and/or regulation? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is media pluralism generally respected as policy goal in the Member 
State? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  non-respect 
of  media pluralism by the legislator/regulator when adopting legislation or 
issuing regulatory decisions, tick ‘NO’). 
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent 
bodies or NGOs. 
+ _ 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law, regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 1  
Policy documents:  
For instance:  
Activity Report of the Committee of Experts on Media Concentration and Pluralism (MM-CM 1994). 
Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating the recognition of media pluralism as intrinsic part of media 
freedoms and/or as policy objective of media legislation and/or regulation: 
Idem as indicator 1. ;  
ELIAMEP. 2010. MEDIADEM background information report “Media policies and regulatory practices 
in a selected set of European countries, the European Union and the Council of Europe; 
ELIAMEP. 2011. MEDIADEM Case study report “Does media policy promote media freedom and 
independence?”; 
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European Commission. 2009. Media for Diversity. Taking the Pulse of Diversity in the Media. A Study on 
Media and Diversity in EU Member States and 3 EEA countries; 
European Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, 
SEC (2007) 32 and 
Council of Europe. 2003. Media Diversity in Europe, H/APMD (2003)001. 
Websites providing more information: 
For instance: www.media-accountability.org 
 
4. Regulatory safeguards for journalistic profession 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards for journalistic practice. This indicator focuses on four pillars: (i) criteria to become a journalist, 
(ii) editorial independence, (iii) protection of  journalistic sources and (iv) safeguards for access to events 
for news reporting. Firstly, it looks at legal restrictions on who can become a journalist, since these may 
have a deterring effect and hence a negative influence on media pluralism (e.g. burdensome accreditation, 
registration or licensing schemes). Secondly, it assesses whether the editorial independence of  journalists is 
protected in case of  change of  ownership. It then looks at legal provisions guaranteeing the protection of  
sources and finally it focuses on the right for journalists to access to events for news reporting.  
 
Method of  measurement: analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Is access to the journalistic profession open according to the regulatory 
framework in place? Do the laws or self-regulatory instruments that prescribe 
who may practice journalism or requiring the licensing or registration of  
journalists impose transparent, objective, proportionate (not synonym for strict 
conditions; e.g. diploma is a proportionate condition) and non discriminatory 
requirements? 
+ - 
E.2. Are there any laws or self-regulatory codes prohibiting commercial parties to 
influence, or seek to influence editorial content? 
+ - 
E.3. Is the protection of  journalistic sources explicitly recognised by the law and 
is it in accordance with Recommendation (2000) 7 on the right of  journalists 
not to disclose their sources of  information of  the Council of  Europe?  
+ - 
E.4. If  not, do the highest courts in your country recognise the principle of  the 
protection of  journalistic sources as an intrinsic part of  free speech?  
+ - 
E.5. Is journalists' access to events for news reporting explicitly recognised by the 
law and/or by the Courts? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the 
scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is access to the journalistic profession open in practice? (If  the related 
regulatory framework (if  available, see E.1. above) is implemented and enforced 
+ - 
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in practice, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence that the conditions to 
become a journalist impose barriers to exercise the profession of  journalist, tick 
‘NO’). 
Sources of  reference: Reports, studies, surveys.  
I.2. Are there any mechanisms granting social protection to journalists in case of  
changes of  ownership (change of  editorial line)?  
+ - 
I.3. Do commercial entities or the owners of  media companies generally abstain 
from influencing editorial content? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is 
evidence that these actors systematically influence, or seek to influence the 
editorial content, tick ‘NO’). 
+ - 
I.4. Is the protection of  journalistic sources generally enforced in practice? (If  
so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic infringement 
of  the protection of  journalistic sources, tick ‘NO’). 
Evidence of  systematic infringement is e.g. there are several cases where 
journalists were obliged to disclose their sources and where journalists were 
condemned for not disclosing their sources; cases where the Member State did 
not take measures after a conviction by the European Court on Human Rights 
for systematic use of  domiciliary visits and telephone tapping of  journalists. 
+ - 
I.5. Are journalists generally granted access to events for news reporting without 
any type of  discrimination? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is 
evidence of  systematic illegitimate refusal of  journalists' access to events for 
news reporting, tick ‘NO’). 
+ _ 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law and regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 1  
Policy documents: 
For instance: 
Idem as indicator 1  
Council of Europe (2000). Recommendation REC (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their 
sources of information, 8 March 2000 
Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating safeguards for the protection of journalistic sources: 
For instance: 
IFJ (2010), Protecting our sources of information. The updated version is available at: 
http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/efj-policy-document-on-protection-of-sources  
Banisar, D. (2007). Silencing Sources: An International Survey of Protections and Threats to Journalists’ Sources, 
available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1706688  
Websites providing more information: 
For instance: www.enpa.org, www.ifj.org, www.ijnet.org 
 
5. Regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency of 
the relevant national authorities 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards for the independence and efficiency of  the relevant authority(-ies) in the media field. In 
particular, it looks at the independence and efficiency of  the media, competition and telecommunications 
authorities. Independence, transparency and effectiveness are crucial elements that should be guaranteed 
in order for the three authorities to act as watchmen of  media pluralism and freedom.  
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Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Are there any explicit constitutional or legal guarantees of  independence 
of  the media authority from political or commercial interference? 
+ - 
E.2. Are appointment procedures for the media authority transparent, 
democratic and objective and designed to minimize the risk of  political or 
commercial interference, for instance by including rules on incompatibility 
and eligibility? 
+ - 
E.3. Are the procedures for allocation of  budgetary resources for the media 
authority transparent and objective, i.e. leaving no scope for arbitrary 
decisions by the governing powers? 
+ - 
E.4. Are the tasks, duties and responsibilities of  the media authority defined 
in detail in the law (e.g. grant licences, compliance monitoring, sanctioning, 
other)? 
+ - 
E.5. Does regulation attribute sanctioning powers to the media authority (e.g. 
warning, fine, suspension or revocation of  licence, other)? 
+ - 
E.6. With regard to the media authority decisions, are there effective appeal 
mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of  the parties 
involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to 
delay the enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
E.7. Are there any explicit constitutional or legal guarantees of  independence 
of  the competition authority from political or commercial interference? 
+ - 
E.8. Are the appointment procedures for the competition authority 
transparent, democratic and objective and designed to minimize the risk of  
political or commercial interference, for instance by including rules on 
incompatibility and eligibility? 
+ - 
E.9. Are the procedures for allocation of  budgetary resources for the 
competition authority transparent and objective, i.e. leaving no scope for 
arbitrary decisions by the governing powers? 
+ - 
E.10. Are the tasks, duties and responsibilities of  the competition authority 
defined in detail in the law? 
+ - 
E.11. Does the law attribute powers to the competition authority? + - 
E.12. With regard to the competition authority decisions, are there effective 
appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of  the parties 
involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to 
delay the enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
E.13. Are there any explicit constitutional or legal guarantees of  + - 
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independence of  the telecommunications authority from political or 
commercial interference? 
E.14. Are the appointment procedures for the telecommunications authority 
transparent, democratic and objective and designed to minimize the risk of  
political or commercial interference, for instance by including rules on 
incompatibility and eligibility? 
+ - 
E.15. Are the procedures for allocation of  budgetary resources to the 
telecommunications authority transparent and objective, i.e. leaving no scope 
for arbitrary decisions by the governing powers? 
+ - 
E.16. Are the tasks, duties and responsibilities of  the telecommunications 
authority defined in detail in the law? 
+ - 
E.17. Does the law attribute powers to the telecommunications authority? + - 
E.18. With regard to the telecommunications authority decisions, are there 
effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of  the parties 
involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, the procedures of  which are not systematically misused 
to delay the enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
Total number of  +    
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Are the appointment procedures for the media authority respected in 
practice? 
+ - 
I.2. Does decisional practice of  the media authority indicate that the authority 
uses its powers in practice in the interest of  the public (the media authority 
has never been condemned after an investigation by anti-corruption bodies)? 
+ - 
I.3. Is the budget adequate and consistent for the media authority to safeguard 
its independence and/or protect it from coercive budgetary pressures and to 
perform its functions (e.g. check annual reports of  the media authority, 
eumap.org, transparancyinternational.org, etc.)? 
+ - 
I.4. The Government cannot arbitrarily overrule the decision of  the media 
authority. 
+ - 
I.5. Is the media authority accountable to the public for its activities, (e.g. is it 
required to publish regular or ad hoc reports relevant to their work or the 
exercise of  their missions)? 
+ - 
I.6. Are the appointment procedures for the competition authority respected 
in practice? 
+ - 
I.7. Does decisional practice of  the competition authority indicate that the 
authority effectively uses its powers in consumers’ interest? 
+ - 
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I.8. Is the budget adequate and consistent for the competition authority to 
safeguard its independence and/or protect it from coercive budgetary 
pressures and to perform its functions? 
+ - 
I.9. The Government cannot arbitrarily overrule the decisions of  the 
competition authority. 
+ - 
I.10. Are the appointment procedures for the telecommunication authority 
respected in practice? 
+ - 
I.11. Does decisional practice of  the telecommunications authority indicate 
that the authority effectively uses its powers? 
+ - 
I.12. Is the budget adequate and consistent for the telecommunications 
authority to safeguard its independence and/or protect it from coercive 
budgetary pressures and to perform its functions? 
+ - 
I.13. The Government cannot arbitrarily overrule the decisions of  the 
telecommunications authority. 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -  
 
 
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law and regulatory decisions: 
Policy documents: 
For instance: 
Idem as indicator 1  
Hans Bredow Institute et al. (2011). Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services 
regulatory bodies. Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, findings available at: 
http://www.indireg.eu/  
Council of Europe (2008). Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions 
of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 26 March 2008, available at:  
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1266737&Site=CM  
Council of Europe (2000). Recommendation REC (2000) 23 on the independence and functions of 
regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 20 December 2000 and efficiency of the media authority 
(-ies), available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=393649&  
Related studies/Reports:  
Cullen International (2006). Study on the regulation of broadcasting issues under the new regulatory framework prepared 
for the European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate-General. 
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence  
Websites providing more information: 
 133 
For instance: www.eumap.org, www.itu.int, www.transparencyinternational.org and www.mediapolicy.org, 
websites of national competition authorities and 
Idem as indicators 1. , 2. and 3.  
 
6. Policies and support measures for media literacy (or digital 
literacy in particular) among different groups of  population 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the active measures taken by the state to promote media 
literacy among different groups of  population. The aim of  media literacy is to increase awareness of  the 
many forms of  media messages encountered in their everyday lives. It should help citizens to recognise 
how the media filters their perceptions and beliefs, shape popular culture and influence personal choices. 
It should empower them with the critical thinking and creative problem-solving skills to make them 
judicious consumers and producers of  information. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  policies and support measures and their implementation by the 
user on the basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
Does the state take active measures to promote media literacy among different groups of  population? 
 
For example: 
Is media literacy taught in the context of  the formal educational system in your Member State? 
Are there media literacy initiatives in environments outside the formal educational systems, such as cultural 
centres, film schools, life-long learning programmes, on-line discussion groups concerned with ethics in 
the media, advertising, media industry and the press, etc.? 
Does your Member State organize computer classes for children, elderly, minority groups? Either free of  
charge or at affordable prices? 
Does your Member State take measures to help children and young people to acquire the necessary skills to 
decipher, evaluate and develop a critical approach to advertising and other forms of  commercial 
communication enabling them to make informed choices? 
Does your Member State take measures aiming at implementing and encouraging a critical approach to 
content, especially informational material, available online? 
Does your Member State take measures either through education or via the media itself  to inform citizens 
about the political leanings of  news providers, and the method by which news is made? 
Does your Member State take measures aiming at increasing citizens' active participation in virtual 
information communities such as news-related discussion forums, user's generated 
databases/encyclopaedias? 
Does your Member State take measures to raise awareness about how search engines work (prioritisation 
of  answers, etc.) and learning to better use search engines? 
Does your Member State take measures to indicate the importance of  copyright, from the perspective of  
both consumers and creators of  content? 
Does your Member State take measures to educate the public on laws and rights relating to media? 
Does your Member State take measures to empower users with tools to critically assess online content; 
extending digital creativity and production skills and encouraging awareness of  copyright issues? 
Does your Member State take measures to ensure that the benefits of  the information society can be 
enjoyed by everyone, including people who are disadvantaged due to limited resources or education, age, 
gender, ethnicity, people with disabilities (e-accessibility) as well as those living in less favoured areas (all 
these are encompassed under e-inclusion)? 
Did organisations in your Member State sign the European Charter for Media Literacy? 
Does your Member State take measures to educate the public on the protection of  minors within media? 
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Does your Member State's literacy and training strategy take into account the recommendations of  the 
Recommendation of  the Committee of  Ministers to Member States on empowering children in the new 
information and communications environment (Adopted on 27 September 2006)? 
Are coordinated measures taken in your Member State to enhance media literacy within the general 
populace, in education, legislation and co- and self-regulation by the media industry itself ? 
Does your Member State evaluate and assess in a reliable manner the effectiveness of  policies and media 
literacy activities? 
Does your Member State take measures to educate the public on media funding (of  television, internet, 
radio, etc)? 
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law, regulatory decisions:  
Idem as indicator 1  
Policy documents: 
Several policy documents containing information on media literacy may be found through the 
Commission’s website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/media-literacy/index_en.htm and through Eurostat’s website at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/  
European Commission (2007). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European 
approach to media literacy in the digital environment, 20 December 2007, COM(2007) 833 final 
European Parliament (2008). Report on media literacy in a digital world, 2008/2129(INI), Rapporteur: 
Christa Prets, A6-0461/2008, 24 November 2008, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A6-0461/2008  
Studies/reports:  
Several studies/reports on media literacy may be found through the Commission’s website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/media-literacy/index_en.htm  
Milioni, D. et al. 2012.‘Their two cents worth’: Exploring user agency in readers” comments in online 
news media. In Observatorio (OBS) Journal, Vol. 6 – No. 3: 21-47. 
Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona (2007). Current trends and approaches to media literacy in Europe, Study for 
the European Commission, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/media-literacy/studies_en.htm  
European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI) Consortium. Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels, 
Study for the European Commission (2009), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/media-
content/media-literacy/studies/eavi_study_assess_crit_media_lit_levels_europe_finrep.pdf  
Studies and articles on citizens’ online activism. Also see: CIVICWEB “Young people, the internet and 
civic participation” database and reports (FP6 project): 
http://www.civicweb.eu/  
Websites providing more information: 
For instance: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/index_en.htm and http://www.euromedialiteracy.eu 
 
7 Safeguards for access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural 
and social groups 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards for access to airtime on PSM by the various cultural and social groups. Cultural and social 
groups (or communities) are broadly understood as groups in society with specific characteristics, which 
distinguish them from the majority. These characteristics can relate to national, racial or ethnical origin, 
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language, religion or belief, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, and age. 
Such safeguards may be found in statutory or co/self-regulatory measures. The indicator therefore assesses 
both the scenario of  legislative intervention (E.1 and E.2) and the scenario of  co/self-regulation (E.3). 
They are put at the same level, without expressing any preference for one over the other. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does media law (including conventions between PSM and the 
government) guarantee access to airtime on PSM channels and services by the 
various cultural (cultural community) and social groups? 
+ - 
E.2. Does other formal law (e.g. administrative law) guarantee access to airtime 
on PSM channels and services for cultural and social groups? 
+ - 
E.3. Is there a functional equivalent to a formal law (e.g. internal charters of  
PSM)? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Are the conditions and procedures in order to gain access to airtime 
transparent and based on objective criteria? 
+ - 
I.2. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring compliance 
with these rules and/or hearing complaints? If  not (in particular in the case of  
self-regulation), is there a voluntary control institution and/or complaints 
mechanism to check compliance with these (self-regulatory) rules? 
+ - 
I.3. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in 
order to impose proportionate remedies in case of  noncompliance with the 
rules? Or, in case of  self-regulatory measures, is the voluntary control or 
complaints mechanism based on transparent and objective procedures which 
may ultimately lead to the imposition of  effective and proportionate remedies 
to stop non-compliance with the rules? 
+ - 
I.4. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU,  
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.5.  
Is access to airtime for cultural and social groups guaranteed in practice? (If  
so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic denial of  
airtime for certain cultural or social groups, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies 
+ _ 
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or NGOs. 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct…), case 
law and regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 1.  
Policy documents:  
Idem as at indicator 1.  
See also:  
Council of Europe (2007) Recommendation CM/Rec (2007)15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on Measures concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns (+ Explanatory Memorandum 
CM(2007)155). 
Studies/reports: 
European Audiovisual Observatory (2007). The Public Service Broadcasting Culture. Iris Special 2007 
edition. http://www.obs.coe.int/about/oea/pr/irisspecial2007_1.html  
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence  
OFCOM (2002). Multicultural Broadcasting: concept and reality, available at: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/bsc/pdfs/research/multicultural.pdf  
EBU – European Broadcasting Union: http://www.ebu.ch/en/  
European Audiovisual Observatory: http://www.obs.coe.int/ 
National media regulation data bases (available on web sites of relevant state bodies).  
Baldi, P. & Hasebrink, U. (Eds.) (2007). Broadcasters and Citizens in Europe. Trends in Media Accountability and 
Viewer Participation, Bristol & Chicago: Intellect. 
Cammaerts, B. & Carpentier, N. (Eds.) (2007). Reclaiming the Media, Communication Rights and 
Democratic Media Roles. Bristol & Chicago: Intellect. 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2008) Pilot Media Project: Experts and research groups for the 
analysis of media content.  
Global Media Monitoring Project (2005). A study of women and men in the news by Margaret Gallagher. London: 
WACC  
ter Val, J. (Ed) (2002). Racism and cultural diversity in the mass media: An overview of research and examples of good 
practice in the EU Member States. 1995-2000, available at:  
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2002/racism-and-cultural-diversity-mass-media  
Media Diversity Institute, International Federation of Journalists & Internews Europe (2009). Study on 
Media & Diversity, Study for the European Commission, http://www.media4diversity.eu/ 
UNESCO (1977). Ethnicity and The Media: An Analysis of Media Reporting in the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Ireland, New York: UNESCO. 
Annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory agencies: 
Christensen, Ch. (2001). Minorities, Multiculturalism and Theories of Public Service. In U. Kivikuru (Ed.), 
Contesting the Frontiers: Media and Dimensions of Identity (pp. 81 – 103), Nordicom: Goeteborg. 
Council of Europe (2008). Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: State Reports – focus on 
Article 9, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_atglance/fcnm_texts_EN.asp  
ECRI (2000). Examples of ‘Good Practices’ to fight against racism and intolerance in the European Media. CRI (2000) 
19, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/good_practices/2-media/ecri00-
19%20Good%20practice%20Media.pdf  
Scannell, P. (1997). Britain: Public Service Broadcasting, from National Culture to Multiculturalism. In M. 
Raboy (Ed.) Public Service Broadcasting in the 21st Century, John Libbey Media: London 
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8. Regulatory safeguards for minority & community media 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  specific 
regulatory safeguards for minority and community media. 
Community media that serve the interests of  other communities (like women, elderly, religious or sexual 
minorities) are called 'other community media'. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does the media law contain specific provisions on minority and 
community media (granting legal recognition to such media as a distinct 
group alongside commercial and public media)? 
+ - 
E.2. Are there frequencies reserved for minority and community media? + - 
E.3. Does the media legislation ensure access by regional and/or local media 
to platforms of  electronic communication network providers (in particular, 
via must-carry rules)? 
+ - 
E.4. Does the State, regional and/or local authority actively support minority 
and community media through direct or indirect subsidies or other policy 
measures? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1 Does this regulatory framework guarantee independence of  the minority 
or community media, meaning that they are de facto owned by or accountable 
to the community or the minority that they seek to serve (e.g. they can elect 
their own board/management bodies)? 
+ - 
I.2. Are these media de facto open to participation (both in programme 
making and management)? 
+ - 
1.3. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring 
compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints and is this 
supervision over these media done in an objective way? 
+ - 
I.4. Does the law grant that body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers 
in order to impose proportionate remedies in case of  noncompliance with 
the rules? 
+ - 
I.5. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, 
+ - 
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• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
I.6. Is minority and community media safeguarded in practice? (If  so, tick 
‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic political 
censorship, interference or manipulation of  these media, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies 
or NGOs. 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law, regulatory decisions: 
Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:  
 EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-
europe  
 Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities; 
 Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and  
 Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/  
Studies/reports: 
European Parliament (2007). The State of Community Media in the European Union, available at: 
http://www.communitymedia.se/europe/stateofcommedia.pdf  
Bi-annual Commission reports and Staff Working Document of the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/implementation/promotion/index_en.htm 
Collins, R. (2002). Media and identity in contemporary Europe: consequences of global convergence. 
Bristol: Intellect. 
Graham, D. (2005). Impact Study of Measures (Community and National) Concerning the Promotion of Distribution 
and Production of TV Programs Provided for Under Article 25(a) of the TV Without Frontiers Directive, 24 May 2005, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/finalised/4-5/27_03_finalrep.pdf  
OFCOM (2002). Multicultural Broadcasting: concept and reality, available at:  
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/bsc/pdfs/research/multicultural.pdf  
Attentional et al. (2009). Study on the application of measures concerning the promotion of the distribution and production 
of European works in audiovisual media services (i.e. including television programs and non-linear services) – Final Report 
for the European Commission, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/art4_5/final_report.pdf  
Suggested guidelines for the monitoring of the implementation of Articles 4 and 5 of the TWFD, June 
1999: http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/reg/tvwf/eu_works/controle45_en.pdf  
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence 
 
9. Regulatory safeguards and policies for regional and local media 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards for the existence and preservation of  regional and local media. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
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 YES NO 
E.1. Does the media legislation recognise regional and/or local media as 
specific categories of  media (with special mission and obligations)? 
+ - 
E.2. Does the law reserve frequencies for regional/local radio and/or TV? + - 
E.3. Does media regulation prohibit networking or affiliation arrangements 
(which can jeopardize local/regional character) between regional and/or local 
media and national media? 
+ - 
E.4. Does the media legislation ensure access by regional and/or local media 
to platforms of  electronic communication network providers (in particular, via 
must-carry rules)? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring compliance 
with these rules and/or hearing complaints? 
+ - 
I.2. Does the law grant that body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in 
order to impose proportionate remedies in case of  noncompliance with the 
rules? 
+ - 
I.3. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.4. Is existence and preservation of  regional/local media safeguarded in 
practice? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic 
noncompliance with the rules, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies 
or NGOs. 
+ - 
I.5. Is the state supporting regional and local media through any support 
mechanism (for example subsidies)? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law and regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 1.  
Studies/reports: 
Annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory agencies several of which 
available through EPRA’s website at: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-
legislation-in-europe 
Ader, T. (2006). Cultural and Regional Remits in Broadcasting. IRIS plus: Legal observations of the European 
Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg. 
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Bakker, P. (2008). The Simultaneous Rise and Fall of Free and Paid Newspapers in Europe. Journalism 
Practice, Vol 2 (3), 427 – 443. 
European Audiovisual Observatory (2008) Yearbook 2008: Film, television and video in Europe.  
MAVISE. Database of TV companies and TV channels in the European Union and 
Candidate Countries. 
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports (2008). Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence 
Petković, B. (Ed.) (2004). Media Ownership and Its Impact on Media Independence. Ljubljana: SEENPM and 
Peace Institute. 
Collins, R. (2002). Media and identity in contemporary Europe: consequences of global convergence. 
Bristol: Intellect. 
Picard, R.G. (2007). Subsidies for Newspapers: Can the Nordic Model Remain Viable?. In H. Bohrmann; 
E. Klaus & M. Machill (Eds.) Media Industry, Journalism Culture and Communication Policies in Europe, Koln: 
Halem. 
World Association of Newspapers (1996 – 2007) World Press Trends, Paris. 
Idem as indicator 8.  
 
10. Regulatory safeguards for locally oriented and locally produced 
content on PSM channels and services 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards guaranteeing local orientation and local production of  content delivered by PSM channels and 
services. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Is the PSM obliged (either via legislation or management charter) to 
have a minimum proportion of  regional and/or local communities involved 
in the production and distribution of  content? 
+ - 
E.2. Is the PSM obliged (either via legislation or management charter) to 
have its own regional correspondents or do they use material acquired from 
news agencies? 
+ - 
E.3. Is the PSM obliged to install and maintain local presence with regard 
to production and transmission facilities in its area of  coverage? 
+ - 
E.4. Is the PSM obliged (either via legislation, management charter, 
employment rules or code) to have a balance of  journalists coming from 
various geographic groups? 
+ - 
E.5. Is the PSM obliged (either via legislation or management charter) to 
have national news available in regional languages? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -    
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How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring 
compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? 
+ - 
I.2. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in 
order to impose proportionate remedies in case of  noncompliance with the 
rules? 
+ - 
I.3. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.4. Is the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory safeguards 
for local orientation and production of  content assured in practice? (If  so, 
tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic noncompliance 
with the rules, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies 
or NGOs. 
+ - 
I.5. Does PSM effectively cover local events? + - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law and regulatory decisions:  
Idem as indicator 9.  
Studies/reports: 
Idem as indicator 9.  
 
11. Regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of  the media 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards for universal coverage of  the media. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Is the PSM under a legal obligation to ensure universal coverage of  its (at 
least major) channels and services? 
+ - 
E.2. Is universal coverage of  the (at least major) PSM channels and services 
enshrined in the charter/agreement/convention between the PSM and public 
authorities? 
+ - 
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E.3. Does the State take active measures to promote roll-out and access to 
broadband networks in remote and/or rural areas? 
+ - 
E.4. Does the State take active measures to promote sufficient distribution of  
newspapers in remote and/or rural areas? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring compliance 
with these rules and/or hearing complaints? 
+ - 
I.2. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in 
order to impose proportionate remedies in case of  noncompliance with the 
rules? 
+ - 
I.3. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place? 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.4.  
Do remote and/or rural areas generally have access to online news? (If  so, tick 
‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  these areas not having access to 
online news, tick ‘NO’).  
 
+ - 
I.5. Is there evidence of  remote and/or rural areas not receiving sufficient 
variety of  newspapers? 
Do remote and/or rural areas generally receive sufficient variety of  
newspapers? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  these 
areas not receiving a variety of  newspapers, tick ‘NO’).  
+ - 
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law and regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 9.  
Studies/reports:  
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence 
European Commission (2012). Broadband Coverage in Europe. Final Report, 2012 Survey, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/broadband-coverage-europe-2012-final-report  
European Commission (2006) Bridging the Broadband Gap. Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, COM (2006) 129 final. 
Harcourt, A. (2008). Report for the group of specialists on media diversity (MC-SMD) on methodology for the monitoring 
of media concentration, pluralism and diversity, February 2008. 
Alonsa, I. F., de Moragas, M., Blasco, J.J., & Nuria Almiron, G. (Eds.) (2006). Press Subsidies in Europe. 
Barcelona: Institute de la Comunicacio, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. 
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Murschetz, P. (1997). State support of the press: Theory and practice: A survey of Austria, France, Norway and Sweden. 
Düsseldorf: European Institute for the Media. 
Picard, R.G. (2007). Subsidies for Newspapers: Can the Nordic Model Remain Viable? In H. Bohrmann; 
E. Klaus & M. Machill (Eds.) Media Industry, Journalism Culture and Communication Policies in Europe, Koln: 
Halem 
Picard, R. G. (2006). Issues and Challenges in the Provision of Press Subsidies. In Alonsa, I. F., de 
Moragas, M., Blasco, J.J., & Nuria Almiron, G. (Eds.) (2006). Press Subsidies in Europe (pp. 211-220), 
Barcelona: Institute de la Comunicacio, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. 
Picard, R. G. (1985). Patterns of state intervention in western press economics. Journalism Quarterly, 62, 
3–9. 
Picard, R. G. (1985). The press and the decline of democracy: The democratic socialist response in public policy. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
Santini, A. (1990). L’Étât et la press. Paris: LITEC. 
Smith, A. (1977). Subsidies and the press in Europe. London: PEP. 
Websites:  
Relevant information may also be found on Eurostat’s website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/  
 
12. Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of  ownership 
and/or control in media (horizontal) 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of  ownership 
and/or control in the different media.  
Method of  measurement: Analysis of laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of the following questionnaire (for the relevant media). 
 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND/OR CONTROL IN TELEVISION (linear and non-
linear audio-visual media services) (HORIZONTAL) : 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on 
objective criteria, such as number of  licences, audience share, circulation, 
distribution of  share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a 
high level of  horizontal concentration of  ownership and/or control in the 
television sector? 
+ - 
E.2. Can a high level of  horizontal concentration of  ownership and/or control 
in the television sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that 
take into account the specificities of  the media sector, for instance: 
- By containing media-specific provisions that impose stricter thresholds than in 
other sectors; 
- The mandatory intervention of  a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, 
the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of  the media 
authority); 
- The possibility to overrule the approval of  a concentration by the competition 
authority for reasons of  media pluralism (or public interest in general); 
+ - 
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-that - even though they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not 
exclude the media sector from their scope of  application? 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring 
compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media 
and/or competition authority) 
+ - 
I.2. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in 
order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in 
case of  non-respect of  the thresholds, such as: 
 - Refusal of  additional licences; 
 - Blocking of  a merger or acquisition; 
 - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; 
 - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors 
 divestiture? 
+ - 
I.3. Is there evidence (for instance in case law or positive evaluations in 
independent reports) of  these powers being effectively and appropriately 
exercised? Is there pro-active and effective policy making and 
implementation? 
+ - 
I.4. Are there any procedures for regular review of  established thresholds in 
the light of  on-going technological, economic and social developments in 
order not to hinder innovations in the media field?  
+ - 
I.5. Are the conditions imposed at the moment of  mergers effectively 
monitored? 
+ - 
I.6. Are competition authorities taking into account (implicitly or explicitly) 
considerations about media pluralism when applying competition rules to the 
media sector? Do they assess the impact of  a proposed concentration on 
media pluralism? If  merger procedures provide for the intervention of  the 
media authority at some stage (like rendering its advice), is the competition 
authority taking the utmost account of  that opinion (either because it is 
bound by the advice or because it does so in practice)? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND/OR CONTROL IN RADIO (HORIZONTAL): 
Please follow mutatis mutandis the guidelines given for television. 
 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND/OR CONTROL IN NEWSPAPERS 
(HORIZONTAL): 
Please follow mutatis mutandis the guidelines given for television. 
 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND/OR CONTROL IN INTERNET SERVICE 
PROVIDERS (HORIZONTAL): 
Please follow mutatis mutandis the guidelines given for television and avoid doing the analysis for media that 
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are not relevant in your country. 
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law, regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 1.).  
Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities setting out media 
ownership regulations and detailing their activities and responsibilities.  
Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the 
enforcement of measures to prevent undue concentration of ownership. 
Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national anti-concentration rules: 
For instance: 
ELIAMEP. 2010. MEDIADEM background information report “Media policies and regulatory practices 
in a selected set of European countries, the European Union and the Council of Europe”. 
ELIAMEP. 2011. MEDIADEM Case study report “Does media policy promote media freedom and 
independence? 
European Audiovisual Observatory. 2006. Media Regulation in the Interest of the Audience. 
European Audiovisual Observatory.2011. Yearbook: Film, television, video and multimedia in 
Europe. 
European Commission. 2009. Media for Diversity. Taking the Pulse of Diversity in the Media. A Study on 
Media and Diversity in EU Member States and 3 EEA countries. 
European Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of 
the EU, SEC (2007) 32. 
Noam, E.M., 2009. Media ownership and concentration in America, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
OECD (2003). Policy Roundtable Report on Media Mergers. 
Ofcom (2012). Communications Market Report. 
Ofcom. (2012). Measuring media plurality. 
Ofcom. (2010). Report on public interest test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting 
Group plc by News Corporation.  
Ofcom (2006). Review of Media Ownership Rules. London. 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/media_owners/rulesreview/ 
Ward, D. (2004). A mapping study of media concentration and ownership in ten European countries, 
http://77.87.161.246/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/A-Mapping-Study-of-Media-Concentration-and-
Ownership-in-Ten-European-Countries.pdf  
European Commission (2007). Commission Staff Working Document - Media pluralism in the Member 
States of the European Union, 16 January 2007, SEC(2007) 32, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/media_pluralism_swp_en.pdf  
Harcourt, A. (2008). Report for the group of specialists on media diversity (MC-SMD) on methodology for the monitoring 
of media concentration, pluralism and diversity, February 2008. 
Favre, J., Peruško, Z. & Vartanova, E. (2008). Methodology for the monitoring media concentration and 
media content diversity Report prepared for the Group of specialists on media diversity (MC-S-MD). 
 
13. Regulatory safeguards against high degree of  cross-ownership 
between television and other media 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of  cross-ownership between 
television and other relevant media (press, radio, internet).  
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
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basis of  the following questionnaire. Given the diversity of  thresholds or limits that exist in EU Member 
States with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of  
your country and in the light of  the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES N
O 
E.1 Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective 
criteria, such as number of  licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of  
share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of  
cross-ownership between television and other media? 
+ - 
E.2 Can a high degree of  cross-ownership between television and other media 
be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the 
specificities of  the media sector, for instance: 
- By containing media-specific provisions that impose stricter thresholds than in 
other sectors; 
- The mandatory intervention of  a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, 
the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of  the media 
authority); 
- The possibility to overrule the approval of  a concentration by the competition 
authority for reasons of  media pluralism (or Public interest in general); 
-that - even though they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not 
exclude the media sector from their scope of  application? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring 
compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media 
and/or competition authority) 
+ - 
I.2. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in 
order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in 
case of  non-respect of  the thresholds, such as: 
- refusal of  additional licences; 
- blocking of  a merger or acquisition; 
- obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; 
- obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors 
divestiture. 
+ - 
I.3. Is there evidence (for instance in case law or positive evaluations in 
independent reports) of  these powers being effectively and appropriately 
exercised? Is there pro-active and effective policy making and 
implementation? 
+ - 
1.5. Are conditions imposed at the moment of  mergers effectively 
monitored? 
+ - 
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I.5. Are competition authorities taking into account (implicitly or explicitly) 
considerations about media pluralism when applying competition rules to the 
media sector? Do they assess the impact of  a proposed concentration on 
media pluralism? If  merger procedures provide for the intervention of  the 
media authority at some stage (like rendering its advice), is the competition 
authority taking the utmost account of  that opinion (either because it is 
bound by the advice or because it does so in practice)? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
Idem as indicator 12.  
 
14. Regulatory safeguards for transparency of  ownership and/or 
control  
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  transparency 
and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and 
disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership 
structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to 
the public? 
+ - 
E.2. Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and 
disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report (changes in) 
ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
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I.1. Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after 
every change in ownership structure? 
+ - 
I.2. Are there any sanctions in case of  non-respect of  disclosure obligations? + - 
I.3. Do transparency and reporting provisions provide the public authorities/ 
the public with reliable and accurate information about media ownership? 
+ - 
I.4. Do these obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural 
person effectively owns or controls the media company? 
+ - 
I.5. Are the records or documents in which the information is made available 
easily accessible to the public? 
+ - 
I.6. Are journalists or activists using that information to react against undue 
forms of  concentration? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
Idem as indicator 12.  
 
15. Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and impartial political 
reporting in television. 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards that guarantee that in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services all 
political viewpoints existing in society are represented in a fair (qualitative), balanced (quantitative) and 
impartial (without taking sides) way. It also aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  
regulatory safeguards that guarantee that in news and informative programmes on private television, 
political viewpoints are represented in a fair and accurate way. 
Moreover, the indicator aims to assess the existence and implementation of  regulatory safeguards for fair 
access to airtime on PSM channels during electoral campaigns.  
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does media law (including conventions between PSM and the 
government) guarantee fair, balanced and impartial representation of  political 
viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and 
+ - 
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services? 
E.2. Does media law guarantee fair, balanced and impartial representation of  
political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on commercial 
channels and services? 
+ - 
E.3. Does media law (including conventions between PSM and the 
government) guarantee access to airtime on PSM channels and services for 
political actors during electoral campaigns? 
+ - 
E.4 Is there an internal charter of  PSM or another self  regulatory instrument 
that guarantees the access to PSM channels for political actors in general and 
during electoral campaigns? 
+ - 
E.5 Does media law or any other statutory measure (e.g conventions between 
PSM and the government and legislation on the financing of  political parties 
or on elections) prohibit or impose restrictions on political advertising during 
electoral campaigns to allow equal opportunities to all political parties? 
+ - 
E.6 Is there a functional equivalent to statutory measures? (e.g. codes of  
conduct, internal charters of  private television and radio channels)? Only mark 
+ if  the majority of  the mainstream broadcasters have a code or a charter in 
place which contains such safeguards. 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring compliance 
with these rules and/or hearing complaints? 
+ - 
I.2. Does the law grant the administrative/judicial body effective 
sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies 
in case of  noncompliance with the rules? 
+ - 
I.3. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.4. Are regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and impartial political reporting 
on television implemented in practice? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the contrary, 
there is evidence of  systematic one-sided coverage, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies 
or NGOs. 
+ - 
I.5. Do the measures apply to all types of  political elections, including 
presidential, legislative, regional and local elections and referenda? 
+ - 
I.6. Do the regulatory safeguards in place apply at least to linear and non-linear 
broadcasters without significant exceptions? 
+ - 
I.7 In case political advertising is allowed (to a certain extent), is the possibility 
of  buying advertising space available to all contending parties, on equal 
conditions and rates of  payment? 
+ - 
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I.8 In case political advertising is allowed (to a certain extent), does the 
regulatory framework ensure that the public is aware that the message is a paid 
political advertisement? 
+ - 
 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct…), case 
law, regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 1.  
See also: Council of Europe (2007) Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)15 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on Measures concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns (+ Explanatory 
Memorandum CM(2007)155 add). 
Studies/reports: 
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence 
Media Diversity Institute, International Federation of Journalists & Internews Europe (2009). Study on 
Media & Diversity, Study for the European Commission, http://www.media4diversity.eu/ 
Graber, D., McQuail, D. & Norris, P. (Eds.) (2008). The Politics of News. The News of Politics, 2nd edition, CQ 
Press: Washington. 
Reports of ethics councils, press councils, press complaints commissions, media ombudsman, readers’ 
editors etc. 
Election monitoring reports by OSCE Election Monitoring Mission, available through: 
http://www.osce.org/  
The Guardian Social, Ethical and Environmental Audit, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit  
International Press Center (IPC) databases and reports: 
http://www.ipcng.org/ 
European Commission (2007). Current trends and approaches to media literacy in Europe, 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/media_literacy/studies/index_en.htm 
OFCOM (2005). Media Literacy Audit – Report on adult media literacy. 
Ward, D., & Lange, B.-P. (Eds.) (2004). The Media and Elections: A Handbook and Comparative Study (pp. 264). 
LEA Publishing. 
National Regulatory Agencies monitoring and various monitoring reports by NGOs and/or scholars: 
EURALVA. European Alliance of Listeners and Viewers Associations databases and reports 
http://www.euralva.org  
European Audiovisual Observatory (2007). The Public Service Broadcasting Culture. Iris Special 2007 
edition. 
National and International unions: 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) alerts and reports: http://www.ifj.org/  
Media Wise: http://www.mediawise.org.uk/  
 
16. Regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or 
control of  mainstream media by politicians 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards against excessive ownership and/or control of  media (radio, television and newspapers) by 
politicians. 
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Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does media law (including conventions between PSM and the 
government) contain limitations to direct and indirect ownership/control of  
mainstream media by politicians? 
+ - 
E.2. Do other statutory measures (e.g. competition law, company law) contain 
limitations to direct and indirect ownership/control of  media by politicians? 
+ - 
E.3. Are there any self-regulatory measures that stipulate editorial 
independence in audio-visual and print media? (e.g. journalistic codes, codes 
of  ethics, etc. )? Only mark + if  the majority of  the publishers have a code 
or a charter in place. 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Does the regulation apply to all media (print, audiovisual and online) 
with no significant exemptions? 
+ - 
I.2. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring 
compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? 
+ - 
1.3. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in 
order to impose proportionate remedies in case of  noncompliance with the 
rules? 
+ - 
I.4. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.5. Are regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or control of  
mainstream media by politicians implemented in practice? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. 
If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic noncompliance with or 
by-passing of  these rules, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies 
or NGOs. 
+ - 
I.6. Is there a voluntary control institution and/or complaints mechanism to 
check compliance with these rules? 
+ - 
I.7. Does this control or complaints mechanism lead to the imposition of  
effective and proportionate remedies in case of  non-compliance with the 
rules? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
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Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct…), case 
law and regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicators 1. and 15.  
See also: Council of Europe (2007) Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)15 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on Measures concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns (+ Explanatory 
Memorandum CM(2007)155 add). 
 
17. Level of  independence of  PSM considering appointment 
procedure and composition of  its governing bodies/level of  
equal/proportionate representation of  all political groups 
(represented in the Parliament) in the governing bodies 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  fair, objective 
and transparent appointment procedures for professional, management and board functions in PSM, 
which guarantee independence from government/a single political group. These requirements could be 
met for example by applying merits-based appointment procedures or by appointment procedures, which 
assure the presence of  the various political groups within the PSM. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does media law (including conventions between PSM and the government) 
foresee fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for professional, 
management and board functions in PSM, which guarantee independence from 
government/a single political group? 
+ - 
E.2. Do other statutory measures (e.g. administrative law, company law, labour law) 
provide fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for professional, 
management and board functions in PSM, which guarantee independence from 
government/a single political group? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with 
these rules and/or hearing complaints? 
+ - 
I.2. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to + - 
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impose proportionate remedies in case of  non-compliance with the rules? 
I.3. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the parties 
involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are 
subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  Article 267 TFEU, 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the enforcement 
of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.4. Are the legal safeguards for appointment and dismissal procedures for 
professional, management and board functions in PSM (if  such safeguards are 
available, see E.1. above) implemented in practice? (If  so, tick ‘YES’. If, on the 
contrary, there is evidence of  systematic conflicts concerning appointments and 
dismissals of  managers and board members of  PSM, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies or 
NGOs. 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
Council of Europe (2012). Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on 15 February 2012, available at: http://www3.ebu.ch/sites/ebu/contents/policies/eu---
policy/public-affairs-and-legal-issues/public-service-media-governance.html  
EBU – European Broadcasting Union: http://www.ebu.ch/en/ 
European Audiovisual Observatory: http://www.obs.coe.int/  
National media regulation databases (available on web sites of relevant state bodies) 
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence 
 
18. Regulatory safeguards for the distribution of  public interest 
channels on cable, DSL and/or satellite platforms 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards (in accordance with Article 31 Universal Service Directive) for access of  public interest channels 
to cable, DSL and/or satellite platforms. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Are there specific must-carry rules in media legislation guaranteeing 
distribution of  public interest channels on cable, DSL and/or satellite 
platforms? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
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fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Are these safeguards in compliance with the substantive conditions of  
Article 31 Universal Service Directive, in the sense that they are reasonable, 
necessary to meet clearly defined general interest objectives, as well as 
proportionate and transparent (clearly indicating in advance the radio and 
television broadcast channels that benefit of  a must-carry status)? 
+ - 
I.2. Are these safeguards in compliance with the prescription of  Article 31 
Universal Service Directive meaning that they can only be imposed on electronic 
communications networks used for the distribution of  radio or television 
broadcasts to the public where a significant number of  end-users of  such 
networks use them as their principal means to receive radio and television 
broadcasts? 
+ - 
I.3. Are these safeguards subject to periodical review? + - 
I.4. Are these safeguards coupled with a must-offer obligation? + - 
I.5. Is there an administrative or judicial body actively monitoring compliance 
with these rules and/or hearing complaints? 
+ - 
I.6. Does the law grant body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in order 
to impose proportionate remedies in case of  noncompliance with the rules? 
+ - 
I.7. Are there effective appeal mechanisms in place: 
• before a judicial body or if  not, before a body that is independent of  the 
parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose 
decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 267 TFEU, 
• the procedures of  which are not systematically misused to delay the 
enforcement of  remedies? 
+ - 
I.8. Are t “must-carry” rules generally implemented in practice? (If  so, tick 
‘YES’. If, on the contrary, there is evidence of  systematic non-compliance with 
the rules, tick ‘NO’).  
Sources of  reference: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of  independent bodies or 
NGOs. 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct…), case 
law and regulatory decisions: 
Idem as indicator 1.  
Studies/reports providing overviews of rules on media types and genres: 
EBU (2013). EBU reply to the European Commission Green Paper – Preparing for a Fully Converged 
Audiovisual World: Growth, Creation and Values, available at:  
http://www3.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Knowledge/Initiatives%20-
%20Policy/Topical%20Issues/Hybrid/EBU_reply_to_Green_Paper_convergence_final.pdf  
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence 
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Ward, D. (2004). A mapping study of media concentration and ownership in ten European countries, 
http://www.cmpd.eu.com/reports/media_concentration.pdf. 
 
19. Regulatory safeguards for the objective and independent 
allocation of  (adequate, consistent and sufficient) financial 
resources to PSM 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory 
safeguards against the under-funding of  PSM. 
 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  laws and regulations and their implementation by the user on the 
basis of  the following questionnaire. 
 
How to check the existence (E) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and fill in the scoring 
grid. 
 
 YES NO 
E.1. Does media law prescribe transparent and objective procedures on 
determining the amount of  money to be granted to PSM? 
+ - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
How to check the effective implementation (I) of  such safeguards: Answer the questions below and 
fill in the scoring grid. 
 
 YES NO 
I.1. Are the financial statements controlled? + - 
I.2. Is the sufficiency of  resources controlled independently? + - 
I.3. Is PSM financially accountable through its governing body? + - 
Total number of  +   
Total number of  -   
 
Data sources: 
Idem as indicators 1. and 18.  
EBU Viewpoint on PSM Funding, available at: 
http://www3.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Knowledge/Initiatives%20-
%20Policy/Topical%20Issues/Funding/Viewpoint_Funding_EN.pdf  
European Parliament (2010). Report on public service broadcasting in the digital era: the future of the dual 
system (2010/2028(INI)) 
Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting 
(2009/C 257/01) (Broadcasting Communication) 
 
20. Policy measures for the impartial circulation of  internet data, 
without regard to content, destination or source. 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  regulatory or 
policy safeguards for net neutrality, without regard to content, destination or source. 
Method of  measurement: Analysis of  policies and support measures and their implementation by the 
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user on the basis of  the following questionnaire: 
 
Are there regulatory safeguards regarding Net Neutrality in your country? 
Are there any policy measures to avoid blocking of  certain internet content and/ or application providers? 
Are there any policies to avoid quality discrimination between content and service providers? 
Is the consumer informed of  the quality of  the services offered by the ISPs? 
Do ISPs have any obligation of  transparency concerning discriminatory practices in their service? 
 
Data sources: 
Idem as indicators 1.  
EBU (2013). EBU reply to the European Commission Green Paper – Preparing for a Fully Converged 
Audiovisual World: Growth, Creation and Values, available at:  
http://www3.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Knowledge/Initiatives%20-
%20Policy/Topical%20Issues/Hybrid/EBU_reply_to_Green_Paper_convergence_final.pdf 
For related reports/studies prepared for the European Commission see: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/eu-actions  
EU ordinary legislative procedure: European Single market for electronic communications 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/0309(COD) 
See also: http://savetheinternet.eu/it/ (initiative of the European Commission) 
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ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
 
21. Ownership media concentration 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the media sector.  
 
Method of Measurement: Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure.  
 
Data: The market share, namely the share of the total revenue in a market, per each owner of the total 
market of each media platform.  
 
Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the market shares of the major 4 owners within the 
market. 
 
Data sources: 
See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the 
EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe  
  
Score: 
  
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Ownership concentration in television (horizontal) 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share below 25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have a market share 
between 25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share above 50%. 
Ownership concentration in radio (horizontal) 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
an audience share below 
25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
an audience share between 
25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
an audience share above 
50%. 
Ownership concentration in newspapers (horizontal) 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share below 25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share between 
25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share above 50%. 
Ownership concentration in ISPs 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share below 25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share between 
25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a market share above 50%. 
  
22. Audience and readership media concentration 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience and readership across media 
platforms.  
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Method of Measurement: Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure.  
 
Data: The audience share per Top4 owners competing in the media market. Share is based on the 
standard or most accepted audience/readership/subscription measurement system available in the 
country. 
 
Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the audience/readership/subscription shares of the 
major 4 owners within the market.  
 
Data sources: 
See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the 
EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe  
 
Score: 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Audience concentration in television (horizontal) 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have an audience share 
below 25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
an audience share between 
25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have an audience share 
above 50%. 
Audience concentration in Radio (horizontal) 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have an audience share 
below 25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
an audience share between 
25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have an audience share 
above 50%. 
Readership concentration in newspapers (horizontal) 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have a readership share 
below 25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a readership share between 
25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have a readership share 
above 50%. 
Subscriber concentration in internet service provision 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have a subscription share 
below 25%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) have 
a subscription share between 
25% and 49%. 
If within one country the 
major 4 owners (Top4) 
have a subscription share 
above 50%. 
 
23. Number of sectors in which top 8 firms/owners are active 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership in the different sectors – 
television, newspapers, and any other relevant media – of the media industry. Concentration is measured 
by using the Top8 concentration measure. 
 
Method of measurement: 
 
Data: The market share – that is the share of the total revenues within a market – per Top8 owners 
competing in the media market.  
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Measurement: The Top8 measure is obtained by summing the market shares of the major 8 owners 
within the different sectors of the media market. 
 
Data sources: 
Such data can be obtained from the European Audiovisual Observatory, or Eurostat. 
 
Score: 
 LOW  MEDIUM  HIGH 
 If within one country the 
major 8 owners (Top8) 
have a market share below 
50% across the different 
media sectors. 
 If within one country the 
major 8 owners (Top8) have 
a market share between 50% 
and 69% across the different 
media sectors. 
 If within one country the 
major 8 owners (Top8) 
have a market share above 
70% across the different 
media sectors. 
  
24. Availability and Quality of Broadband 
 
Description: This indicator aims to denote the probability of a threat arising to external media pluralism 
because of a limited or an insufficient quality of broadband networks, preventing people from using the 
internet services through DSL. The indicator shows the quality and usability of both fixed and mobile 
broadband in each country.  
 
Method of measurement: This indicator is calculated by aggregating data describing the following 4 
dimensions of broadband in the EU. 
 
Data sources: 
Broadband Subscription - EuroStat  
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/digital-agenda-scoreboard 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/information_society/data/database  
Average Speed of Broadband - NetIndex/Ookai 
Download: http://www.netindex.com/download/1,7/EU  
Upload: http://www.netindex.com/upload/1,7/EU/  
 
Score:  
LOW HIGH 
Fixed broadband penetration - number of fixed broadband subscriptions (lines) per 100 inhabitants 
Fixed Broadband x capita >= EU Average  Fixed Broadband x capita < EU Average  
Mobile broadband penetration, dedicated for data - mobile broadband penetration is defined as number 
of active dedicated data service cards/modems/keys per 100 inhabitants 
Fixed Broadband x capita >= EU Average  Fixed Broadband x capita < EU Average  
National average fixed internet speed measured in Mbps in download, compared with EU average 
Average Speed >= EU Average  Average Speed < EU Average  
National average fixed internet speed measured in Mbps in upload, compared with EU average 
Average Speed >= EU Average  Average speed < EU Average  
 
25. Minority and Community Media 
 
Description: This indicator assesses the number of media channels dedicated to ethnic, linguistic or 
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national minorities in the country, and their ratio compared to the total amount domestic media channels. 
In particular, it measures whether within one country there are channels per media platform dedicated to 
ethnic, linguistic or national minorities, and if yes how many they are compared to the total domestic 
channels. 
 
Method of measurement: 
Data: Ratio of channels dedicated to ethnic/linguistic/national minorities per media main national 
platform compared to the total number of domestic media channels.  
 
Measurement: The number of channels dedicated to ethnic, linguistic or national minorities is divided by 
the number of total domestic channels. The result has to be compared with the percentage of the ethnic or 
language minorities in the country.  
 
Data sources: 
Such data can be found, for instance, in the European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO), and/or required 
by the National Regulatory Authorities, the National Broadcasting Union, the World Press Trends (WPT), 
National Industry Associations and Public Bodies. 
  
Score:  
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Ratio of television channels dedicated to ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total number of domestic 
televisions 
If within one country the 
number of television 
channels dedicated to 
ethnic, linguistic or 
national minorities is 
more than proportional 
or equal to the size of the 
minority population, then 
the risk of an insufficient 
system of minority and 
community media is 
considered as non-
existent. 
If within one country the 
number of television 
channels dedicated to ethnic, 
linguistic or national 
minorities is less than 
proportional to the size of 
the minority population, then 
there is a risk of an 
insufficient system of 
minority and community 
media. 
If within one country there is 
no television channel 
dedicated to ethnic, linguistic 
or national minorities, then 
the risk of an insufficient 
system of minority and 
community media is high. 
Ratio of newspapers dedicated to ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total number of domestic 
newspapers 
If within one country the 
number of newspapers 
dedicated to ethnic, 
linguistic or national 
minorities is more than 
proportional to the size 
of the minority 
population, then the risk 
of an insufficient system 
If within one country the 
number of newspapers 
dedicated to ethnic, linguistic 
or national minorities is less 
than proportional to the size 
of the minority population, 
then there is a risk of an 
insufficient system of 
minority and community 
If within one country there is 
no newspaper dedicated to 
ethnic, linguistic or national 
minorities, then the risk of an 
insufficient system of 
minority and community 
media is high. 
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of minority and 
community media is 
considered as non-
existent. 
media. 
Ratio of radio channels dedicated to ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total number of domestic radio 
channels 
If within one country the 
number of radio 
dedicated to ethnic, 
linguistic or national 
minorities is more than 
proportional to the size 
of the minority 
population, then the risk 
of an insufficient system 
of minority and 
community media is 
considered as non-
existent. 
If within one country the 
number of radio dedicated to 
ethnic, linguistic or national 
minorities is less than 
proportional to the size of 
the minority population, then 
there is a risk of an 
insufficient system of 
minority and community 
media. 
If within one country there is 
no radio dedicated to ethnic, 
linguistic or national 
minorities, then the risk of an 
insufficient system of 
minority and community 
media is high. 
 
26. Centralisation of the national media system 
 
Description: This indicator aims to denote the probability of a threat arising to external diversity of a 
media system perceived as high and growing centralisation of a media system on a national scale. 
 
Method of measurement: The score for this indicator is assigned by aggregating results generated from 
the following five tests:  
 
1) A relative strength of local/regional media (daily newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, 
news websites) in a particular media system. 
 
Description: The probability of a threat arising to external diversity of a media system perceived as high 
and growing centralisation of a media system on a national scale. 
A relative strength of regional daily newspapers in a particular media system shows the level of its 
decentralisation and potential to offer information from diverse sources for local and regional 
communities. Rich and well-developed regional media may compensate a lack of external diversity on 
highly concentrated national markets. The decentralisation test proposes measurement of the relative 
strength of regional daily newspapers, local and regional TV, radio stations and news websites/ internet 
portals in a particular media system over a longer period of time (in different time points, e.g. 2006, 2001, 
1996, 1991, 1986 – more recent for websites/web portals: 2006, 2001). 
It is important in this context to underline the difference between the indicator G.1.1. (a relative strength 
of local/regional media in a particular media system) aiming at measuring the strength of a regional media 
system as a whole and the indicator G.1.2. (proportion of regional capital cities with competing regional or 
local media) focusing on an eventual diversity within different parts of that system. 
Calculated borderlines are estimated for a medium-sized media system with a relatively balanced strength 
of local and regional media. Media system indicators require country specific evaluation and interpretation, 
and should be correlated with factors such as: population size, density of settlement, proportion of urban 
population, population size of a capital city, Gross National Product per inhabitant, administrative 
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arrangements. Growing or high centralisation of a particular media system might result from significant 
concentration of the population in a capital agglomeration. In other cases, a position in the capital, 
especially as a location of media outlets with national coverage, might be weaker. In other words, in some 
media systems (e.g. Germany) media outlets with a national reach may be located outside the capital. Such 
specific characteristics should be taken into account when applying the measurement. 
 
Method of measurement: Decentralisation test – the relation between sold Circulation of National 
Dailies (CND) published in the Capital and Circulation of Regional Dailies (CRD) published outside the 
capital; Audience Share of Local and Regional TV (ALTV) and Radio (ALR) stations; readership /user 
access rate of news & features websites/web portals with regional/local focus (ALWeb) 
Media sample: 
The measurement should include following media outlets: 
- National daily newspapers published in the capital; 
- Regional daily newspapers published outside the capital (e.g. in regional metropolises); 
- Local and regional TV stations; 
- Local and regional radio stations;  
- News & features websites/web portals with regional/local focus. 
 
Data sources: 
See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities, link 
through the EPRA website (http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-
europe). Such data can also be obtained by the National Newspapers Associations. 
 
Score: 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
CND - up to 60%  
ALTV - more than 15%  
ALR - more than 30%  
ALWeb - more than 15% 
CND - 60%–80%  
ALTV - 5 – 15%  
ALR - 30 – 10%  
ALWeb - 15 – 5% 
CND - more than 80%  
ALTV - less than 5%  
ALR - less than 10%  
ALWeb - less than 5% 
 
 
2) Combined ownership of regional/local media and national media outlets by the same 
company 
 
Description: As there are also national papers being published alongside regional ones, and national TV 
and radio stations being broadcast, it is relevant to indicate which of the regional newspapers, TV and 
radio stations are owned by the same entities that produce a national paper, TV or radio channel with a 
leading position in a given city/region. 
Method of measurement: Combined ownership test* (concerns only media owners operating both on 
national and regional markets). Measurement of combined ownership can be carried out for five largest 
regional capital cities in a given country: 
- Market share of the largest regional daily publisher and national daily publisher; 
- Market share of the largest regional TV broadcaster and national TV broadcaster; 
- Market share of the largest regional radio broadcaster and national radio broadcaster; 
- Market share of the largest regional internet portal provider and national internet portal provider. 
It is proposed that the market share of different types of media ownership is to be measured through 
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market shares relevant for each media sector: audience shares (for TV and radio), sold circulation (in the 
case of paid newspapers) and distributed copies (in the case of free newspapers). 
 
Media sample: 
The measurement should include the following media outlets: 
- 3 largest regional or local daily newspapers in the 5 largest regional capital cities; 
- 10 largest national daily newspapers; 
- 3 largest local and regional radio stations in the 5 largest regional capital cities; 
- 10 largest national radio stations; 
- 3 local and regional TV stations in the 5 largest regional capital cities; 
- 10 largest national TV stations; 
- 3 local or regional news internet portals in the 5 largest regional capital cities; 
- 10 largest national news internet portals. 
Score: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculated borderlines in the table above are estimated for a middle size media system with relatively 
balanced strength of local and regional media. Media system indicators require country specific evaluation 
and interpretation, and should be correlated with such factors as: population size, density of settlement, 
proportion of urban population, population size of a capital city, Gross National Product per inhabitant, 
administrative arrangements. The table below offers a framework for the analysis used in the combined 
ownership test. 
 
* COMBINED OWNERSHIP TEST: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS 
* Combined ownership test: 
 
Largest regional 
daily publisher 
Regional 
market share 
Largest 
national daily 
publisher 
National market share 
in a given region 
Regions/cities     
 
Largest regional 
TV channel 
Regional 
market share 
Largest 
national TV 
channel 
National market share 
in a given region 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Less than 20% of regional 
market share AND less than 
10% of national market share. 
 
 
 
More than 40% of regional 
market share AND 10%-30% 
of national market share 
OR 
20% – 40% of regional market 
share AND more than 30% of 
national market share. 
More than 40% of 
regional market share 
AND more than 30% of 
national market share. 
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Regions/cities     
 
Largest regional 
radio channel 
Regional 
market share 
Largest 
national radio 
channel 
National market share 
in a given region 
Regions/cities     
 
Largest regional 
internet portal 
Regional 
market share 
Largest 
national 
internet 
portal 
National market share 
in a given region 
Regions/cities     
 
3) Proportion of regional and local television and radio broadcast channels to national broadcast 
channels 
 
Description: To assess whether the ratio of regional and local TV and Radio channels compared to the 
total national channels is proportionate to the ratio of regional population to the national population. 
 
Method of measurement: The indicator is assessed by dividing the number of regional and local TV and 
Radio channels by the total number of national channels, as well as the population of the different regions 
by the total national population, and then comparing the two ratios. This assessment has to be made for 
each region in a country. 
 
Score: 
 
4) Proportion of regional and local newspapers to national newspapers 
 
Description: To assess whether the ratio of regional and local newspapers compared to the total national 
newspapers is proportionate to the ratio of regional population to the national population. 
 
Method of measurement: The indicator is obtained by dividing the number of regional and local 
newspapers by the total number of national newspapers, as well as the population of the different regions 
by the total national population, and then comparing the two ratios. This assessment has to be made for 
each region in a country. 
 
Score: 
 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
If within one country the 
proportion of regional and local 
TV and radio channels to national 
channels is above or equal to 80% 
of the proportion of regional to 
national population. 
If within one country the 
proportion of regional and 
local TV and radio channels 
to national channels is under 
80% of the proportion of 
regional to national 
population. 
If within one country there 
are no regional and local 
TV and radio channels 
(0%)”. 
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5) Estimated reach and audience share of regional and local media 
 
Description: The probability of a threat arising to the external diversity of a media system perceived as 
either an absence of or insufficient system of local and regional media, including in particular: the lack of 
independent media outlets serving local and regional communities; the lack of investment in local and 
regional media; entry barriers for local and regional media created by cable operators and other platform 
providers; marginal reach; lack of support measures. 
This indicator shows an audience share of local and regional media in the overall media system, and 
therefore should be measured media sector-by-sector (TV, radio, print, internet). As print press is, 
compared to other types of media, mainly financed to a greater extent by sales, rather than using 
readership data for the measurement, sales circulation shall be used in case of paid newspapers, while 
distributed copies shall be taken into account when it comes to free newspapers.  
The score table proposes different scores for different media sectors. When calculating scores 
corresponding with a particular level of risk (high, medium, low) for all sectors together, these should be 
weighted as an average. For example, if the TV sector reaches a score of less than 5% and thus also a high 
risk level, the radio sector reaches the score between 10% and 30% and thus a medium risk level and the 
press attains more than 40% and thus also a low level of risk, the average for all three sectors together will 
be medium risk level. 
 
Method of measurement: Quantitative method: Estimated audience share of local and regional media 
outlets in a given media sector. For the print sector, circulation rather than readership data should be used. 
 
Media sample: 
The measurement should include following media outlets: 
- National, regional and local newspapers (for the print sector); 
- National, regional and local radio stations (for the radio sector); 
- National, regional and local TV stations (for the TV sector); 
- National, regional and local news internet portals (for the internet sector). 
 
Score: 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
TV sector > than 15% TV sector 15-5% TV sector < than 5% 
Radio sector > than 30% Radio sector 30-10% Radio sector < than 10% 
Print sector > than 40% Print sector 40-20% Print sector < than 20% 
Internet sector > than 30% Internet sector 30-00% Internet sector < than 10% 
  
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
If within one country the 
proportion of regional and local 
newspapers to the national 
newspapers is above or equal to 
80% of the proportion of regional 
to national population. 
If within one country the 
proportion of regional and 
local newspapers to the 
national newspapers is under 
80% of the proportion of 
regional to national 
population. 
If within one country there 
are no regional and local 
newspapers (0%). 
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SOCIO-POLITICAL INDICATORS 
 
27. Availability of content and service applications for physically 
challenged persons 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of  policies for the 
promotion of  access to media content and services by special needs groups in society, especially the 
elderly and physically challenged persons. This indicator aims to denote the probability of  a threat arising 
to universal access of  media content.  
 
Method of measurement: 
  
Analysis of  policies and support measures and their implementation media content.  
 
1) By the user; 
2) Number and reach of  applications offered by public service TV and largest private TV. 
 
Media sample: Two leading private TV channels (TV channels with largest audience share in a given 
country) and all public service television channels. 
 
Instructions: Policymaking bodies are considered to be political, state and public institutions in a country, 
those who have the power and institutional obligation to introduce and implement the relevant policies.  
 
Data sources: 
 
Reports from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the application of Directive 2010/13/EU 
"Audiovisual Media Service Directive", available through: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/audiovisual_and_media/l24101_en.htm  
 
National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements…), case law and regulatory decisions.  
 
Score:  
 
LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  
Does the state take active measures to promote access to media content and services by special needs groups in 
society, in particular the elderly and physically challenged?  
Well-developed policy: There is 
already a strong tradition of  
policymaking in this area. The 
existing measures are diverse, 
but coherent and up-to-date 
with the latest societal changes. 
Underdeveloped policy: 
Policymaking bodies are aware 
of  the issue and started taking 
measures, but the existing 
policies are only nascent and 
the measures taken are 
fragmented. 
No policy: Policymaking 
bodies have not even started 
to discuss the matter. No 
steps whatsoever have been 
taken in the development of  
any policy measures. 
How would you describe the available subtitles and sound descriptions available for people with 
hearing impairments watching TV (Media sample: two leading TV channels (TV channels with largest 
audience share in a given country) and all public service television channels)?  
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Subtitles and sound 
descriptions are available on a 
regular basis in different 
scheduling windows, especially 
for the most popular and key 
current affairs programs and 
channels. They are of  sufficient 
quality.  
Subtitles and sound 
descriptions are available only 
on irregular basis and in the 
least popular scheduling 
windows (e.g. before 14.00), 
not available for the most 
popular current affairs 
programs and/or the provided 
subtitles are not with sufficient 
quality. 
No subtitles and sound 
descriptions are available. 
 
28. Guarantees for universal coverage of PSM and broadband 
networks regarding geographic coverage  
 
Description: This indicator aims to denote the probability of  a threat arising to accessibility of  PSM 
content and services and broadband. The indicator shows the population coverage of  public service 
television and radio broadcasters. Additionally, this indicator aims to denote the absence of  or insufficient 
system of  broadband networks in rural areas, preventing people from accessing the internet through DSL 
or cable modem. The indicator shows the rural coverage of  DSL and cable modem. With these two 
aspects of  measurement, the indicator covers the areas of  direct state responsibility to provide coverage 
of  media transmission.  
 
Method of measurement:  
 
- Coverage of  population of  public service broadcasters, including television and radio; 
 
- Assessment of  DSL and cable modem coverage (Cov) in rural areas. DSL coverage figures refer to the 
percentage of  the population depending on a Local Exchange equipped with a DSLAM, including those 
people (households or businesses units) that reside too far from these switches to be able to purchase a 
DSL connection even if  they wanted to do so. On the other hand, cable modem coverage figures refer to 
the percentage of  the population living in households effectively passed for cable. 
 
Data sources: 
 
Reports from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the application of Directive 2010/13/EU 
"Audiovisual Media Service Directive", available through: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/audiovisual_and_media/l24101_en.htm 
 
Score 
 
LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  
What percentage of  the population of  the country is covered by sufficient quality of  signal of  all public TV 
channels?  
>99% >98% and <99% <98% 
What percentage of  the population of  the country is covered by sufficient quality of  signal of  all public radio 
channels?  
>99% >98% and <99% <98% 
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What percentage of  the rural population depend on a Local Exchange equipped with a DSLAM, including 
those people (households or businesses units) that reside too far from these switches to be able to purchase a DSL 
connection, even if  they wanted to do so?  
Rural Cov of  DSL >95% Rural Cov of  DSL >75%<95% Rural Cov of  DSL<75% 
What percentage of  the rural population lives in households effectively passed for cable?  
Rural Cov of  cable modem 
>15% 
Rural Cov of  cable modem 
>5%<15% 
Rural Cov of  cable 
modem<5% 
 
29. Political bias in the media 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the proportions of  representation of  various political and 
ideological viewpoints and interests in the media, as well as the existence of  dominant one-sided (negative 
or positive) media portrayal of  specific political actors during and beyond the election campaigns.  
 
Method of measurement: Quantitative content analysis for measuring the proportion and prevailing 
(positive or negative) pattern of portrayal of actors representing different political viewpoints and interests 
by dividing them into 4 groups: government, governing parties, opposition parties, and other actors 
representing political and ideological views (such as non-parliamentary parties, trade unions, 
nongovernmental organisations, churches etc.). Content analysis is done on a sample of selected media 
outlets in the selected period of time, including election campaigning and non-campaigning periods. 
It is suggested that particular categories are coded manually but aggregated with the use of computed or 
statistical methods (e.g. using Excel). If there are existing analysis/databases with content analysis raw or 
aggregate data that covers the research sample and categories, they could be used instead after consultation 
with the CMPF research team.  
It is recommended to use a level of reference to demographic statistics and patterns against which media 
coverage can be assessed, i.e. a question of the type "does media coverage over- or under-represent X?" 
should be assessed against the political presence of X, i.e. representation in the Parliament, public opinion 
support.  
 
Content analysis objective and research question: To identify and count the occurrence and portrayal of 
actors representing different political and ideological viewpoints and interests. Do the news contents of 
selected national TV channels provide balanced representation of various political and ideological 
viewpoints and interests by giving voice to various political actors?  
 
Media sample: For the purposes of the pilot testing of the MPM, the media sample is limited to TV as 
the key media platform that citizens use for acquiring information about political and current affairs (see 
Eurobarometer data, e.g. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_media_en.pdf). The sample will 
include one public TV channel (in countries with more than one public TV channel, select the one with 
largest viewership) and the one leading private TV channel (private generalist TV channel with the largest 
audience share in a given country).  
 
Type of the content (per TV channel):  
- The main (1) and secondary (2) news programmes at a day (the choice should be based on the audience 
figures and usually will include evening/afternoon/lunch time news programmes), including current affairs 
news, reports, comments and analysis; 
- The main political talk show (3) and/or political analysis (4) program;  
- The main morning show (5) (all types of  content related to current affairs; therefore with an exception of: 
advertising, weather forecasts, stock exchange and related financial listings and analyses, real estate and 
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housing, car and motor supplements, announcements, TV schedules and more specialist sections such as 
books, theatre, music, arts and cinema reviews, travelling and lifestyle supplements); 
- The main devoted election programme, block or debates (6).  
 
Period sample: For the purposes of  the pilot testing, the sample period will include only a sample of  the 
election campaign period (12-18 May 2014): 1 working week day and 1 weekend day. The choice of  the 
precise 2 days should be based on the scheduling of  political programs in the respective country. E.g. if  
there are no political programs in the TV scheduling for Sunday, than the sampling choice for a weekend 
day will be Saturday for the weekend quota. Same principle applies for the working week day quota.  
 
Sample of  political actors: To assess the media portrayal, a list of  relevant political actors has to be 
prepared. The list should include and will be coded into the following 4 groups:  
 Government; 
 Governing parties; 
 Opposition parties (represented in the Parliament);  
 Other actors representing political and ideological views (other relevant political and ideological groupings 
and organisations with significant influence on the state of  the political and social affairs in the country, e.g. 
non-parliamentary parties and independent candidates, especially those registered for the electoral race, 
trade unions, non-governmental organisations, interest groups, religious organisations, NGOs).  
For the purposes of  the pilot testing of  the MPM, "political actor" is understood both as a person and as 
an organisation/group of  people.  
The political actor(s) will be coded as mentioned in all of  the following cases: directly or indirectly quoted 
speakers, or when actors are directly or indirectly referred to (i.e. the name is not mentioned explicitly, but 
the contextual information makes it clear that the particular political actor is portrayed) when they act as 
agents of  an action in selected news items.  
 
How to measure and score the indicator: 
Step 1 - Decide the exact dates for monitoring and analysis and the exact programs/time slots according 
to the outlined criteria. 
 
Step 2 - Identify the political actors in the country and classify them according to the four actor categories 
(see the sample description).  
 
Step 3 - Assess and code (the CMPF will provide an Excel table with all coding categories) of  how these 
actors are portrayed in each content item, according to the following dimensions (variables):  
 Length of  the content item (in seconds); 
 Portrayed political actor (name, organisation/group to which he/she is affiliated, category of  political 
actor); 
 By whom (name, journalist/political actor/non-politically affiliated actor; category of  political actor); 
 Format (direct/indirect presence of  the portrayed political actor; anchored news/ report/ interview/ 
debate, etc.); 
 Evaluation of  the political actor (Positive/ Negative/ Both/ Neutral/ Ambivalent); 
 Topic type and scope of  media portrayal of  relevant political actors (public affairs/non-public affairs; 
European/ international/ national/ local/ group-personal level). 
 
Data sources: 
National and International Media Monitoring reports often compiled by Media Monitoring Agencies such 
as: 
Global Media Monitoring Project: http://www.whomakesthenews.org/  
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Portraying Politics project: http://www.portrayingpolitics.net/what.php 
 
Score: 
 
HIGH MEDIUM LOW 
What is the proportion of  representation of  the different groups of  political actors in the selected media sample?  
One group out of  four - 
government, governing parties, 
opposition parties, and other 
actors representing political 
and ideological views - is given 
more than 20% above or 
below the balanced 
representation (25% of  time to 
each). 
One group out of  four - 
government, governing parties, 
opposition parties, and other 
actors representing political 
and ideological views - is given 
more than 10% and less than 
20% above or below the 
balanced representation (25% 
of  time to each). 
Four groups - government, 
governing parties, opposition 
parties, and other actors 
representing political and 
ideological views - are given 
about equal time (25% to 
each) or one group is given 
up to 10% above or below 
the balanced representation. 
What is the proportion of  media (within the sample) that presents one-sided portrayal of  political actors?  
<25% of  selected media items 
provide one-side portrayal of  
one or more of  the selected 
political actors. 
<50% and >25% of  selected 
media items provide one-side 
portrayal of  one or more of  
the selected political actors. 
>50% of  selected media 
items provide one-side 
portrayal of  one or more of  
the selected political actors. 
 
30. Political control over media and distribution networks 
ownership 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the risk of  political affiliations and control over media and 
distribution networks. It examines the transparency of  data about the political affiliations of  media 
owners, the proportion of  specific political affiliation of  media owners across the media market in terms 
of  audience share. It also assesses the level of  discrimination by politically affiliated media distribution 
networks. 
 
Method of measurement:  
 
Step 1: Main collaborator: conducts the evaluation of  evidence and level of  discrimination by politically 
affiliated print media, television and radio distribution systems/networks, based on analysis of  available 
data on ownership, provided from such sources as (not exclusive): company registers, media registers, 
existing media ownership studies/reports conducted at national and international (comparative) level. 
 
- Transparency test using a score list exploring the availability of  data on political affiliation of  media 
owners (see the score list below); 
- Evaluation of  political affiliation of  owners of  the print media distribution networks and of  the television 
and radio distribution networks, taking discriminatory actions. Data should cover a one-year period, 
preferably data covering 2013; 
- Examination of the major/largest 4 media owners, in terms of audience share (television sector, radio, 
newspapers, internet). 
 
Sample table regarding distribution networks:  
Print media distribution 
networks 
Two (where available) largest print media distribution networks 
Radio distribution networks Two (where available) largest radio distribution networks 
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TV distribution networks Two (where available) largest TV distribution networks 
Satellite/Cable/Digital 
distribution networks 
Two (where available) largest distribution networks in the 
country. 
 
Sample regarding media: 
The analysis needs to follow the same procedure as the indicator on ownership concentration. 
 
Data sources: 
Company registers. 
Media registers. 
Existing media ownership studies and reports, including: 
Transparency International data bases: http://www.transparency.org/  
Article 19 databases: http://www.article19.org/  
European Audiovisual Observatory, http://www.obs.coe.int/ 
 
Score: 
 
LOW  MEDIUM HIGH 
How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of  data about the media ownership  
Data on political affiliation of  
media owners is publicly 
available/transparent/not 
hidden and not subject of  
request for access. 
Data on political affiliation of  
media owners are disclosed 
based on investigations of  
journalists and media activists. 
Data on political affiliation 
of  media owners are hidden 
(not easily accessible by the 
public); no efforts are made 
by investigative journalists or 
activists to disclose hidden 
data. 
What is the share of  media owned by politically affiliated entities?  
The media having <30% 
audience share is owned 
(controlled) by a specific 
political party, politician or 
political grouping, or by an 
owner with specific political 
affiliation. 
The media having <50%>30% 
audience share is owned 
(controlled) by a specific 
political party, politician or 
political grouping, or by an 
owner with specific political 
affiliation.  
The media having >50% 
audience share is owned 
(controlled) by a specific 
political party, politician or 
political grouping, or by an 
owner with specific political 
affiliation. 
How would you assess the conduct of  the leading distribution networks for print media?  
Leading distribution networks 
are not politically affiliated or 
do not take discriminatory 
actions. 
Any of  the leading distribution 
networks politically affiliated 
takes occasional discriminatory 
action. 
Any of  the leading 
distribution networks 
politically affiliated takes 
sustained discriminatory 
actions. 
How would you assess the conduct of  the leading radio distribution networks?  
Leading distribution networks 
are not politically affiliated or 
do not take discriminatory 
actions. 
Any of  the leading distribution 
networks politically affiliated 
takes occasional discriminatory 
action. 
Any of  the leading 
distribution networks 
politically affiliated takes 
sustained discriminatory 
actions. 
How would you assess the conduct of  the leading television distribution networks?  
Leading distribution networks 
are not politically affiliated or 
Any of  the leading distribution 
networks politically affiliated 
Any of  the leading 
distribution networks 
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do not take discriminatory 
actions. 
takes occasional discriminatory 
action. 
politically affiliated takes 
sustained discriminatory 
actions. 
How would you assess the conduct of  the leading Satellite/Cable/Digital distribution networks?  
Leading distribution networks 
are not politically affiliated or 
do not take discriminatory 
actions. 
Any of  the leading distribution 
networks politically affiliated 
takes occasional discriminatory 
action. 
Any of  the leading 
distribution networks 
politically affiliated takes 
sustained discriminatory 
actions. 
 
Step 2: Panel of  experts: The panel of  experts conduct the review/verification of  the evaluation of  the 
collaborator.  
 
31. Political control over media funding by advertising 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the state influence on the functioning of  the media market 
focusing on the risk of  discrimination present in the distribution of  state advertisements. It can be 
reflected in favouritism towards the political parties or affiliates of  political parties in the government, or 
of  penalisation of  media criticising the government (and political parties in the government). 
 
Method of measurement:  
Test of  the distribution of  state advertisements across the sample of  selected media types and outlets. The 
study focuses on proportions between amount of  state advertisements and audience share. 
 
Media sample:  
 
National print Two leading quality dailies (quality daily newspapers with largest 
circulation in a given country), 
Two leading quality weeklies (quality weekly newspapers with largest 
circulation in a given country), 
Two leading tabloids (tabloid daily newspapers with largest circulation in 
a given country). 
National radio Two leading private radio stations with national coverage (radio stations 
with largest audience share in a given country), one leading public 
service channel. 
TV Two leading TV channels with national coverage (TV channels with 
largest audience share in a given country), one leading public service 
channel with national coverage. 
Satellite/Cable/Digital A leading, nationally based news channel. 
Internet Two leading internet portals (internet portals with a largest share of  
users in a given country). 
 
Period sample: One year - data should be relevant to/cover the calendar year of  2013.  
 
Score: 
 
HIGH MEDIUM LOW 
Is the state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience share?  
State advertising is State advertising is distributed State advertising is 
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distributed to the media 
relatively proportionately to 
the audience shares of  media. 
disproportionately (in terms of  
audience share) to the media.  
distributed exclusively to few 
media outlets, which do not 
cover all major media outlets 
in the country. 
How would you describe the rules of  distribution of  state advertising?  
State advertising is 
distributed to the media based 
on transparent rules, with 
consideration of  professional 
criteria, regardless political 
profile of  the media. 
Rules on transparency in state 
advertising distribution are 
being drafted. 
No rules on transparency of  
state advertisement 
distribution. 
 
32. Presence of professional associations providing advocacy for 
editorial independence and respect of professional standards 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess if  there are professional associations providing advocacy for 
editorial independence and the respect of  professional standards. 
 
Method of measurement:  
(1) Main Collaborator: evaluation of  the presence and the active role of  professional associations 
(including trade unions, associations, self-regulatory bodies, etc.) providing advocacy for editorial 
independence and respect of  professional standards. 
In the measurement, please take into account both the existence/presence and the functioning of  
regulatory or self-regulatory mechanisms of  advocacy.  
 
(2) Panel of  experts: The panel of  experts conduct the evaluation/verification of  the evaluation of  the 
collaborator.  
 
Data sources: 
Databases of Press Complaints Commissions e.g. the UK Press Complaint Commissions, 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/practice.html 
National Unions reports 
IFJ alerts and reports: http://www.ifj.org/  
Media Wise reports: http://www.mediawise.org.uk/  
 
Score  
 
LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  
Professional associations 
providing advocacy for 
editorial independence and 
the respect of  professional 
standards are present and 
active. 
Professional associations 
providing advocacy for 
editorial independence and the 
respect of  professional 
standards are present, but not 
active. 
Professional associations 
providing advocacy for 
editorial independence and 
the respect of  professional 
standards are not present.  
There are mechanisms that 
allow and/or facilitate the 
work of  professional 
associations in their advocacy 
There are mechanisms that 
allow and/or facilitate the 
work of  professional 
associations in their advocacy 
There are no mechanisms 
that allow and/or facilitate 
the work of  professional 
associations in their advocacy 
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for editorial independence 
and the respect of  
professional standards, and 
they are implemented 
properly. 
for editorial independence and 
the respect of  professional 
standards, but they are not 
implemented. 
for editorial independence 
and the respect of  
professional standards.  
 
33. Level of independence of PSM considering mechanisms of its 
financing  
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the level of  independence of  PSM, by considering the 
mechanisms of  its financing. 
 
Method of measurement:  
(1) Main Collaborator: Evaluation of  the financial mechanisms enabling the government (political 
groupings in the government) to exercise pressure on the PSM, such as decision-making on the level of  
licence fee, proportion of  direct government financing, and decision-making on wages of  PSM 
employees. The study includes quantitative evaluation of  the indicators of  PSM financial independence.  
 
(2) Panel of  experts: The panel of  experts conduct the evaluation/verification of  the evaluation of  the 
collaborator.  
 
Data sources:  
EBU – European Broadcasting Union, http://www.ebu.ch/en/  
See in particular documents available at: http://www3.ebu.ch/policies/initiatives/sustainable-psm  
European Audiovisual Observatory, http://www.obs.coe.int/  
National media regulation databases (available on web sites of relevant state bodies). 
Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and 
Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europe-
regulation-policy-and-independence 
 
Score 
 
LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  
How would you describe the mechanism of  providing financing to the PSM by the government?  
Level of  licence fee depends 
on the economic indicator set 
in the law. 
Government decides on 
licence fee based on thorough 
analysis with public discussion.  
Government decides on 
licence fee without public 
discussion.  
What is the percentage of  direct government financing for the PSM?  
Direct government financing 
is <10%. 
Direct government financing is 
<25% ≥10%. 
Direct government financing 
is ≥25%. 
Does the government decide about the wages of  the PSM employees?  
N N Y 
 
34. Independence and ownership of news agencies 
 
Description: This indicator aims to assess the range and independence of  competing news agencies, 
including the assessment of  the level of  state ownership and level of  independence of  state owned news 
agencies. 
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Method of  measurement:  
(1) Main local collaborator: Evaluation of  a range of  competing news agencies, level of  state ownership 
and level of  independence of  state owned news agencies. The study applies analysis of  evidence of  
presence of  competing news agencies. In the case of  state ownership in news agencies, it also applies 
analysis of  legal documents, economic indicators such as the level of  state financing of  news agencies and 
procedures of  appointment of  key personnel. The evaluation is performed based on a score list or 
checkpoint list. The evaluation should be based on analysis of  available data provided from such sources 
as (not exclusive): media registers (in some countries established by media regulator such as ministry of  
culture or other), statutes and annual financial breakdowns of  news agencies, state budget breakdown. 
 
(2) Panel of  experts: The panel of  experts conduct the evaluation/verification of  the evaluation of  the 
collaborator.  
 
Sample: All news agencies officially registered and running at national and/or local level, privately and 
publicly (including jointly) owned, managed and financed. 
 
Data sources: 
Media registers (in some countries established by media regulators, Ministry of culture or other); Statutes 
and annual financial breakdowns of news agencies and State budget breakdown. 
 
Score: 
 
LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  
What is the market share of  the leading news agency?  
No news agency dominates 
the market (occupy >30% of  
the market of  news 
agencies).  
One news agency has <50% 
≥30% share of  the market of  
news agencies.  
The leading news agency has 
≥50% market share.  
How would you evaluate the political affiliation and/or dependence of  the largest news agency?  
The largest news agency 
(having the biggest market 
share) is independent from 
political groupings and from 
the government in terms of  
ownership and affiliation of  
key personnel. 
The largest news agency 
(having the biggest market 
share) is affiliated to one 
political grouping but its key 
personnel is appointed based 
on professional criteria and its 
editorial policy is independent 
from the political grouping. 
The largest news agency 
(having the biggest market 
share) is affiliated to one 
political grouping and its key 
personnel are appointed 
based on political affiliation. 
How would you describe the relation between the leading news agency and the government?  
The largest news agency 
(having the biggest market 
share) is independent from 
the government in terms of  
ownership, affiliation of  key 
personnel and editorial 
policy. 
The largest news agency 
(having the biggest market 
share) is owned by the 
government, but its key 
personnel is appointed based 
on professional criteria and its 
editorial policy is independent 
from the government. 
The largest news agency 
(having the biggest market 
share) is owned by the 
government and the 
government is involved in the 
personnel appointment 
and/or editorial policy. 
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APPENDIX 3: CONTENT ANALYSIS  
 
Content analysis is performed in each examined country, in order to measure: Proportion of  
representation and dominant (positive or negative) media portrayal of  the various political and 
ideological viewpoints and interests represented (given voice) in the media, as part of  the indicator 
29 Representation of  political views in the media. It is applied in a very small sample, in order to examine 
the overall feasibility of  applying this method as part of  the MPM.  
Media sample: For the purposes of  the pilot testing of  the MPM, the media sample is limited to TV as 
the key media platform that citizens use for acquiring information about political and current affairs (see 
Eurobarometer data, e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_media_en.pdf). 
The sample will include one public TV channel (in countries with more than one public TV channels, 
select the one with larger viewership) and the one leading terrestrial TV channel (generalist TV channel 
with the largest audience share in a given country).  
Type of  the content:  
- The main and secondary news programmes at a day (the choice should be based on the audience figures 
and usually will include evening/afternoon/lunch time news programmes), including current affairs news, 
reports, comments and analysis;  
- The main political talk show and/or political analysis program;  
- The main morning show (all types of  content with an exception of: advertising, weather forecasts, stock 
exchange and related financial listings and analyses, real estate and housing, car and motor supplements, 
announcements, TV schedules and more specialist sections such as books, theatre, music, arts and cinema 
reviews, travelling and lifestyle supplements)  
- Devoted election programme, block or debates.  
Period sample: 12-18 May 2014: 1 working week day and 1 weekend day. The choice of  the precise 2 days 
should be based on the scheduling of  political programs in the respective country. E.g. if  there are no 
political programs in the TV scheduling for Sunday, than the sampling choice for a weekend day will be in 
both cases Saturday for the weekend quota. Same principle applies for the working week day quota.  
Sample of  political actors: List of  relevant political actors within one country whose media portrayal 
will be assessed has to be established to include political and ideological groupings represented in the 
parliament, but also other relevant political and ideological groupings and organisations with significant 
influence on state of  political and social affairs in the country (for instance the church, unions, etc.), and 
non-parliamentary parties and independent candidates, especially those registered for the electoral race. 
Therefore, the political actors should be divided into 4 groups: government, governing parties, opposition 
parties, and other actors representing political and ideological views (non-parliamentary parties, unions, 
non-governmental organisations, interest groups, churches etc.). For the purposes of  the pilot testing of  
the MPM, "political actor" is understood both as a person and as and organisation/group of  people. The 
political actor(s) will be considered as mentioned in all of  the following cases: directly or indirectly quoted 
speakers, or when actors are directly or indirectly referred to when they act as agents of  an action in 
selected news items.  
Content item: Each program in the media sample needs to be split into content items for the purposes 
of  coding. The duration of  the whole program needs to be split into consecutive content items. The end 
of  each content item (the cutting point between content items) is the moment in which the portrayed 
political actor is changed. Therefore, the content items will have different duration, which will depend on 
the content.  
 177 
How to measure and score the indicator: 
Step 1 - deciding the exact dates to be monitored and analysed and the exact programs/time slots 
according to the outlined criteria  
Step 2 - identification of  dominant actors in the country on group level (e.g. parties, unions, pressure 
groups, social movements, etc.) and classifying them according to the four actor categories 
Step 3 - assessment and coding of  how these actors are portrayed in each content item, according to the 
following variables (using the provided Excel file):  
1 
VARIABLE /CODE INSTRUCTION 
DATE 
Please, insert the date of the program transmission from the drop-down 
menu 
12/05/14 
In your sample, there should be one weekday. 
13/05/14 
14/05/14 
15/05/14 
16/05/14 
17/05/14 
In your sample, there should be one weekend day. 
18/05/14 
 
2 
TIME SLOT OF 
THE PROGRAM 
Insert the time slot of the whole program in the following format, e.g. 20:00-
21:00 
  
Please, insert the time slot as text (not from a drop-down menu), following 
the proposed formatting and covering the time of the whole program that is 
coded.  
 
3 
TV CHANNEL 
NAME 
Insert the name of the TV channel transmitting the program 
  
Please, insert the name of the TV channel as text (not from a drop-down 
menu), in the original language in which the TV channel is popular in the 
country. In case the name uses alphabet or symbols different from the 
standard Latin alphabet (English), please, include a transliteration if the name 
in standard Latin alphabet in brackets.  
 
4 
TV CHANNEL 
TYPE 
Insert the type of the channel from the drop-down menu 
Public 
Public service TV channel is considered to be an organisations fulfilling the 
public service remit in broadcasting and an offer of various services, resulting 
in the emergence of public service media (PSM). The channel is normally 
characterised by state/public ownership and predominant public funding.  
Private 
Private channel is considered a channel that is owned by private 
entities/persons and does not fulfil the requirements for PSM 
 
5 
VARIABLE /CODE INSTRUCTIONS 
PROGRAM NAME  Insert the name of the TV program 
  
Please, insert the name of the TV program as text (not from a drop-down 
menu), in the original language in which the TV program is popular in the 
country. In case the name uses alphabet or symbols different from the 
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standard Latin alphabet (English), please, include a transliteration if the name 
in standard Latin alphabet in brackets. 
 
6 
PROGRAM TYPE  Insert the type of the TV program from the drop-down menu 
Main news program 
The main news programme at a day - a daily new emission with the largest 
audience; normally it would be the evening/afternoon/lunch time news 
programme, and it will include current affairs news, reports, comments and 
analysis;  
Secondary news 
program 
The secondary news programme at a day - a daily new emission with the 
second largest audience; normally it would be the evening/afternoon/lunch 
time news programme, and it will include current affairs news, reports, 
comments and analysis;  
Political talk show 
The main political talk show should be coded only if it has larger audience 
that the main political analysis programme 
Political analysis 
program 
The main political analysis programme should be coded only if it has larger 
audience that the main political talk show  
Morning show 
The main morning show, which also covers news and public affairs 
information. If there is not a morning show that covers these areas, do not 
code. Please, code only content items that cover news and current affairs. 
E.g. do not code advertising, weather forecasts, stock exchange and related 
financial listings and analyses, real estate and housing, car and motor 
supplements, announcements, TV schedules and more specialist sections 
such as books, theatre, music, arts and cinema reviews, travelling and lifestyle 
supplements 
Electoral program 
The main devoted election programme, block or debates. This would be 
different type of programmes in different countries, depending on the 
arrangement of the media coverage of the electoral campaigns. If there are 
several types of TV electoral programmes, please, choose the one with the 
largest audience.  
 
7 
NUMBER OF 
CONTENT ITEM 
Insert the consecutive number of the content item, restarting the numbering 
for each program 
  
Please, insert the number without using any additional symbols (i.e. insert 4 
and NOT 4. or IV 
 
8 
LENGTH OF THE 
CONTENT ITEM 
(IN SECONDS) 
Insert the length/duration of the content item in seconds 
  
Please, insert the duration as numbers and stick to the following formatting: 
e.g. ten seconds is coded 0:10; hundred seconds is coded 1:40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
VARIABLE /CODE INSTRUCTIONS 
NAME OF 
PORTRAYED 
POLITICAL ACTOR 
Insert the full name of the portrayed political actor (person or organisation) 
  
By "political actor" (PA) we understand both a person and an 
organisation/group of people. Therefore, please code here whichever is 
portrayed. The PA should be coded as mentioned in all of the following 
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cases: PA is directly or indirectly quoted (i.e. the name is not mentioned 
explicitly, but the contextual information makes it clear that the particular PA 
is portrayed); PA is directly or indirectly referred to; PA acts as an agent of 
an action in selected news items (i.e. the PA acts/talks in the transmitted TV 
content). In the cases when a PA X is talking about PA Y, then the PA Y is 
coded as the portrayed one. In case the name uses alphabet or symbols 
different from the standard Latin alphabet (English), please, include a 
transliteration if the name in standard Latin alphabet in brackets. 
 
10 
NAME OF THE 
ORGANISATION/G
ROUP TO WHICH 
THE PORTRAYED 
POLITICAL ACTOR 
IS AFFILIATED 
Insert the full name of the organisation to which the portrayed political actor 
belongs 
  
As organisation/group is considered the most politically relevant affiliation 
of the PA. E.g. if the PA is MP and also publicly known as a Head of the 
Association of Hunters, he/she is coded as affiliated to the political party 
that he/she represents in the Parliament. However, if instead of the 
Association of Hunters, the PA is a key figure in the trade unions (or other 
politically relevant entities), please code the affiliation to both organisations. 
In the cases of the portrayed PA is the organisation itself, then the name here 
will be the same as the name in the previous variable (V9). In case the name 
uses alphabet or symbols different from the standard Latin alphabet 
(English), please, include a transliteration if the name in standard Latin 
alphabet in brackets. 
 
11 
CATEGORY OF 
THE PORTRAYED 
POLITICAL ACTOR 
Insert the category of the portrayed political actor from the drop-down 
menu 
Government PA that has a position in the executive power 
Governing parties 
PA that has a position in a party that is part of the government, e.g. member 
of the party, member of the parliamentary group of the party 
Opposition parties 
PA is affiliated to a political party that is represented in the Parliament, but is 
not in the government 
Other actors 
The actor belongs to another relevant political and ideological grouping/ 
organisations with significant influence on the state of the political and social 
affairs in the country, e.g. non-parliamentary parties and independent 
candidates, especially those registered for the electoral race, trade unions, 
non-governmental organisations, interest groups, religious organisations, 
NGOs 
 
12 
VARIABLE /CODE INSTRUCTIONS 
PORTRAYED BY 
WHOM (NAME) 
Insert the full name of the person portraying the political actor (person or 
organisation) 
  
In case the name uses alphabet or symbols different from the standard Latin 
alphabet (English), please, include a transliteration if the name in standard 
Latin alphabet in brackets. 
 
13 
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PORTRAYED BY 
WHOM (TYPE) 
Insert the relevant professional category of the actor who portrays the 
political actor (from the drop-down menu) 
Journalist 
A person working as a journalist and/or popularly known as a citizen 
journalist/blogger 
Political actor A person or organisation as defined previously in this document 
Publicist 
A person who is professionally involved in representing/providing 
information about PA, e.g. spokes persons, PR, etc.  
Non-politically 
affiliated actor 
Other actors that cannot be classified under the categories journalist or 
political actor (i.e. not relevant for the purposes of this coding; do not have 
professional role in portraying PAs) 
 
14 
PORTRAYED BY 
WHICH 
CATEGORY OF 
POLITICAL ACTOR 
Insert the category of the person portraying the political actor from the 
drop-down menu 
Government The portrayal is done by a person who has a position in the executive power 
Governing parties 
The portrayal is done by a person who has a position in a party that is part of 
the government, e.g. member of the party, member of the parliamentary 
group of the party 
Opposition parties 
The portrayal is done by a person who is affiliated to a political party that is 
represented in the Parliament, but is not in the government 
Other actors 
The portrayal is done by a person who belongs to another relevant political 
and ideological grouping/ organisations with significant influence on the 
state of the political and social affairs in the country, e.g. non-parliamentary 
parties and independent candidates, especially those registered for the 
electoral race, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, interest groups, 
religious organisations, NGOs 
 
15 
DIRECT OR 
INDIRECT 
PORTRAYAL 
Insert the type of presence of the portrayed political actor from the drop-
down menu  
Direct presence of the 
portrayed political actor 
The portrayed PA is mentioned directly and/or his/her image is explicitly 
shown  
Indirect presence of the 
portrayed political actor 
The portrayed PA is not mentioned directly, neither his/her image is 
explicitly shown, but the contextual information makes it clear that the 
particular PA is portrayed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
VARIABLE /CODE INSTRUCTIONS 
PROGRAMME 
TYPE  
Insert the media program type from the drop-down menu 
Anchored news The content consists of news announcement delivered in the TV studio 
Report 
The content consists of news/information reported from outside the TV 
studio (this includes hidden camera and similar reports).  
Interview The content is constructed as a dialogue between a journalist and a PA 
Debate The content is structured as a dialogue (direct, structured, indirect, etc.) 
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between different Pas 
PR material 
The content is constructed and/or presented by the communication 
experts/publicists of a political actor (regardless if it is the portrayed PA or 
not)  
Data The content presents data, e.g. polling data, economic statistics, ratings, etc.  
Commentary/ Review 
The content includes the journalist presenting his/her commentary and/or 
reviews 
Interactive content 
The content is constructed by interaction with the audience, e.g. reading 
viewers' comments from the online platforms of the media, viewers calls, etc.  
 
17 
EVALUATION OF 
THE POLITICAL 
ACTOR  
Insert the evaluation of the portrayed political actor from the drop-down 
menu 
Positive 
The portrayal shows clear positive connotations and presents the PA in 
positive light 
Negative 
The portrayal shows clear negative connotations and presents the PA in 
negative light 
Both 
The portrayal shows some clear positive and some clear negative 
connotations. It presents the PA both in positive and in negative light. There 
is no clear predominance of either the positive or the negative connotations 
Neutral The portrayal does not include any evaluative connotations f the PA.  
Ambivalent 
The portrayal is not perfectly neutral, but the evaluative connotations are not 
clear (neither clearly positive, nor clearly negative).  
 
18 
SCOPE OF MEDIA 
MATERIAL  
Insert the scope of the content item from the drop-down menu, following a 
priority order from International having the highest priority and group 
having the lowest priority. I.e. the item is coded according to the highest 
aspect that is present.  
International/ global 
The content item refers to international and/or global (beyond EU) 
events/issues/organisations. This code is with the highest ranking. 
Therefore, code the item here, even if there are other levels mentioned, e.g. 
national, local, etc. 
European The content item refers to EU events/issues/organisations. 
National The content item refers to national events/issues/organisations. 
Local The content item refers to local/regional events/issues/organisations. 
Group-personal level 
The content item refers to events/issues/organisations that involve and/or 
concern only limited groups of people.  
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APPENDIX 4: SIMPLIFICATION OF THE MPM2009 INDICATORS  
 
ID RISK KEY INDICATOR 
TY
PE 
NOTES JUSTIFICATION 
B1.1 
B1 Freedom of speech 
and related rights and 
freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected 
Regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression L To be tested 
 
B1.2 Regulatory safeguards for right to information L To be tested 
 
B1.3 
Recognition of media pluralism as intrinsic part of 
media freedoms and/or as policy objective of media 
legislation and/or regulation L To be tested 
 
B1.4 Regulatory safeguards for journalistic practice L 
To be tested 
jointly  
B1.5 
Regulatory safeguards for the protection of 
journalistic sources L 
To be tested 
jointly  
B1.6 
Regulatory safeguards for journalists’ access to 
events for news reporting L 
To be tested 
jointly  
B2.1 
B2 Insufficiently 
independent 
supervision in media 
sector 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and 
efficiency of the media authority (authorities) L 
To be tested 
jointly  
B2.2 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and 
efficiency of a self-regulatory body in the press sector L 
Not to be 
tested 
The existence of self-regulatory bodies in the press sector is highly 
recommendable to safeguard freedom of expression and of information 
and the responsibility and accountability of the media, but not 
"mandatory" according to different country legal orders and traditions. 
B2.3 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and 
efficiency of the competition authority L 
To be tested 
jointly  
B2.4 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and 
efficiency of the telecommunications authority L 
To be tested 
jointly  
B3.1 
B3 Insufficient media 
(including digital) 
literacy 
Policies and support measures for media literacy (or 
digital literacy in particular) among different groups 
of population L To be tested 
 
C1.1 
C1 Insufficient media 
representation of 
European cultures 
Proportion of European works in television broadcasting 
(linear AVMS) S 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, namely 
cultural pluralism not directly related to informing the public on current 
affairs 
C1.2 
Regulatory safeguards for European works in television 
broadcasting (linear AVMS) L 
Not to be 
tested 
C1.3 Proportion of European works in non-linear AVMS S 
Not to be 
tested 
C1.4 
Regulatory safeguards for European works in non-linear 
AVMS L 
Not to be 
tested 
C1.5 
Proportion of non-domestic European works in 
television broadcasting (linear AVMS) S 
Not to be 
tested 
C1.6 
Proportion of non-domestic European works in top TV 
programmes in linear AVMS S 
Not to be 
tested 
C1.7 
Proportion of TV coverage focusing on non-domestic 
European issues in TV news on linear AVMS S 
Not to be 
tested 
C1.8 
Proportion of coverage focusing on non-domestic 
European issues in quality daily newspapers S 
Not to be 
tested 
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C2.1 
C2 Insufficient media 
representation of national 
culture 
Proportion of national works in television broadcasting 
(linear AVMS) S 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, namely 
cultural pluralism not directly related to informing the public on current 
affairs 
C2.2 
Proportion of national works in top TV programmes in 
linear AVMS S 
Not to be 
tested 
C2.3 
Regulatory safeguards for national works in television 
broadcasting L 
Not to be 
tested 
C2.4 
Regulatory safeguards for national music in radio 
broadcasting L 
Not to be 
tested 
C2.5 
Policies and support measures for the promotion of 
national works apart from general PSM funding) L 
Not to be 
tested 
C3.1 
C3 Insufficient 
proportion of 
independent production 
Proportion of European works by independent producers 
in television broadcasting (linear AVMS) S 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, namely 
cultural pluralism not directly related to informing the public on current 
affairs 
C3.2 
Proportion of European works by independent producers 
among top TV programmes in linear AVMS S 
Not to be 
tested 
C3.3 
Regulatory safeguards for European works by 
independent producers in television broadcasting (linear 
AVMS) L 
Not to be 
tested 
C4.1 
C4 Insufficient 
proportion of in-house 
production 
Proportion of in-house production in television 
broadcasting (linear AVMS) S 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, namely 
cultural pluralism not directly related to informing the public on current 
affairs 
C4.2 
Proportion of in-house production in top 10 TV 
programmes in linear AVMS S 
Not to be 
tested 
C5.1 
C5 Insufficient 
representation of world 
cultures 
Proportion of non-European and non-US production in 
television broadcasting (linear AVMS) S 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, namely 
cultural pluralism not directly related to informing the public on current 
affairs 
C5.2 
Proportion of TV coverage focusing on non-European 
and non-US regions in TV news on linear AVMS S 
Not to be 
tested 
C5.3 
Proportion of coverage focusing on non-European and 
non-US regions in quality daily newspapers S 
Not to be 
tested 
C6.1 
C6 Insufficient 
representation of the 
various cultural and 
social groups in 
mainstream media 
content and services 
Proportion of actors representing different cultural and 
social groups in selected 
 national newspapers, TV, radio programmes and internet 
services (news contents). S 
Not to be 
tested 
Due to the lack of unified and commonly accepted operational 
definition of minority throughout the EU, the indicators measuring 
minority relevant issues are not included in the pilot testing of the 
social-political indicators. Nevertheless, their inclusion in a potential 
follow-up development of the MPM is considered. 
C6.2 
Representation of minorities on the TV screen and in 
news rooms S 
Not to be 
tested 
C6.3 
Policies and support measures for the promotion of 
cultural diversity in media (apart from general PSM 
funding) L 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is structured as an assessment on country policies and 
was not considered enough specific to give an effective and measurable 
point of reference to assess the risk for pluralism. 
C7.1 
C7 Insufficient 
representation of the 
various cultural and 
social groups in PSM 
Availability and proportion of programming provided for 
cultural and social minority groups on PSM channels and 
services S 
Not to be 
tested 
Due to the lack of unified and commonly accepted operational 
definition of minority throughout the EU, the indicators measuring 
minority relevant issues are not included in the pilot testing of the 
social-political indicators. Nevertheless, their inclusion in a potential 
follow-up development of the MPM is considered. C7.2 
Availability of media contents in minority languages on 
PSM channels and services S 
Not to be 
tested 
C7.3 
Regulatory safeguards for access to airtime on PSM 
by the various cultural and social groups L Тo be tested  
C8.1 
C8 Insufficient system 
of minority and 
community media 
Ratio of terrestrial TV channels dedicated to 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total 
number of domestic terrestrial TV channels E 
To be tested 
jointly 
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C8.2 
C8 Insufficient system 
of minority and 
community media 
Ratio of TV/Cable/Sat/ADSL television channels 
dedicated to ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to 
total number of domestic TV/Cable/Sat/ADSL 
television channels E 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
C8.3 
Ratio of radio channels dedicated to 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total 
number of domestic radio channels E 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
C8.4 
Ratio of newspapers dedicated to 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total 
number of domestic newspapers E 
To be tested 
jointly 
Due to the lack of unified and commonly accepted operational 
definition of minority throughout the EU, the indicators 
measuring minority relevant issues are not included in the pilot 
testing of the social-political indicators. Nevertheless, their 
inclusion in a potential follow-up development of the MPM is 
considered. 
C8.5 
Ratio of number of magazines dedicated to 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities compared to total 
number of domestic magazines E 
Not to be 
tested 
In the logic of MPM2014, magazines are excluded form the analysis, 
while newspapers are considered key source for people to access 
information on current affairs 
C8.6 
Parity of financing of secondary linguistic media 
compared to population size E 
Not to be 
tested Due to the lack of unified and commonly accepted operational 
definition of minority throughout the EU, the indicators measuring 
minority relevant issues are not included in the pilot testing of the 
MPM2014. Nevertheless, their inclusion in a potential follow-up 
development of the MPM is considered. 
C8.7 
Number, estimated reach and existence of (other) 
community media outlets serving different communities 
and minority groups S 
Transferred to 
Economic 
indicator 
C8.8 
Sustainability of investment and proportion of subsidies 
in minority and community media S 
Not to be 
tested 
C8.9 
Access of minority and community media to networks 
and platforms S 
Transferred to 
Economic 
indicator 
Due to the lack of unified and commonly accepted operational 
definition of minority throughout the EU, the indicators measuring 
minority relevant issues are not included in the pilot testing of the 
social-political indicators. Nevertheless, their inclusion in a potential 
follow-up development of the MPM is considered. 
C8.10 
Regulatory safeguards for minority and community 
media L To be tested  
C9.1 
C9 Insufficient 
representation of 
different cultural and 
social groups in HR in 
the media sector 
Proportion of journalists and media executives from 
different cultural and social groups (including 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities, women and 
disabled people) in PSM S 
Not to be 
tested 
Due to the lack of unified and commonly accepted operational 
definition of minority throughout the EU, the indicators measuring 
minority relevant issues are not included in the pilot testing of the 
social-political indicators. Nevertheless, their inclusion in a potential 
follow-up development of the MPM is considered. 
C9.2 
Availability of diversity measures within media companies 
(such as a diversity officer, targeted training etc) S 
Not to be 
tested 
C9.3 
Regulatory safeguards for the representation of the 
various cultural and social groups in professional, 
management and board functions in private (commercial 
and/or non-profit) media L 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator refers to the private sector. The representation of the 
various cultural & social groups in professional management & board 
functions of private media was not considered directly relevant for the 
assessment of media pluralism risks. 
C9.4 
Regulatory safeguards for the representation of the 
various cultural and social groups in professional, 
management and board functions in PSM L 
Not to be 
tested The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, namely 
cultural pluralism not directly related to informing the public on current 
affairs 
C9.5 
Regulatory safeguards for the representation of the 
various cultural and social groups in media councils 
and/or other advisory bodies in the media sector L 
Not to be 
tested 
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C10.1 C10 Limited 
accessibility by 
disabled people 
Availability of content and service applications for 
disabled people S To be tested  
C10.2 
Policies and support measures for enhanced access to 
media contents and services by groups with special needs 
in society, like the elderly, disabled,… L 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is structured as an assessment on country policies and 
was not considered enough specific to give an effective and measurable 
point of reference to assess the risk for pluralism. See, instead, S10.1. 
G1.1 
G1 High centralisation 
of the national media 
system 
A relative strength of local/regional media (daily 
newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, news websites) 
in a particular media system S 
Transferred to 
Economic 
indicator to be 
tested jointly 
This indicator measures concentration and ownership and as such, it is 
considered to be better suited for the economic set of indicators. 
G1.2 
Proportion of regional metropolises (main city in a given 
region, province, land) with competing regional or local 
media (daily newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, 
news websites) S 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, indicators focus on 
national level media. Including local media level will be considered on a 
potential follow up application of the MPM 
G1.3 
Combined ownership of regional/local media and 
national media outlets by the same company S 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, indicators focus on 
national level media. Including local media level will be considered on a 
potential follow up application of the MPM 
G1.4 
Ratio of number of cities with TV and radio stations 
to total number of cities E 
To be tested 
jointly  
G1.5 
Ratio of number of cities with newspapers to total 
number of cities E 
To be tested 
jointly  
G2.1 
G2 Insufficient system 
of regional and local 
media 
Proportion of regional and local television and radio 
broadcast channels to national broadcast channels E 
To be tested 
jointly  
G2.2 
Proportion of regional and local newspapers to 
national newspapers E 
To be tested 
jointly  
G2.3 
Herfindahl Herschman Index (HHI) based on regional 
channels/newspapers available in the region, divided by 
total number of channels/newspapers E 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, indicators focus on 
national level media. Including local media level will be considered on a 
potential follow up application of the MPM 
G2.4 
Parity of financing of regional and /local TV, radio and 
newspapers relative to population size E 
Not to be 
tested 
G2.5 
Estimated reach and audience share of regional and local 
media S 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, the social/political 
indicators focus on national level media as indicators and as sampling. 
Including local media level will be considered on a potential follow up 
application of the MPM 
G2.6 
Access of regional and local media to networks and 
platforms S 
Not to be 
tested 
G2.7 
Proportion of different types of media ownership of 
regional and local media S 
Not to be 
tested 
G2.8 
Level of investment in production of regional/local news 
in regional and local media S 
Not to be 
tested 
G2.9 Regulatory safeguards for regional and local media L 
To be tested 
jointly  
G2.10 
Policies and support measures for regional and local 
media L 
To be tested 
jointly  
G3.1 
G3 Insufficient 
representation of 
regional and local 
communities in media 
content and services 
Proportion of locally oriented and locally produced 
content S 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, the social/political 
indicators focus on national level media as indicators and as sampling. 
Including local media level will be considered on a potential follow up 
application of the MPM 
G3.2 Regulatory safeguards for locally oriented and locally L To be tested  
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produced content on PSM channels and services 
G4.1 
G4 Insufficient 
representation of regional 
and local communities in 
HR in the media sector 
Proportion of journalists and media executives based in 
local communities S 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, the social/political 
indicators focus on national level media as indicators and as sampling. 
Including local media level will be considered on a potential follow up 
application of the MPM 
G4.2 
Regulatory safeguards for the representation of regional 
and local communities in media councils and/or other 
advisory bodies in the media sector L 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, this is an indicator 
that covers too specific requirements that must be considered on a 
potential follow up application of the MPM. 
G5.1 
G5 Dominance of a 
limited number of 
information sources for 
local issues 
News source preferences of audiences for local issues 
(what is the primary source of information?) S 
Not to be 
tested 
For the purposes of the pilot testing of MPM 2014, the social/political 
indicators focus on national level media as indicators and as sampling. 
Including local media level will be considered on a potential follow up 
application of the MPM 
G6.1 
G6 Insufficient access 
to media and 
distribution systems 
due to geographic 
factors 
Number of people without access to PSM because of 
geographic obstacles S 
To be tested 
jointly  
G6.2 
Regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of PSM 
channels and services L 
To be tested 
jointly  
G6.3 Availability of broadband networks in rural areas S 
To be tested 
jointly  
G6.4 
Policy measures to promote roll out of and access to 
broadband networks in remote and/or rural areas L 
To be tested 
jointly  
G6.5 
Policies and support measures for the distribution of 
newspapers in remote areas L 
To be tested 
jointly  
O1.1 O1 High ownership 
concentration in 
terrestrial television 
Ownership concentration in terrestrial television 
(horizontal) E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O1.2 Audience concentration in terrestrial television E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O1.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in television (horizontal) L 
To be tested 
jointly  
O2.1 
O2 High ownership 
concentration in radio 
Ownership concentration in radio (horizontal) E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O2.2 Audience concentration in radio E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O2.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in radio (horizontal) L 
To be tested 
jointly  
O3.1 
O3 High ownership 
concentration in 
newspapers 
Ownership concentration in newspapers (horizontal) E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O3.2 Readership concentration in newspapers E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O3.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in newspapers (horizontal) L 
To be tested 
jointly  
O4.1 
O4 High ownership 
concentration in 
Cable/Sat/ADSL/TV 
Ownership concentration in Cable/Sat/ADSL-TV 
(horizontal) E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O4.2 Audience concentration in Cable/Sat/ADSL-TV E 
To be tested 
jointly  
O4.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in Cable/Sat/ADSL-TV L 
To be tested 
jointly  
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(horizontal) 
O5.1 
O5 High ownership 
concentration in 
magazines 
Ownership concentration in magazines (horizontal) E 
Not to be 
tested 
In the logic of MPM2014, magazines are excluded form the analysis, 
while newspapers are considered key source for people to access 
information on current affairs 
O5.2 Readership concentration in magazines E 
Not to be 
tested 
O5.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in magazines (horizontal) L 
Not to be 
tested 
O6.1 
O6 High ownership 
concentration in internet 
content provision 
Ownership concentration in internet content provision 
(horizontal) E 
Not to be 
tested 
The MPM2014 takes in consideration measurable indicators. This one 
was substituted by "Ownership concentration of ISPs" and merged with 
the other economic indicators on ownership. 
O6.2 Readership concentration in internet content provision E 
Not to be 
tested 
The MPM2014 takes in consideration measurable indicators. This one 
was substituted by "Subscriber concentration in internet service 
provision" and merged with the other economic indicators on 
ownership. 
O6.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in internet content provision 
(horizontal) L 
Not to be 
tested 
The MPM2014 takes in consideration measurable indicators. This one 
was substituted by "ownership concentration and/or control in internet 
service providers" and merged with the other legal indicators on 
ownership. 
O7.1 
O7 High ownership 
concentration in book 
publishing 
Ownership concentration in book publishing (horizontal) E 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, namely 
cultural pluralism not directly related to informing the public on current 
affairs 
O7.2 Readership concentration in book publishing E 
Not to be 
tested 
O7.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in book publishing (horizontal) L 
Not to be 
tested 
O8.1 
O8 High concentration 
of cross-media 
ownership 
Number of sectors in which top 8 firms/owners are 
active E To be tested  
O8.2 
Regulatory safeguards against high degree of cross-
ownership between radio and television L 
To be tested 
jointly  
O8.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high degree of cross-
ownership between print (or text-based) and 
audiovisual media L 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
O9.1 O9 High vertical 
concentration 
Regulatory safeguards against bottlenecks in 
distribution/networks resulting from vertical integration L 
Not to be 
tested In the logic of MPM2014, this indicator was considered as one of those 
to be assessed on a potential follow up application of the MPM. 
O9.2 
Regulatory safeguards against high degree of integration 
between advertising and media activities L 
Not to be 
tested 
O10.1 
O10 Lack of 
transparency in 
ownership structures 
Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership 
and/or control towards the public L 
To be tested 
jointly  
O10.2 
Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership 
and/or control towards the relevant authorities L 
To be tested 
jointly  
P1.1 P1 Political bias in the 
media 
Proportion of the various political and ideological 
viewpoints and interests represented (given voice) in 
the media S 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
P1.2 
Indication of dominant (positive or negative) media 
portrayal of specific political actors S 
To be tested 
jointly  
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P1.3 
P1 Political bias in the 
media 
Indication of range of investigative reporting disclosing 
hidden actions of various political actors or groups S 
Not to be 
tested 
Investigative reporting is an important element of pluralistic journalism, 
but this indicator covers it in a very limited and thus potentially 
misleading way. Therefore, its measurement is omitted at this stage 
P1.4 
Regulatory remedies against political bias in the media 
(right to reply, complaints mechanisms...) L 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator was considered too specific for political bias and 
absorbed in the basic indicator on freedom of expression. 
P1.5 
Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and 
impartial political reporting in PSM L 
To be tested 
jointly  
P1.6 
Regulatory safeguards for fair and accurate political 
reporting in private radio and television 
broadcasting L 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
P1.7 
Regulatory safeguards for fair and accurate political 
reporting in print media L 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator evaluates the existence of regulatory measures to 
guarantee fair representation of political viewpoints in private press. As 
related to the private sector internal pluralism, it falls, at least for this 
simplified version, outside the scope of application of the MPM2014. 
P1.8 
Regulatory safeguards for the fair representation of the 
various political groups in management or board 
functions of private audiovisual media (if these include 
political representatives) L 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator evaluates the existence of regulatory measures to 
guarantee political representation in the board functions of private 
companies. As related to the private sector, it falls, at least for this 
simplified version, outside the scope of application of the MPM2014. 
Moreover, the validity of this indicator is questionable and up to the 
different country political structure. 
P1.9 
Regulatory safeguards for the representation of the 
various political groups in media councils and/or other 
advisory bodies in the media sector (if these include 
political representatives) L 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator evaluates the existence of regulatory measures to 
guarantee political representation in media councils or other advisory 
bodies. The validity of this indicator is questionable and up to the 
different country political structure. 
P2.1 
P2 Political bias in the 
media during election 
periods campaigns 
Level of successful complaints to the media and self-
regulatory bodies by citizens or political groups with 
regard to misconduct in political reporting during election 
campaigns S 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is not tested at the MPM 2014 as it shows only partial 
illustration of the risk of misconduct in political reporting, e.g. the level 
of successful complaints could be misleading if there are reasons for 
under or over-reporting (writing complaints) such misconduct 
P2.2 
Indication of the level of partisanship and political 
bias in the media during election campaigns S 
To be tested 
jointly  
P2.3 
Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and 
impartial coverage of election campaigns in radio 
and television broadcasting L 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
P2.4 
Regulatory safeguards for fair access to airtime on 
PSM channels and services by political actors during 
election campaigns L 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
P2.5 
Regulatory safeguards relating to political 
advertising in election campaigns L 
To be tested 
jointly  
P3.1 
P3 Excessive 
politicisation of media 
ownership/control 
Public access to data about political affiliation of 
media owners S 
To be tested 
jointly  
P3.2 
Proportion of specific political affiliations of the 
media owners across the media market in terms of 
audience share, including proportion of the media 
owned by political parties, politicians or political 
groupings S 
To be tested 
jointly 
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P3.3 
P3 Excessive 
politicisation of media 
ownership/control 
Proportion of the state ownership in the media across the 
media markets in terms of audience share S 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is not going to be tested in MPM 2014 as aspects of state 
control and ownership are tested by other indicators 
P3.4 
Level of discrimination in distribution of state 
advertisements reflected in favouritism of the media 
owned by political parties or affiliates of political 
parties in the government or penalisation of the 
media critics S To be tested 
 
P3.5 
Regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership 
and/or control of media by politicians L 
To be tested 
jointly  
P3.6 
Regulatory safeguards for structural, 
financial,…independence of mainstream radio and 
TV channels from political parties / politicians (in 
addition to editorial independence) L 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
P4.1 
P4 Insufficient editorial 
independence 
Representation of the interests of media professionals 
and media employers in labour relations is established 
through professional associations, providing high level of 
participation of media professionals and media publishers 
in their membership. S 
Not to be 
tested 
Other indicators cover aspects of the presence and activities of 
professional associations (indicator 34 from MPM 2014) 
P4.2 
Evidences of conflicts between editorial staff and media 
owners due to attempts of political instrumentalisation of 
the media S 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is considered as highly problematic as measurement due 
to the near impossibility to access relevant and exhaustive data on the 
indicator. 
P4.3 
Presence of professional associations providing 
advocacy for editorial independence and respect of 
professional standards S To be tested 
 
P4.4 
Regulatory safeguards for editorial independence of 
in print media from political actors L 
To be tested 
jointly  
P4.5 
Regulatory safeguards for editorial independence of 
mainstream radio and television broadcast channels 
(linear AVMS) from political actors L 
To be tested 
jointly 
 
P4.6 
Regulatory safeguards for editorial independence of 
mainstream non-linear AVMS from political actors L 
To be tested 
jointly  
P5.1 
P5 Insufficient 
independence of PSM 
Level of independence of PSM considering appointment 
procedures and composition of its governing bodies / 
Level of equal/proportionate representation of all 
political groups (represented in the parliament) in the 
governing bodies S 
Not to be 
tested 
The independence of PSM will be pilot tested mainly with the 
mechanisms of PSM financing as a stronger functional risk of control 
over PSM. The rationale behind it is that different countries employ 
various forms and levels of political involvement in the media 
management and sometimes the same form of political involvement can 
lead to different outcomes for media pluralism. 
P5.2 
Level of independence of PSM considering 
mechanisms of its financing S To be tested  
P5.3 
Level of independence of PSM considering mechanisms 
of appointments and dismissal of key personnel 
/Indication of whether key editorial personnel and 
management of PSM change with the change of the 
government S 
Not to be 
tested 
The independence of PSM will be pilot tested mainly with the 
mechanisms of PSM financing as a stronger functional risk of control 
over PSM. The rationale behind it is that different countries employ 
various forms and levels of political involvement in the media 
management and sometimes the same form of political involvement can 
lead to different outcomes for media pluralism. 
P5.4 
Regulatory safeguards for editorial independence of PSM 
channels and services from government / political L 
Not to be 
tested 
In the logic of MPM2014, this indicator was considered as one of those 
to be assessed on a potential follow up application of the MPM. The 
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powers MPM2014 will assess the level of independence of PSM according to 
appointment procedures and composition of its governing body and 
according its financing. 
P5.5 
P5 Insufficient 
independence of PSM 
Fair, objective and transparent appointment 
procedures for professional, management and board 
functions within PSM ensuring independence from 
government / a single political group L To be tested 
 
P6.1 
P6 Insufficient 
pluralism of news 
agencies 
Range and independence of competing news 
agencies S 
To be tested 
jointly  
P6.2 
Level of state ownership in news agencies and level 
of independence of state owned news agencies S 
To be tested 
jointly  
P7.1 
P7 Insufficient 
pluralism of 
distribution systems 
Discrimination by politically affiliated television and 
radio distribution networks S 
To be tested 
jointly  
P7.2 
Discrimination by politically affiliated distribution 
networks for print media S 
To be tested 
jointly  
P8.1 
P8 Insufficient citizen 
activity and political 
impact in online media 
Range of citizens and citizens’ groups using online media 
for posting their content relevant for political debate S 
Not to be 
tested Other indicators measuring pluralism aspects of the internet were 
considered more relevant. 
P8.2 
Level of influence on political and public debate by 
bloggers S 
Not to be 
tested 
T1.1 
T1 Lack of/under-
representation 
of/dominance of 
media types 
Audience parity between the TV channels of commercial 
broadcasters and of PSM E 
Not to be 
tested 
Controlling ownership concentration is considered sufficiently 
exhaustive for the scope of MPM2014, due also the lack of empirical 
evidence of the risk to media pluralism assessed with unbalanced 
between commercial and PSM channels 
T1.2 
Financial parity between the TV channels of commercial 
broadcasters and of PSM E 
Not to be 
tested 
T1.3 
Audience parity between the radio channels of 
commercial broadcasters and of PSM E 
Not to be 
tested 
T1.4 
Financial parity between the radio channels of 
commercial broadcasters and of PSM E 
Not to be 
tested 
T1.5 
Percent of GDP per capita required for an individual to 
obtain TV and radio reception, newspaper subscription, 
magazine subscription, or internet Service E 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is considered not sufficiently relevant for the scope of 
MPM2014 
T1.6 
Regulatory safeguards for the distribution of public 
interest channels on cable, DSL and/or satellite 
platforms L To be tested 
 
T2.1 
T2 Lack of/under-
representation 
of/dominance of media 
genres 
Ratio of news/public affairs, education and entertainment 
programmes on terrestrial TV to total programmes on 
terrestrial TV E 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is not considered methodological feasible due to time 
constraints 
T2.2 
Ratio of news/public affairs, education and entertainment 
programmes on radio to total programmes radio E 
Not to be 
tested 
T2.3 
Ratio of news/public affairs, education and entertainment 
magazines to total number of magazines E 
Not to be 
tested 
In the logic of MPM2014, magazines are excluded form the analysis, 
while newspapers are considered key source for people to access 
information on current affairs 
T2.4 
Ratio of Cab/Sat/ADSL-TV channels dedicated to 
news/public affairs, education and entertainment to total 
number of Cab/Sat/ADSL-TV channels E 
Not to be 
tested 
This indicator is not considered methodological feasible due to time 
constraints 
T2.5 
Regulatory safeguards for the presence of a diversity of 
media genres on the channels and services of private 
(commercial and non-profit) audiovisual media L 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, as it is 
not focussing on news and current affairs. 
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T2.6 
Regulatory safeguards for the public's access to major 
events on free television L 
Not to be 
tested 
The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, as it is 
not focussing on news and current affairs (according to the most 
common lists of major events). 
T2.7 
T2 Lack of/under-
representation 
of/dominance of media 
genres 
Regulatory safeguards for short news reporting on events 
of high interest in case of exclusive broadcast rights L 
Not to be 
tested The indicator relates to issues beyond the scope of MPM 2014, as it is 
not focussing on news and current affairs. 
T2.8 
Regulatory safeguards for a varied and pluralistic offer on 
PSM channels and services L 
Not to be 
tested 
T3.1 
T3 Lack of sufficient 
market resources to 
support range of media 
Ratio of consumer spending on different media per capita 
to GDP per capita E 
Not to be 
tested This indicator is considered not sufficiently relevant for the scope of 
MPM2014 
T3.2 
Ratio of advertising expenditures per capita to GDP per 
capita E 
Not to be 
tested 
T4.1 
T4 Lack of sufficient 
resources to support 
public service media 
Regulatory safeguards for the objective and 
independent allocation of (adequate, consistent and 
sufficient) resources to PSM L To be tested 
 
T5.1 
T5 Insufficient 
engagement of PSM in 
new media 
Regulatory safeguards for the engagement/presence of 
PSM in/on new media L 
Not to be 
tested 
Other indicators measuring pluralism aspects of the internet were 
considered more relevant. T5.2 Proportion of employees dedicated to new media services S 
Not to be 
tested 
T5.3 Amount of financing invested in new media by the PSM E 
Not to be 
tested 
T6.1 
T6 Insufficient attention 
paid to public 
participation 
Proportion of online media offering space for publicly 
available comments and complaints S 
Not to be 
tested 
Other indicators measuring pluralism aspects of the internet were 
considered more relevant. 
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APPENDIX 5: TABLE OF RISK DOMAINS AND INDICATORS INCLUDED IN MPM2014 AND THEIR 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH MPM2009 
 
 
 
 
 Risk Code 
MPM2014 
RISK NAME MPM2014 RISK NAME MPM2009 
Indicator 
ID 
MPM2014 
Indicator 
ID 
MPM2009 
KEY INDICATOR 
B
a
si
c
 R
is
k
 D
o
m
a
in
 
B1 
Freedom of speech and related 
rights and freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected 
B1 Freedom of speech and related 
rights and freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected 1L B1.1 
Regulatory safeguards for freedom of 
expression 
B1 
Freedom of speech and related 
rights and freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected 
B1 Freedom of speech and related 
rights and freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected 2L B1.2 
Regulatory safeguards for right to 
information 
B1 
Freedom of speech and related 
rights and freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected 
B1 Freedom of speech and related 
rights and freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected 3L B1.3 
Recognition of media pluralism as 
intrinsic part of media freedoms and/or as 
policy objective of media legislation 
and/or regulation 
B1 
Freedom of speech and related 
rights and freedoms are not 
sufficiently protected   4L 
B1.4+B1.5+
B1.6 
Regulatory safeguards for the journalistic 
profession 
    
B1 Freedom of speech and related rights and 
freedoms are not sufficiently protected   B1.4 Regulatory safeguards for journalistic practice 
    
B1 Freedom of speech and related rights and 
freedoms are not sufficiently protected   B1.5 
Regulatory safeguards for the protection of journalistic 
sources 
    
B1 Freedom of speech and related rights and 
freedoms are not sufficiently protected   B1.6 
Regulatory safeguards for journalists’ access to events for 
news reporting 
B2 
Insufficiently independent 
supervision in media sector   5L 
B2.1+B2.3+
B2.4 
Regulatory safeguards for the 
independence and the efficiency of the 
relevant national authorities 
    
B2 Insufficiently independent supervision in media 
sector   B2.1 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency 
of the media authority (authorities) 
    
B2 Insufficiently independent supervision in media 
sector   B2.3 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency 
of the competition authority 
    
B2 Insufficiently independent supervision in media 
sector   B2.4 
Regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency 
of the telecommunications authority 
B3 
Insufficient media (including 
digital) literacy 
B3 Insufficient media (including 
digital) literacy 6L B3.1 
Policies and support measures for media 
literacy (and digital literacy in particular) 
among different groups of population 
B4 
Barriers to the free flow of digital 
information  
B4 Barriers to the free flow of digital 
information  20L B4.1 
Policy measures for the impartial 
circulation of internet data, without regard 
to content, destination or source 
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C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 i
n
 t
h
e
 M
e
d
ia
 
C1 
Insufficient representation of the 
various cultural and social groups 
in PSM 
C7 Insufficient representation of the 
various cultural and social groups in 
PSM 7L C7.3 
Regulatory safeguards for access to 
airtime on PSM by the various cultural 
and social groups 
C2 
Insufficient system of minority 
and community media 
C8 Insufficient system of minority 
and community media 8L C8.10 
Regulatory safeguards for minority and 
community media 
C2 
Insufficient system of minority 
and community media   25E 
C8.1+C8.3+
C8.4+C8.9 Minority and community media 
    
C8 Insufficient system of minority and community 
media   C8.1 
Ratio of TV channels dedicated to 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total number of 
domestic TV channels 
    
C8 Insufficient system of minority and community 
media   C8.3 
Ratio of radio channels dedicated to 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total number of 
domestic radio channels 
    
C8 Insufficient system of minority and community 
media   C8.4 
Ratio of newspapers dedicated to 
ethnic/linguistic/national minorities to total number of 
domestic newspapers 
C3 
Limited accessibility by special 
needs people 
C10 Limited accessibility by special 
needs people 27S C10.1 
Guarantees for universal access to media 
regarding special needs groups  
              
G
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
l 
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 i
n
 t
h
e
 M
e
d
ia
 
G1 
Insufficient system of regional 
and local media   9L G2.9+ G2.10 
Regulatory safeguards and policies for 
regional and local media 
    G2 Insufficient system of regional and local media   G2.9 Regulatory safeguards for regional and local media 
    G2 Insufficient system of regional and local media   G2.10 
Policies and support measures for regional and local 
media 
G2 
Insufficient representation of 
regional and local communities in 
news 
G3 Insufficient representation of 
regional and local communities in 
news 10L G3.2 
Regulatory safeguards for locally oriented 
and locally produced news delivered by 
PSM channels and services 
G3 
Insufficient access to media and 
distribution systems due to 
geographic factors   11L 
G6.2+G6.4+
G6.5 
Regulatory safeguards for the universal 
coverage of the media 
    
G6 Insufficient access to media and distribution 
systems due to geographic factors   G6.2 
Regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of PSM 
channels and services 
    
G6 Insufficient access to media and distribution 
systems due to geographic factors   G6.4 
Policy measures to promote roll out of and access to 
broadband networks in remote and/or rural areas 
    
G6 Insufficient access to media and distribution 
systems due to geographic factors   G6.5 
Policies and support measures for the distribution of 
newspapers in remote areas 
G3 
Insufficient access to media and 
distribution systems due to 
geographic factors   28S G6.1+G6.3 
Guarantees for universal coverage of PSM 
and broadband networks regarding 
geographic coverage 
    
G6 Insufficient access to media and distribution 
systems due to geographic factors   G6.1 
Number of people without access to PSM because of 
geographic obstacles 
    
G6 Insufficient access to media and distribution 
systems due to geographic factors   G6.3 Availability of broadband networks in rural areas 
G4 
High centralisation of the 
national media system   26E 
G1.1+G1.3+
G2.1+G2.2+
G2.5 
Centralisation of the national media 
system 
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G1 High centralisation of the national media 
system   G1.1 
A relative strength of local/regional media (daily 
newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, news websites) 
in a particular media system 
    
G1 High centralisation of the national media 
system   G1.3 
Combined ownership of regional/local media and 
national media outlets by the same company 
    G2 Insufficient system of regional and local media   G2.1 
Proportion of regional and local television and radio 
broadcast channels to national broadcast channels 
    G2 Insufficient system of regional and local media   G2.2 
Proportion of regional and local newspapers to national 
newspapers 
    G2 Insufficient system of regional and local media   G2.5 
Estimated reach and audience share of regional and local 
media 
G5 
Insufficient quality of the digital 
infrastructure   24E   Availability and quality of broadband 
              
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 a
n
d
 M
e
d
ia
 O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
O1 
High ownership concentration in 
media   12L 
O1.3+O2.3+
O3.3+O4.3
+O6.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high 
concentration of ownership and/or control 
in media 
    O1 High ownership concentration in television   O1.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in television (horizontal) 
    O2 High ownership concentration in radio   O2.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in radio (horizontal) 
    O3 High ownership concentration in newspapers   O3.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in newspapers (horizontal) 
    
O4 High ownership concentration in 
Cable/Sat/ADSL/TV   O4.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in Cable/Sat/ADSL-TV 
(horizontal) 
    
O6 High ownership concentration in internet 
service providers (changed)   O6.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high concentration of 
ownership and/or control in internet service providers 
(horizontal) 
O1 
High ownership concentration in 
media   21E 
O1.1+O2.1+
O3.1+O6.1 Media ownership concentration 
    O1 High ownership concentration in television   O1.1 Ownership concentration in television (horizontal) 
    O2 High ownership concentration in radio   O2.1 Ownership concentration in radio (horizontal) 
    O3 High ownership concentration in newspapers   O3.1 Ownership concentration in newspapers (horizontal) 
    
O6 High ownership concentration in internet 
content provision     Ownership concentration of ISPs 
O1 
High ownership concentration in 
media   22E 
O1.2+O2.2+
O3.2+O6.2 
Media audience and readership 
concentration 
    O1 High ownership concentration in television   O1.2 Audience concentration in television 
    O2 High ownership concentration in radio   O2.2 Audience concentration in radio 
    O3 High ownership concentration in newspapers   O3.2 Readership concentration in newspapers 
    
O6 High ownership concentration in internet 
content provision     Subscription Concentration in internet services provision 
O2 
High concentration of cross-
media ownership   13L O8.2+O8.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high degree 
of cross ownership between television and 
other media 
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    O8 High concentration of cross-media ownership   O8.2 
Regulatory safeguards against high degree of cross-
ownership between radio and television 
    O8 High concentration of cross-media ownership   O8.3 
Regulatory safeguards against high degree of cross-
ownership between print (or text-based) and audio-visual 
media 
O2 
High concentration of cross-
media ownership 
O8 High concentration of cross-
media ownership 23E O8.1 
Number of sectors in which top 8 
firms/owners are active 
O3 
Lack of transparency in media 
ownership    14L 
O10.1+O10.
2 
Regulatory safeguards for transparency of 
ownership and/or control 
    O10 Lack of transparency in ownership structures   O10.1 
Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership 
and/or control towards the public 
    O10 Lack of transparency in ownership structures   O10.2 
Regulatory safeguards for transparency of ownership 
and/or control towards the relevant authorities 
              
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 i
n
 t
h
e
 M
e
d
ia
 
P1 Political bias in the media   15L 
P1.5+P1.6+
P2.3+P2.4+
P2.5 
Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced 
and impartial political reporting in media  
    P1 Political bias in the media   P1.5 
Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and impartial 
political reporting in PSM 
    P1 Political bias in the media   P2.4 
Regulatory safeguards for fair access to airtime on PSM 
channels and services by political actors during election 
campaigns 
    P1 Political bias in the media   P2.5 
Regulatory safeguards relating to political advertising in 
election campaigns 
    P1 Political bias in the media   P1.6 
Regulatory safeguards for fair and accurate political 
reporting in private radio and television broadcasting 
    
P2 Political bias in the media during election 
periods campaigns   P2.3 
Regulatory safeguards for fair, balanced and impartial 
coverage of election campaigns in radio and television 
broadcasting 
P1 Political bias in the media   29S 
P1.1+P1.2+
P2.2 
Representation of political views in the 
media 
    P1 Political bias in the media   P1.1 
Proportion of the various political and ideological 
viewpoints and interests represented (given voice) in the 
media 
    P1 Political bias in the media   P1.2 
Indication of dominant (positive or negative) media 
portrayal of specific political actors 
    
P2 Political bias in the media during election 
periods campaigns   P2.2 
Indication of the level of partisanship and political bias in 
the media during election campaigns 
P2 
Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control   16L 
P3.5+P3.6+
P4.4+P4.5+
P4.6 
Regulatory safeguards against excessive 
ownership and/or control of mainstream 
media by politicians 
    
P3 Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control   P3.5 
Regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or 
control of media by politicians 
    
P3 Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control   P3.6 
Regulatory safeguards for structural, financial, 
independence of mainstream radio and TV channels from 
political parties / politicians (in addition to editorial 
independence) 
    P4 Insufficient editorial independence   P4.4 
Regulatory safeguards for editorial independence of in 
print media from political actors 
 196 
    P4 Insufficient editorial independence   P4.5 
Regulatory safeguards for editorial independence of 
mainstream radio and television broadcast channels 
(linear AVMS) from political actors 
    P4 Insufficient editorial independence   P4.6 
Regulatory safeguards for editorial independence of 
mainstream non-linear AVMS from political actors 
P2 
Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control   30S 
P3.1+P3.2+
P7.1+P7.2 
Political control over media and 
distribution networks ownership 
  
P3 Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control   P3.1 
Public access to data about political affiliation of media 
owners 
    
P3 Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control   P3.2 
Proportion of specific political affiliations of the media 
owners across the media market in terms of audience 
share, including proportion of the media owned by 
political parties, politicians or political groupings 
    P7 Insufficient pluralism of distribution systems   P7.1 
Discrimination by politically affiliated television and radio 
distribution networks 
    P7 Insufficient pluralism of distribution systems   P7.2 
Discrimination by politically affiliated distribution 
networks for print media 
P2 
Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control 
P3 Excessive politicisation of media 
ownership/control 31S P3.4 
Political control over media funding by 
advertising 
P3 
Insufficient editorial 
independence 
P4 Insufficient editorial 
independence 32S P4.3 
Presence of professional associations 
providing advocacy for editorial 
independence and respect of professional 
standards 
P4 Insufficient independence of PSM P5 Insufficient independence of PSM 17L P5.5 
Fair, objective and transparent 
appointment procedures for PSM 
professionals and management boards 
P4 Insufficient independence of PSM P5 Insufficient independence of PSM 33S P5.2 
Level of independence of PSM 
considering mechanisms of its financing 
P5 
Insufficient pluralism of news 
agencies   34S P6.1+P6.2 
Independence and ownership of news 
agencies 
    P6 Insufficient pluralism of news agencies   P6.1 Range and independence of competing news agencies 
    P6 Insufficient pluralism of news agencies   P6.2 
Level of state ownership in news agencies and level of 
independence of state owned news agencies 
             
P
lu
ra
li
sm
 o
f 
M
e
d
ia
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d
 G
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T1 
Lack of/under-representation 
of/dominance of media types 
T1 Lack of/under-representation 
of/dominance of media types 18L T1.6 
Regulatory safeguards for the distribution 
of public interest channels on cable, DSL 
and/or satellite platforms 
T2 
Lack of sufficient resources to 
support public service media 
T4 Lack of sufficient resources to 
support public service media 19L T4.1 
Regulatory safeguards for the objective 
and independent allocation of adequate, 
consistent and sufficient financial 
resources to PSM 
        
 
